diff --git a/src/pk/dsa/dsa_verify_key.c b/src/pk/dsa/dsa_verify_key.c
index c429ce0..0f84ea0 100644
--- a/src/pk/dsa/dsa_verify_key.c
+++ b/src/pk/dsa/dsa_verify_key.c
@@ -49,33 +49,33 @@ int dsa_verify_key(dsa_key *key, int *stat)
 */
 int dsa_int_validate_pqg(dsa_key *key, int *stat)
 {
-   void *tmp, *tmp2;
+   void *tmp1, *tmp2;
    int  err;
 
    *stat = 0;
    LTC_ARGCHK(key  != NULL);
    LTC_ARGCHK(stat != NULL);
 
-   /* now make sure that g is not -1, 0 or 1 and <p */
-   if (mp_cmp_d(key->g, 0) == LTC_MP_EQ || mp_cmp_d(key->g, 1) == LTC_MP_EQ) {
+   /* FIPS 186-4 chapter 4.1: 1 < g < p */
+   if (mp_cmp_d(key->g, 1) != LTC_MP_GT || mp_cmp(key->g, key->p) != LTC_MP_LT) {
       return CRYPT_OK;
    }
-   if ((err = mp_init_multi(&tmp, &tmp2, NULL)) != CRYPT_OK)         { return err; }
-   if ((err = mp_sub_d(key->p, 1, tmp)) != CRYPT_OK)                 { goto error; }
-   if (mp_cmp(tmp, key->g) == LTC_MP_EQ || mp_cmp(key->g, key->p) != LTC_MP_LT) {
-      err = CRYPT_OK;
-      goto error;
-   }
 
-   /* now we have to make sure that g^q = 1, and that p-1/q gives 0 remainder */
-   if ((err = mp_div(tmp, key->q, tmp, tmp2)) != CRYPT_OK)           { goto error; }
+   if ((err = mp_init_multi(&tmp1, &tmp2, NULL)) != CRYPT_OK)        { return err; }
+
+   /* FIPS 186-4 chapter 4.1: q is a divisor of (p - 1) */
+   if ((err = mp_sub_d(key->p, 1, tmp1)) != CRYPT_OK)                { goto error; }
+   if ((err = mp_div(tmp1, key->q, tmp1, tmp2)) != CRYPT_OK)         { goto error; }
    if (mp_iszero(tmp2) != LTC_MP_YES) {
       err = CRYPT_OK;
       goto error;
    }
 
-   if ((err = mp_exptmod(key->g, key->q, key->p, tmp)) != CRYPT_OK)  { goto error; }
-   if (mp_cmp_d(tmp, 1) != LTC_MP_EQ) {
+   /* FIPS 186-4 chapter 4.1: g is a generator of a subgroup of order q in
+    * the multiplicative group of GF(p) - so we make sure that g^q mod p = 1
+    */
+   if ((err = mp_exptmod(key->g, key->q, key->p, tmp1)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; }
+   if (mp_cmp_d(tmp1, 1) != LTC_MP_EQ) {
       err = CRYPT_OK;
       goto error;
    }
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ int dsa_int_validate_pqg(dsa_key *key, int *stat)
    err   = CRYPT_OK;
    *stat = 1;
 error:
-   mp_clear_multi(tmp, tmp2, NULL);
+   mp_clear_multi(tmp1, tmp2, NULL);
    return err;
 }
 
@@ -150,18 +150,29 @@ int dsa_int_validate_xy(dsa_key *key, int *stat)
       goto error;
    }
 
-   /* now we have to make sure that y^q = 1, this makes sure y \in g^x mod p */
-   if ((err = mp_exptmod(key->y, key->q, key->p, tmp)) != CRYPT_OK) {
-      goto error;
-   }
-   if (mp_cmp_d(tmp, 1) != LTC_MP_EQ) {
-      err = CRYPT_OK;
-      goto error;
-   }
-
    if (key->type == PK_PRIVATE) {
-      /* x > 1 */
-      if (!(mp_cmp_d(key->x, 1) == LTC_MP_GT)) {
+      /* FIPS 186-4 chapter 4.1: 0 < x < q */
+      if (mp_cmp_d(key->x, 0) != LTC_MP_GT || mp_cmp(key->x, key->q) != LTC_MP_LT) {
+         err = CRYPT_OK;
+         goto error;
+      }
+      /* FIPS 186-4 chapter 4.1: y = g^x mod p */
+      if ((err = mp_exptmod(key->g, key->x, key->p, tmp)) != CRYPT_OK) {
+         goto error;
+      }
+      if (mp_cmp(tmp, key->y) != LTC_MP_EQ) {
+         err = CRYPT_OK;
+         goto error;
+      }
+   }
+   else {
+      /* with just a public key we cannot test y = g^x mod p therefore we
+       * only test that y^q mod p = 1, which makes sure y is in g^x mod p
+       */
+      if ((err = mp_exptmod(key->y, key->q, key->p, tmp)) != CRYPT_OK) {
+         goto error;
+      }
+      if (mp_cmp_d(tmp, 1) != LTC_MP_EQ) {
          err = CRYPT_OK;
          goto error;
       }