android_kernel_xiaomi_sm8350/security/selinux/netlabel.c

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/*
* SELinux NetLabel Support
*
* This file provides the necessary glue to tie NetLabel into the SELinux
* subsystem.
*
* Author: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
*
*/
/*
* (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2007, 2008
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See
* the GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
*
*/
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
#include <linux/ip.h>
#include <linux/ipv6.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <net/netlabel.h>
#include <net/ip.h>
#include <net/ipv6.h>
#include "objsec.h"
#include "security.h"
#include "netlabel.h"
/**
* selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached - Cache a SID lookup
* @skb: the packet
* @secattr: the NetLabel security attributes
* @sid: the SID
*
* Description:
* Query the SELinux security server to lookup the correct SID for the given
* security attributes. If the query is successful, cache the result to speed
* up future lookups. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
*
*/
static int selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
u32 *sid)
{
int rc;
rc = security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(secattr, sid);
if (rc == 0 &&
(secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHEABLE) &&
(secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE))
netlbl_cache_add(skb, secattr);
return rc;
}
/**
* selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr - Generate the NetLabel socket secattr
* @sk: the socket
*
* Description:
* Generate the NetLabel security attributes for a socket, making full use of
* the socket's attribute cache. Returns a pointer to the security attributes
* on success, NULL on failure.
*
*/
static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(struct sock *sk)
{
int rc;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
if (sksec->nlbl_secattr != NULL)
return sksec->nlbl_secattr;
secattr = netlbl_secattr_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
if (secattr == NULL)
return NULL;
rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(sksec->sid, secattr);
if (rc != 0) {
netlbl_secattr_free(secattr);
return NULL;
}
sksec->nlbl_secattr = secattr;
return secattr;
}
/**
* selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate - Invalidate the NetLabel cache
*
* Description:
* Invalidate the NetLabel security attribute mapping cache.
*
*/
void selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(void)
{
netlbl_cache_invalidate();
}
/**
* selinux_netlbl_err - Handle a NetLabel packet error
* @skb: the packet
* @error: the error code
* @gateway: true if host is acting as a gateway, false otherwise
*
* Description:
* When a packet is dropped due to a call to avc_has_perm() pass the error
* code to the NetLabel subsystem so any protocol specific processing can be
* done. This is safe to call even if you are unsure if NetLabel labeling is
* present on the packet, NetLabel is smart enough to only act when it should.
*
*/
void selinux_netlbl_err(struct sk_buff *skb, int error, int gateway)
{
netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, error, gateway);
}
/**
* selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free - Free the NetLabel fields
* @sssec: the sk_security_struct
*
* Description:
* Free all of the memory in the NetLabel fields of a sk_security_struct.
*
*/
void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(struct sk_security_struct *ssec)
{
if (ssec->nlbl_secattr != NULL)
netlbl_secattr_free(ssec->nlbl_secattr);
}
/**
* selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset - Reset the NetLabel fields
* @ssec: the sk_security_struct
* @family: the socket family
*
* Description:
* Called when the NetLabel state of a sk_security_struct needs to be reset.
* The caller is responsibile for all the NetLabel sk_security_struct locking.
*
*/
netlabel: Label incoming TCP connections correctly in SELinux The current NetLabel/SELinux behavior for incoming TCP connections works but only through a series of happy coincidences that rely on the limited nature of standard CIPSO (only able to convey MLS attributes) and the write equality imposed by the SELinux MLS constraints. The problem is that network sockets created as the result of an incoming TCP connection were not on-the-wire labeled based on the security attributes of the parent socket but rather based on the wire label of the remote peer. The issue had to do with how IP options were managed as part of the network stack and where the LSM hooks were in relation to the code which set the IP options on these newly created child sockets. While NetLabel/SELinux did correctly set the socket's on-the-wire label it was promptly cleared by the network stack and reset based on the IP options of the remote peer. This patch, in conjunction with a prior patch that adjusted the LSM hook locations, works to set the correct on-the-wire label format for new incoming connections through the security_inet_conn_request() hook. Besides the correct behavior there are many advantages to this change, the most significant is that all of the NetLabel socket labeling code in SELinux now lives in hooks which can return error codes to the core stack which allows us to finally get ride of the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() logic which greatly simplfies the NetLabel/SELinux glue code. In the process of developing this patch I also ran into a small handful of AF_INET6 cleanliness issues that have been fixed which should make the code safer and easier to extend in the future. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-27 17:10:34 -04:00
void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(struct sk_security_struct *ssec)
{
netlabel: Label incoming TCP connections correctly in SELinux The current NetLabel/SELinux behavior for incoming TCP connections works but only through a series of happy coincidences that rely on the limited nature of standard CIPSO (only able to convey MLS attributes) and the write equality imposed by the SELinux MLS constraints. The problem is that network sockets created as the result of an incoming TCP connection were not on-the-wire labeled based on the security attributes of the parent socket but rather based on the wire label of the remote peer. The issue had to do with how IP options were managed as part of the network stack and where the LSM hooks were in relation to the code which set the IP options on these newly created child sockets. While NetLabel/SELinux did correctly set the socket's on-the-wire label it was promptly cleared by the network stack and reset based on the IP options of the remote peer. This patch, in conjunction with a prior patch that adjusted the LSM hook locations, works to set the correct on-the-wire label format for new incoming connections through the security_inet_conn_request() hook. Besides the correct behavior there are many advantages to this change, the most significant is that all of the NetLabel socket labeling code in SELinux now lives in hooks which can return error codes to the core stack which allows us to finally get ride of the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() logic which greatly simplfies the NetLabel/SELinux glue code. In the process of developing this patch I also ran into a small handful of AF_INET6 cleanliness issues that have been fixed which should make the code safer and easier to extend in the future. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-27 17:10:34 -04:00
ssec->nlbl_state = NLBL_UNSET;
}
/**
* selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid - Get the sid of a packet using NetLabel
* @skb: the packet
* @family: protocol family
* @type: NetLabel labeling protocol type
* @sid: the SID
*
* Description:
* Call the NetLabel mechanism to get the security attributes of the given
* packet and use those attributes to determine the correct context/SID to
* assign to the packet. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
*
*/
int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
u16 family,
u32 *type,
u32 *sid)
{
int rc;
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
if (!netlbl_enabled()) {
*sid = SECSID_NULL;
return 0;
}
netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
if (rc == 0 && secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE)
rc = selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(skb, &secattr, sid);
else
*sid = SECSID_NULL;
*type = secattr.type;
netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
return rc;
}
/**
* selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid - Set the NetLabel on a packet given a sid
* @skb: the packet
* @family: protocol family
* @sid: the SID
*
* Description
* Call the NetLabel mechanism to set the label of a packet using @sid.
* Returns zero on auccess, negative values on failure.
*
*/
int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
u16 family,
u32 sid)
{
int rc;
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr_storage;
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr = NULL;
struct sock *sk;
/* if this is a locally generated packet check to see if it is already
* being labeled by it's parent socket, if it is just exit */
sk = skb->sk;
if (sk != NULL) {
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB)
return 0;
secattr = sksec->nlbl_secattr;
}
if (secattr == NULL) {
secattr = &secattr_storage;
netlbl_secattr_init(secattr);
rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(sid, secattr);
if (rc != 0)
goto skbuff_setsid_return;
}
rc = netlbl_skbuff_setattr(skb, family, secattr);
skbuff_setsid_return:
if (secattr == &secattr_storage)
netlbl_secattr_destroy(secattr);
return rc;
}
/**
netlabel: Label incoming TCP connections correctly in SELinux The current NetLabel/SELinux behavior for incoming TCP connections works but only through a series of happy coincidences that rely on the limited nature of standard CIPSO (only able to convey MLS attributes) and the write equality imposed by the SELinux MLS constraints. The problem is that network sockets created as the result of an incoming TCP connection were not on-the-wire labeled based on the security attributes of the parent socket but rather based on the wire label of the remote peer. The issue had to do with how IP options were managed as part of the network stack and where the LSM hooks were in relation to the code which set the IP options on these newly created child sockets. While NetLabel/SELinux did correctly set the socket's on-the-wire label it was promptly cleared by the network stack and reset based on the IP options of the remote peer. This patch, in conjunction with a prior patch that adjusted the LSM hook locations, works to set the correct on-the-wire label format for new incoming connections through the security_inet_conn_request() hook. Besides the correct behavior there are many advantages to this change, the most significant is that all of the NetLabel socket labeling code in SELinux now lives in hooks which can return error codes to the core stack which allows us to finally get ride of the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() logic which greatly simplfies the NetLabel/SELinux glue code. In the process of developing this patch I also ran into a small handful of AF_INET6 cleanliness issues that have been fixed which should make the code safer and easier to extend in the future. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-27 17:10:34 -04:00
* selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request - Label an incoming stream connection
* @req: incoming connection request socket
*
* Description:
netlabel: Label incoming TCP connections correctly in SELinux The current NetLabel/SELinux behavior for incoming TCP connections works but only through a series of happy coincidences that rely on the limited nature of standard CIPSO (only able to convey MLS attributes) and the write equality imposed by the SELinux MLS constraints. The problem is that network sockets created as the result of an incoming TCP connection were not on-the-wire labeled based on the security attributes of the parent socket but rather based on the wire label of the remote peer. The issue had to do with how IP options were managed as part of the network stack and where the LSM hooks were in relation to the code which set the IP options on these newly created child sockets. While NetLabel/SELinux did correctly set the socket's on-the-wire label it was promptly cleared by the network stack and reset based on the IP options of the remote peer. This patch, in conjunction with a prior patch that adjusted the LSM hook locations, works to set the correct on-the-wire label format for new incoming connections through the security_inet_conn_request() hook. Besides the correct behavior there are many advantages to this change, the most significant is that all of the NetLabel socket labeling code in SELinux now lives in hooks which can return error codes to the core stack which allows us to finally get ride of the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() logic which greatly simplfies the NetLabel/SELinux glue code. In the process of developing this patch I also ran into a small handful of AF_INET6 cleanliness issues that have been fixed which should make the code safer and easier to extend in the future. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-27 17:10:34 -04:00
* A new incoming connection request is represented by @req, we need to label
* the new request_sock here and the stack will ensure the on-the-wire label
* will get preserved when a full sock is created once the connection handshake
* is complete. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
*
*/
netlabel: Label incoming TCP connections correctly in SELinux The current NetLabel/SELinux behavior for incoming TCP connections works but only through a series of happy coincidences that rely on the limited nature of standard CIPSO (only able to convey MLS attributes) and the write equality imposed by the SELinux MLS constraints. The problem is that network sockets created as the result of an incoming TCP connection were not on-the-wire labeled based on the security attributes of the parent socket but rather based on the wire label of the remote peer. The issue had to do with how IP options were managed as part of the network stack and where the LSM hooks were in relation to the code which set the IP options on these newly created child sockets. While NetLabel/SELinux did correctly set the socket's on-the-wire label it was promptly cleared by the network stack and reset based on the IP options of the remote peer. This patch, in conjunction with a prior patch that adjusted the LSM hook locations, works to set the correct on-the-wire label format for new incoming connections through the security_inet_conn_request() hook. Besides the correct behavior there are many advantages to this change, the most significant is that all of the NetLabel socket labeling code in SELinux now lives in hooks which can return error codes to the core stack which allows us to finally get ride of the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() logic which greatly simplfies the NetLabel/SELinux glue code. In the process of developing this patch I also ran into a small handful of AF_INET6 cleanliness issues that have been fixed which should make the code safer and easier to extend in the future. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-27 17:10:34 -04:00
int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req, u16 family)
{
int rc;
netlabel: Label incoming TCP connections correctly in SELinux The current NetLabel/SELinux behavior for incoming TCP connections works but only through a series of happy coincidences that rely on the limited nature of standard CIPSO (only able to convey MLS attributes) and the write equality imposed by the SELinux MLS constraints. The problem is that network sockets created as the result of an incoming TCP connection were not on-the-wire labeled based on the security attributes of the parent socket but rather based on the wire label of the remote peer. The issue had to do with how IP options were managed as part of the network stack and where the LSM hooks were in relation to the code which set the IP options on these newly created child sockets. While NetLabel/SELinux did correctly set the socket's on-the-wire label it was promptly cleared by the network stack and reset based on the IP options of the remote peer. This patch, in conjunction with a prior patch that adjusted the LSM hook locations, works to set the correct on-the-wire label format for new incoming connections through the security_inet_conn_request() hook. Besides the correct behavior there are many advantages to this change, the most significant is that all of the NetLabel socket labeling code in SELinux now lives in hooks which can return error codes to the core stack which allows us to finally get ride of the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() logic which greatly simplfies the NetLabel/SELinux glue code. In the process of developing this patch I also ran into a small handful of AF_INET6 cleanliness issues that have been fixed which should make the code safer and easier to extend in the future. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-27 17:10:34 -04:00
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
netlabel: Label incoming TCP connections correctly in SELinux The current NetLabel/SELinux behavior for incoming TCP connections works but only through a series of happy coincidences that rely on the limited nature of standard CIPSO (only able to convey MLS attributes) and the write equality imposed by the SELinux MLS constraints. The problem is that network sockets created as the result of an incoming TCP connection were not on-the-wire labeled based on the security attributes of the parent socket but rather based on the wire label of the remote peer. The issue had to do with how IP options were managed as part of the network stack and where the LSM hooks were in relation to the code which set the IP options on these newly created child sockets. While NetLabel/SELinux did correctly set the socket's on-the-wire label it was promptly cleared by the network stack and reset based on the IP options of the remote peer. This patch, in conjunction with a prior patch that adjusted the LSM hook locations, works to set the correct on-the-wire label format for new incoming connections through the security_inet_conn_request() hook. Besides the correct behavior there are many advantages to this change, the most significant is that all of the NetLabel socket labeling code in SELinux now lives in hooks which can return error codes to the core stack which allows us to finally get ride of the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() logic which greatly simplfies the NetLabel/SELinux glue code. In the process of developing this patch I also ran into a small handful of AF_INET6 cleanliness issues that have been fixed which should make the code safer and easier to extend in the future. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-27 17:10:34 -04:00
if (family != PF_INET)
return 0;
netlabel: Label incoming TCP connections correctly in SELinux The current NetLabel/SELinux behavior for incoming TCP connections works but only through a series of happy coincidences that rely on the limited nature of standard CIPSO (only able to convey MLS attributes) and the write equality imposed by the SELinux MLS constraints. The problem is that network sockets created as the result of an incoming TCP connection were not on-the-wire labeled based on the security attributes of the parent socket but rather based on the wire label of the remote peer. The issue had to do with how IP options were managed as part of the network stack and where the LSM hooks were in relation to the code which set the IP options on these newly created child sockets. While NetLabel/SELinux did correctly set the socket's on-the-wire label it was promptly cleared by the network stack and reset based on the IP options of the remote peer. This patch, in conjunction with a prior patch that adjusted the LSM hook locations, works to set the correct on-the-wire label format for new incoming connections through the security_inet_conn_request() hook. Besides the correct behavior there are many advantages to this change, the most significant is that all of the NetLabel socket labeling code in SELinux now lives in hooks which can return error codes to the core stack which allows us to finally get ride of the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() logic which greatly simplfies the NetLabel/SELinux glue code. In the process of developing this patch I also ran into a small handful of AF_INET6 cleanliness issues that have been fixed which should make the code safer and easier to extend in the future. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-27 17:10:34 -04:00
netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(req->secid, &secattr);
if (rc != 0)
goto inet_conn_request_return;
rc = netlbl_req_setattr(req, &secattr);
inet_conn_request_return:
netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
return rc;
}
/**
netlabel: Label incoming TCP connections correctly in SELinux The current NetLabel/SELinux behavior for incoming TCP connections works but only through a series of happy coincidences that rely on the limited nature of standard CIPSO (only able to convey MLS attributes) and the write equality imposed by the SELinux MLS constraints. The problem is that network sockets created as the result of an incoming TCP connection were not on-the-wire labeled based on the security attributes of the parent socket but rather based on the wire label of the remote peer. The issue had to do with how IP options were managed as part of the network stack and where the LSM hooks were in relation to the code which set the IP options on these newly created child sockets. While NetLabel/SELinux did correctly set the socket's on-the-wire label it was promptly cleared by the network stack and reset based on the IP options of the remote peer. This patch, in conjunction with a prior patch that adjusted the LSM hook locations, works to set the correct on-the-wire label format for new incoming connections through the security_inet_conn_request() hook. Besides the correct behavior there are many advantages to this change, the most significant is that all of the NetLabel socket labeling code in SELinux now lives in hooks which can return error codes to the core stack which allows us to finally get ride of the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() logic which greatly simplfies the NetLabel/SELinux glue code. In the process of developing this patch I also ran into a small handful of AF_INET6 cleanliness issues that have been fixed which should make the code safer and easier to extend in the future. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-27 17:10:34 -04:00
* selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone - Initialize the newly created sock
* @sk: the new sock
*
* Description:
netlabel: Label incoming TCP connections correctly in SELinux The current NetLabel/SELinux behavior for incoming TCP connections works but only through a series of happy coincidences that rely on the limited nature of standard CIPSO (only able to convey MLS attributes) and the write equality imposed by the SELinux MLS constraints. The problem is that network sockets created as the result of an incoming TCP connection were not on-the-wire labeled based on the security attributes of the parent socket but rather based on the wire label of the remote peer. The issue had to do with how IP options were managed as part of the network stack and where the LSM hooks were in relation to the code which set the IP options on these newly created child sockets. While NetLabel/SELinux did correctly set the socket's on-the-wire label it was promptly cleared by the network stack and reset based on the IP options of the remote peer. This patch, in conjunction with a prior patch that adjusted the LSM hook locations, works to set the correct on-the-wire label format for new incoming connections through the security_inet_conn_request() hook. Besides the correct behavior there are many advantages to this change, the most significant is that all of the NetLabel socket labeling code in SELinux now lives in hooks which can return error codes to the core stack which allows us to finally get ride of the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() logic which greatly simplfies the NetLabel/SELinux glue code. In the process of developing this patch I also ran into a small handful of AF_INET6 cleanliness issues that have been fixed which should make the code safer and easier to extend in the future. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-27 17:10:34 -04:00
* A new connection has been established using @sk, we've already labeled the
* socket via the request_sock struct in selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request() but
* we need to set the NetLabel state here since we now have a sock structure.
*
*/
netlabel: Label incoming TCP connections correctly in SELinux The current NetLabel/SELinux behavior for incoming TCP connections works but only through a series of happy coincidences that rely on the limited nature of standard CIPSO (only able to convey MLS attributes) and the write equality imposed by the SELinux MLS constraints. The problem is that network sockets created as the result of an incoming TCP connection were not on-the-wire labeled based on the security attributes of the parent socket but rather based on the wire label of the remote peer. The issue had to do with how IP options were managed as part of the network stack and where the LSM hooks were in relation to the code which set the IP options on these newly created child sockets. While NetLabel/SELinux did correctly set the socket's on-the-wire label it was promptly cleared by the network stack and reset based on the IP options of the remote peer. This patch, in conjunction with a prior patch that adjusted the LSM hook locations, works to set the correct on-the-wire label format for new incoming connections through the security_inet_conn_request() hook. Besides the correct behavior there are many advantages to this change, the most significant is that all of the NetLabel socket labeling code in SELinux now lives in hooks which can return error codes to the core stack which allows us to finally get ride of the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() logic which greatly simplfies the NetLabel/SELinux glue code. In the process of developing this patch I also ran into a small handful of AF_INET6 cleanliness issues that have been fixed which should make the code safer and easier to extend in the future. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-27 17:10:34 -04:00
void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
{
netlabel: Label incoming TCP connections correctly in SELinux The current NetLabel/SELinux behavior for incoming TCP connections works but only through a series of happy coincidences that rely on the limited nature of standard CIPSO (only able to convey MLS attributes) and the write equality imposed by the SELinux MLS constraints. The problem is that network sockets created as the result of an incoming TCP connection were not on-the-wire labeled based on the security attributes of the parent socket but rather based on the wire label of the remote peer. The issue had to do with how IP options were managed as part of the network stack and where the LSM hooks were in relation to the code which set the IP options on these newly created child sockets. While NetLabel/SELinux did correctly set the socket's on-the-wire label it was promptly cleared by the network stack and reset based on the IP options of the remote peer. This patch, in conjunction with a prior patch that adjusted the LSM hook locations, works to set the correct on-the-wire label format for new incoming connections through the security_inet_conn_request() hook. Besides the correct behavior there are many advantages to this change, the most significant is that all of the NetLabel socket labeling code in SELinux now lives in hooks which can return error codes to the core stack which allows us to finally get ride of the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() logic which greatly simplfies the NetLabel/SELinux glue code. In the process of developing this patch I also ran into a small handful of AF_INET6 cleanliness issues that have been fixed which should make the code safer and easier to extend in the future. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-27 17:10:34 -04:00
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
if (family == PF_INET)
sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED;
else
sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_UNSET;
}
/**
netlabel: Label incoming TCP connections correctly in SELinux The current NetLabel/SELinux behavior for incoming TCP connections works but only through a series of happy coincidences that rely on the limited nature of standard CIPSO (only able to convey MLS attributes) and the write equality imposed by the SELinux MLS constraints. The problem is that network sockets created as the result of an incoming TCP connection were not on-the-wire labeled based on the security attributes of the parent socket but rather based on the wire label of the remote peer. The issue had to do with how IP options were managed as part of the network stack and where the LSM hooks were in relation to the code which set the IP options on these newly created child sockets. While NetLabel/SELinux did correctly set the socket's on-the-wire label it was promptly cleared by the network stack and reset based on the IP options of the remote peer. This patch, in conjunction with a prior patch that adjusted the LSM hook locations, works to set the correct on-the-wire label format for new incoming connections through the security_inet_conn_request() hook. Besides the correct behavior there are many advantages to this change, the most significant is that all of the NetLabel socket labeling code in SELinux now lives in hooks which can return error codes to the core stack which allows us to finally get ride of the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() logic which greatly simplfies the NetLabel/SELinux glue code. In the process of developing this patch I also ran into a small handful of AF_INET6 cleanliness issues that have been fixed which should make the code safer and easier to extend in the future. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-27 17:10:34 -04:00
* selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create - Label a socket using NetLabel
* @sock: the socket to label
* @family: protocol family
*
* Description:
netlabel: Label incoming TCP connections correctly in SELinux The current NetLabel/SELinux behavior for incoming TCP connections works but only through a series of happy coincidences that rely on the limited nature of standard CIPSO (only able to convey MLS attributes) and the write equality imposed by the SELinux MLS constraints. The problem is that network sockets created as the result of an incoming TCP connection were not on-the-wire labeled based on the security attributes of the parent socket but rather based on the wire label of the remote peer. The issue had to do with how IP options were managed as part of the network stack and where the LSM hooks were in relation to the code which set the IP options on these newly created child sockets. While NetLabel/SELinux did correctly set the socket's on-the-wire label it was promptly cleared by the network stack and reset based on the IP options of the remote peer. This patch, in conjunction with a prior patch that adjusted the LSM hook locations, works to set the correct on-the-wire label format for new incoming connections through the security_inet_conn_request() hook. Besides the correct behavior there are many advantages to this change, the most significant is that all of the NetLabel socket labeling code in SELinux now lives in hooks which can return error codes to the core stack which allows us to finally get ride of the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() logic which greatly simplfies the NetLabel/SELinux glue code. In the process of developing this patch I also ran into a small handful of AF_INET6 cleanliness issues that have been fixed which should make the code safer and easier to extend in the future. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-27 17:10:34 -04:00
* Attempt to label a socket using the NetLabel mechanism using the given
* SID. Returns zero values on success, negative values on failure.
*
*/
netlabel: Label incoming TCP connections correctly in SELinux The current NetLabel/SELinux behavior for incoming TCP connections works but only through a series of happy coincidences that rely on the limited nature of standard CIPSO (only able to convey MLS attributes) and the write equality imposed by the SELinux MLS constraints. The problem is that network sockets created as the result of an incoming TCP connection were not on-the-wire labeled based on the security attributes of the parent socket but rather based on the wire label of the remote peer. The issue had to do with how IP options were managed as part of the network stack and where the LSM hooks were in relation to the code which set the IP options on these newly created child sockets. While NetLabel/SELinux did correctly set the socket's on-the-wire label it was promptly cleared by the network stack and reset based on the IP options of the remote peer. This patch, in conjunction with a prior patch that adjusted the LSM hook locations, works to set the correct on-the-wire label format for new incoming connections through the security_inet_conn_request() hook. Besides the correct behavior there are many advantages to this change, the most significant is that all of the NetLabel socket labeling code in SELinux now lives in hooks which can return error codes to the core stack which allows us to finally get ride of the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() logic which greatly simplfies the NetLabel/SELinux glue code. In the process of developing this patch I also ran into a small handful of AF_INET6 cleanliness issues that have been fixed which should make the code safer and easier to extend in the future. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-27 17:10:34 -04:00
int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
{
int rc;
netlabel: Label incoming TCP connections correctly in SELinux The current NetLabel/SELinux behavior for incoming TCP connections works but only through a series of happy coincidences that rely on the limited nature of standard CIPSO (only able to convey MLS attributes) and the write equality imposed by the SELinux MLS constraints. The problem is that network sockets created as the result of an incoming TCP connection were not on-the-wire labeled based on the security attributes of the parent socket but rather based on the wire label of the remote peer. The issue had to do with how IP options were managed as part of the network stack and where the LSM hooks were in relation to the code which set the IP options on these newly created child sockets. While NetLabel/SELinux did correctly set the socket's on-the-wire label it was promptly cleared by the network stack and reset based on the IP options of the remote peer. This patch, in conjunction with a prior patch that adjusted the LSM hook locations, works to set the correct on-the-wire label format for new incoming connections through the security_inet_conn_request() hook. Besides the correct behavior there are many advantages to this change, the most significant is that all of the NetLabel socket labeling code in SELinux now lives in hooks which can return error codes to the core stack which allows us to finally get ride of the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() logic which greatly simplfies the NetLabel/SELinux glue code. In the process of developing this patch I also ran into a small handful of AF_INET6 cleanliness issues that have been fixed which should make the code safer and easier to extend in the future. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-27 17:10:34 -04:00
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
netlabel: Label incoming TCP connections correctly in SELinux The current NetLabel/SELinux behavior for incoming TCP connections works but only through a series of happy coincidences that rely on the limited nature of standard CIPSO (only able to convey MLS attributes) and the write equality imposed by the SELinux MLS constraints. The problem is that network sockets created as the result of an incoming TCP connection were not on-the-wire labeled based on the security attributes of the parent socket but rather based on the wire label of the remote peer. The issue had to do with how IP options were managed as part of the network stack and where the LSM hooks were in relation to the code which set the IP options on these newly created child sockets. While NetLabel/SELinux did correctly set the socket's on-the-wire label it was promptly cleared by the network stack and reset based on the IP options of the remote peer. This patch, in conjunction with a prior patch that adjusted the LSM hook locations, works to set the correct on-the-wire label format for new incoming connections through the security_inet_conn_request() hook. Besides the correct behavior there are many advantages to this change, the most significant is that all of the NetLabel socket labeling code in SELinux now lives in hooks which can return error codes to the core stack which allows us to finally get ride of the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() logic which greatly simplfies the NetLabel/SELinux glue code. In the process of developing this patch I also ran into a small handful of AF_INET6 cleanliness issues that have been fixed which should make the code safer and easier to extend in the future. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-27 17:10:34 -04:00
if (family != PF_INET)
return 0;
netlabel: Label incoming TCP connections correctly in SELinux The current NetLabel/SELinux behavior for incoming TCP connections works but only through a series of happy coincidences that rely on the limited nature of standard CIPSO (only able to convey MLS attributes) and the write equality imposed by the SELinux MLS constraints. The problem is that network sockets created as the result of an incoming TCP connection were not on-the-wire labeled based on the security attributes of the parent socket but rather based on the wire label of the remote peer. The issue had to do with how IP options were managed as part of the network stack and where the LSM hooks were in relation to the code which set the IP options on these newly created child sockets. While NetLabel/SELinux did correctly set the socket's on-the-wire label it was promptly cleared by the network stack and reset based on the IP options of the remote peer. This patch, in conjunction with a prior patch that adjusted the LSM hook locations, works to set the correct on-the-wire label format for new incoming connections through the security_inet_conn_request() hook. Besides the correct behavior there are many advantages to this change, the most significant is that all of the NetLabel socket labeling code in SELinux now lives in hooks which can return error codes to the core stack which allows us to finally get ride of the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() logic which greatly simplfies the NetLabel/SELinux glue code. In the process of developing this patch I also ran into a small handful of AF_INET6 cleanliness issues that have been fixed which should make the code safer and easier to extend in the future. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-27 17:10:34 -04:00
secattr = selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(sk);
if (secattr == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, family, secattr);
switch (rc) {
case 0:
sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED;
break;
case -EDESTADDRREQ:
sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_REQSKB;
rc = 0;
netlabel: Label incoming TCP connections correctly in SELinux The current NetLabel/SELinux behavior for incoming TCP connections works but only through a series of happy coincidences that rely on the limited nature of standard CIPSO (only able to convey MLS attributes) and the write equality imposed by the SELinux MLS constraints. The problem is that network sockets created as the result of an incoming TCP connection were not on-the-wire labeled based on the security attributes of the parent socket but rather based on the wire label of the remote peer. The issue had to do with how IP options were managed as part of the network stack and where the LSM hooks were in relation to the code which set the IP options on these newly created child sockets. While NetLabel/SELinux did correctly set the socket's on-the-wire label it was promptly cleared by the network stack and reset based on the IP options of the remote peer. This patch, in conjunction with a prior patch that adjusted the LSM hook locations, works to set the correct on-the-wire label format for new incoming connections through the security_inet_conn_request() hook. Besides the correct behavior there are many advantages to this change, the most significant is that all of the NetLabel socket labeling code in SELinux now lives in hooks which can return error codes to the core stack which allows us to finally get ride of the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() logic which greatly simplfies the NetLabel/SELinux glue code. In the process of developing this patch I also ran into a small handful of AF_INET6 cleanliness issues that have been fixed which should make the code safer and easier to extend in the future. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-27 17:10:34 -04:00
break;
}
return rc;
}
/**
* selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb - Do an inbound access check using NetLabel
* @sksec: the sock's sk_security_struct
* @skb: the packet
* @family: protocol family
* @ad: the audit data
*
* Description:
* Fetch the NetLabel security attributes from @skb and perform an access check
* against the receiving socket. Returns zero on success, negative values on
* error.
*
*/
int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
struct sk_buff *skb,
u16 family,
struct avc_audit_data *ad)
{
int rc;
u32 nlbl_sid;
u32 perm;
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
if (!netlbl_enabled())
return 0;
netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
if (rc == 0 && secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE)
rc = selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(skb, &secattr, &nlbl_sid);
else
nlbl_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
if (rc != 0)
return rc;
switch (sksec->sclass) {
case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
break;
case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
break;
default:
perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
}
rc = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, nlbl_sid, sksec->sclass, perm, ad);
if (rc == 0)
return 0;
if (nlbl_sid != SECINITSID_UNLABELED)
netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc, 0);
return rc;
}
/**
* selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt - Do not allow users to remove a NetLabel
* @sock: the socket
* @level: the socket level or protocol
* @optname: the socket option name
*
* Description:
* Check the setsockopt() call and if the user is trying to replace the IP
* options on a socket and a NetLabel is in place for the socket deny the
* access; otherwise allow the access. Returns zero when the access is
* allowed, -EACCES when denied, and other negative values on error.
*
*/
int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
int level,
int optname)
{
int rc = 0;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
if (level == IPPROTO_IP && optname == IP_OPTIONS &&
(sksec->nlbl_state == NLBL_LABELED ||
sksec->nlbl_state == NLBL_CONNLABELED)) {
netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
lock_sock(sk);
rc = netlbl_sock_getattr(sk, &secattr);
release_sock(sk);
if (rc == 0)
rc = -EACCES;
else if (rc == -ENOMSG)
rc = 0;
netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
}
return rc;
}
/**
* selinux_netlbl_socket_connect - Label a client-side socket on connect
* @sk: the socket to label
* @addr: the destination address
*
* Description:
* Attempt to label a connected socket with NetLabel using the given address.
* Returns zero values on success, negative values on failure.
*
*/
int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr)
{
int rc;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB &&
sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_CONNLABELED)
return 0;
local_bh_disable();
bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
/* connected sockets are allowed to disconnect when the address family
* is set to AF_UNSPEC, if that is what is happening we want to reset
* the socket */
if (addr->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC) {
netlbl_sock_delattr(sk);
sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_REQSKB;
rc = 0;
goto socket_connect_return;
}
secattr = selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(sk);
if (secattr == NULL) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto socket_connect_return;
}
rc = netlbl_conn_setattr(sk, addr, secattr);
if (rc == 0)
sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_CONNLABELED;
socket_connect_return:
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
local_bh_enable();
return rc;
}