2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* This is <linux/capability.h>
|
|
|
|
*
|
Implement file posix capabilities
Implement file posix capabilities. This allows programs to be given a
subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them, without having to use
setuid and giving the binary all of root's powers.
This version works with Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools, found at
http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php. For more information on how to use this
patch, Chris Friedhoff has posted a nice page at
http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.
Changelog:
Nov 27:
Incorporate fixes from Andrew Morton
(security-introduce-file-caps-tweaks and
security-introduce-file-caps-warning-fix)
Fix Kconfig dependency.
Fix change signaling behavior when file caps are not compiled in.
Nov 13:
Integrate comments from Alexey: Remove CONFIG_ ifdef from
capability.h, and use %zd for printing a size_t.
Nov 13:
Fix endianness warnings by sparse as suggested by Alexey
Dobriyan.
Nov 09:
Address warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security
when file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean
up the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper
function.
Nov 08:
For pointers to required userspace tools and how to use
them, see http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.
Nov 07:
Fix the calculation of the highest bit checked in
check_cap_sanity().
Nov 07:
Allow file caps to be enabled without CONFIG_SECURITY, since
capabilities are the default.
Hook cap_task_setscheduler when !CONFIG_SECURITY.
Move capable(TASK_KILL) to end of cap_task_kill to reduce
audit messages.
Nov 05:
Add secondary calls in selinux/hooks.c to task_setioprio and
task_setscheduler so that selinux and capabilities with file
cap support can be stacked.
Sep 05:
As Seth Arnold points out, uid checks are out of place
for capability code.
Sep 01:
Define task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, cap_task_kill, and
task_setnice to make sure a user cannot affect a process in which
they called a program with some fscaps.
One remaining question is the note under task_setscheduler: are we
ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being sufficient to confine a process to a
cpuset?
It is a semantic change, as without fsccaps, attach_task doesn't
allow CAP_SYS_NICE to override the uid equivalence check. But since
it uses security_task_setscheduler, which elsewhere is used where
CAP_SYS_NICE can be used to override the uid equivalence check,
fixing it might be tough.
task_setscheduler
note: this also controls cpuset:attach_task. Are we ok with
CAP_SYS_NICE being used to confine to a cpuset?
task_setioprio
task_setnice
sys_setpriority uses this (through set_one_prio) for another
process. Need same checks as setrlimit
Aug 21:
Updated secureexec implementation to reflect the fact that
euid and uid might be the same and nonzero, but the process
might still have elevated caps.
Aug 15:
Handle endianness of xattrs.
Enforce capability version match between kernel and disk.
Enforce that no bits beyond the known max capability are
set, else return -EPERM.
With this extra processing, it may be worth reconsidering
doing all the work at bprm_set_security rather than
d_instantiate.
Aug 10:
Always call getxattr at bprm_set_security, rather than
caching it at d_instantiate.
[morgan@kernel.org: file-caps clean up for linux/capability.h]
[bunk@kernel.org: unexport cap_inode_killpriv]
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-17 02:31:36 -04:00
|
|
|
* Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
* Alexander Kjeldaas <astor@guardian.no>
|
|
|
|
* with help from Aleph1, Roland Buresund and Andrew Main.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* See here for the libcap library ("POSIX draft" compliance):
|
|
|
|
*
|
Implement file posix capabilities
Implement file posix capabilities. This allows programs to be given a
subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them, without having to use
setuid and giving the binary all of root's powers.
This version works with Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools, found at
http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php. For more information on how to use this
patch, Chris Friedhoff has posted a nice page at
http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.
Changelog:
Nov 27:
Incorporate fixes from Andrew Morton
(security-introduce-file-caps-tweaks and
security-introduce-file-caps-warning-fix)
Fix Kconfig dependency.
Fix change signaling behavior when file caps are not compiled in.
Nov 13:
Integrate comments from Alexey: Remove CONFIG_ ifdef from
capability.h, and use %zd for printing a size_t.
Nov 13:
Fix endianness warnings by sparse as suggested by Alexey
Dobriyan.
Nov 09:
Address warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security
when file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean
up the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper
function.
Nov 08:
For pointers to required userspace tools and how to use
them, see http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.
Nov 07:
Fix the calculation of the highest bit checked in
check_cap_sanity().
Nov 07:
Allow file caps to be enabled without CONFIG_SECURITY, since
capabilities are the default.
Hook cap_task_setscheduler when !CONFIG_SECURITY.
Move capable(TASK_KILL) to end of cap_task_kill to reduce
audit messages.
Nov 05:
Add secondary calls in selinux/hooks.c to task_setioprio and
task_setscheduler so that selinux and capabilities with file
cap support can be stacked.
Sep 05:
As Seth Arnold points out, uid checks are out of place
for capability code.
Sep 01:
Define task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, cap_task_kill, and
task_setnice to make sure a user cannot affect a process in which
they called a program with some fscaps.
One remaining question is the note under task_setscheduler: are we
ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being sufficient to confine a process to a
cpuset?
It is a semantic change, as without fsccaps, attach_task doesn't
allow CAP_SYS_NICE to override the uid equivalence check. But since
it uses security_task_setscheduler, which elsewhere is used where
CAP_SYS_NICE can be used to override the uid equivalence check,
fixing it might be tough.
task_setscheduler
note: this also controls cpuset:attach_task. Are we ok with
CAP_SYS_NICE being used to confine to a cpuset?
task_setioprio
task_setnice
sys_setpriority uses this (through set_one_prio) for another
process. Need same checks as setrlimit
Aug 21:
Updated secureexec implementation to reflect the fact that
euid and uid might be the same and nonzero, but the process
might still have elevated caps.
Aug 15:
Handle endianness of xattrs.
Enforce capability version match between kernel and disk.
Enforce that no bits beyond the known max capability are
set, else return -EPERM.
With this extra processing, it may be worth reconsidering
doing all the work at bprm_set_security rather than
d_instantiate.
Aug 10:
Always call getxattr at bprm_set_security, rather than
caching it at d_instantiate.
[morgan@kernel.org: file-caps clean up for linux/capability.h]
[bunk@kernel.org: unexport cap_inode_killpriv]
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-17 02:31:36 -04:00
|
|
|
* ftp://linux.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.6/
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
|
|
|
|
#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/types.h>
|
|
|
|
|
2007-05-23 16:57:39 -04:00
|
|
|
struct task_struct;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
/* User-level do most of the mapping between kernel and user
|
|
|
|
capabilities based on the version tag given by the kernel. The
|
|
|
|
kernel might be somewhat backwards compatible, but don't bet on
|
|
|
|
it. */
|
|
|
|
|
2008-02-05 01:29:42 -05:00
|
|
|
/* Note, cap_t, is defined by POSIX (draft) to be an "opaque" pointer to
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
a set of three capability sets. The transposition of 3*the
|
|
|
|
following structure to such a composite is better handled in a user
|
|
|
|
library since the draft standard requires the use of malloc/free
|
|
|
|
etc.. */
|
Implement file posix capabilities
Implement file posix capabilities. This allows programs to be given a
subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them, without having to use
setuid and giving the binary all of root's powers.
This version works with Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools, found at
http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php. For more information on how to use this
patch, Chris Friedhoff has posted a nice page at
http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.
Changelog:
Nov 27:
Incorporate fixes from Andrew Morton
(security-introduce-file-caps-tweaks and
security-introduce-file-caps-warning-fix)
Fix Kconfig dependency.
Fix change signaling behavior when file caps are not compiled in.
Nov 13:
Integrate comments from Alexey: Remove CONFIG_ ifdef from
capability.h, and use %zd for printing a size_t.
Nov 13:
Fix endianness warnings by sparse as suggested by Alexey
Dobriyan.
Nov 09:
Address warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security
when file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean
up the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper
function.
Nov 08:
For pointers to required userspace tools and how to use
them, see http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.
Nov 07:
Fix the calculation of the highest bit checked in
check_cap_sanity().
Nov 07:
Allow file caps to be enabled without CONFIG_SECURITY, since
capabilities are the default.
Hook cap_task_setscheduler when !CONFIG_SECURITY.
Move capable(TASK_KILL) to end of cap_task_kill to reduce
audit messages.
Nov 05:
Add secondary calls in selinux/hooks.c to task_setioprio and
task_setscheduler so that selinux and capabilities with file
cap support can be stacked.
Sep 05:
As Seth Arnold points out, uid checks are out of place
for capability code.
Sep 01:
Define task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, cap_task_kill, and
task_setnice to make sure a user cannot affect a process in which
they called a program with some fscaps.
One remaining question is the note under task_setscheduler: are we
ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being sufficient to confine a process to a
cpuset?
It is a semantic change, as without fsccaps, attach_task doesn't
allow CAP_SYS_NICE to override the uid equivalence check. But since
it uses security_task_setscheduler, which elsewhere is used where
CAP_SYS_NICE can be used to override the uid equivalence check,
fixing it might be tough.
task_setscheduler
note: this also controls cpuset:attach_task. Are we ok with
CAP_SYS_NICE being used to confine to a cpuset?
task_setioprio
task_setnice
sys_setpriority uses this (through set_one_prio) for another
process. Need same checks as setrlimit
Aug 21:
Updated secureexec implementation to reflect the fact that
euid and uid might be the same and nonzero, but the process
might still have elevated caps.
Aug 15:
Handle endianness of xattrs.
Enforce capability version match between kernel and disk.
Enforce that no bits beyond the known max capability are
set, else return -EPERM.
With this extra processing, it may be worth reconsidering
doing all the work at bprm_set_security rather than
d_instantiate.
Aug 10:
Always call getxattr at bprm_set_security, rather than
caching it at d_instantiate.
[morgan@kernel.org: file-caps clean up for linux/capability.h]
[bunk@kernel.org: unexport cap_inode_killpriv]
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-17 02:31:36 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2008-02-05 01:29:42 -05:00
|
|
|
#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1 0x19980330
|
|
|
|
#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_1 1
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_2 0x20071026
|
|
|
|
#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_2 2
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_2
|
|
|
|
#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_2
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
typedef struct __user_cap_header_struct {
|
|
|
|
__u32 version;
|
|
|
|
int pid;
|
|
|
|
} __user *cap_user_header_t;
|
Implement file posix capabilities
Implement file posix capabilities. This allows programs to be given a
subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them, without having to use
setuid and giving the binary all of root's powers.
This version works with Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools, found at
http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php. For more information on how to use this
patch, Chris Friedhoff has posted a nice page at
http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.
Changelog:
Nov 27:
Incorporate fixes from Andrew Morton
(security-introduce-file-caps-tweaks and
security-introduce-file-caps-warning-fix)
Fix Kconfig dependency.
Fix change signaling behavior when file caps are not compiled in.
Nov 13:
Integrate comments from Alexey: Remove CONFIG_ ifdef from
capability.h, and use %zd for printing a size_t.
Nov 13:
Fix endianness warnings by sparse as suggested by Alexey
Dobriyan.
Nov 09:
Address warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security
when file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean
up the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper
function.
Nov 08:
For pointers to required userspace tools and how to use
them, see http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.
Nov 07:
Fix the calculation of the highest bit checked in
check_cap_sanity().
Nov 07:
Allow file caps to be enabled without CONFIG_SECURITY, since
capabilities are the default.
Hook cap_task_setscheduler when !CONFIG_SECURITY.
Move capable(TASK_KILL) to end of cap_task_kill to reduce
audit messages.
Nov 05:
Add secondary calls in selinux/hooks.c to task_setioprio and
task_setscheduler so that selinux and capabilities with file
cap support can be stacked.
Sep 05:
As Seth Arnold points out, uid checks are out of place
for capability code.
Sep 01:
Define task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, cap_task_kill, and
task_setnice to make sure a user cannot affect a process in which
they called a program with some fscaps.
One remaining question is the note under task_setscheduler: are we
ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being sufficient to confine a process to a
cpuset?
It is a semantic change, as without fsccaps, attach_task doesn't
allow CAP_SYS_NICE to override the uid equivalence check. But since
it uses security_task_setscheduler, which elsewhere is used where
CAP_SYS_NICE can be used to override the uid equivalence check,
fixing it might be tough.
task_setscheduler
note: this also controls cpuset:attach_task. Are we ok with
CAP_SYS_NICE being used to confine to a cpuset?
task_setioprio
task_setnice
sys_setpriority uses this (through set_one_prio) for another
process. Need same checks as setrlimit
Aug 21:
Updated secureexec implementation to reflect the fact that
euid and uid might be the same and nonzero, but the process
might still have elevated caps.
Aug 15:
Handle endianness of xattrs.
Enforce capability version match between kernel and disk.
Enforce that no bits beyond the known max capability are
set, else return -EPERM.
With this extra processing, it may be worth reconsidering
doing all the work at bprm_set_security rather than
d_instantiate.
Aug 10:
Always call getxattr at bprm_set_security, rather than
caching it at d_instantiate.
[morgan@kernel.org: file-caps clean up for linux/capability.h]
[bunk@kernel.org: unexport cap_inode_killpriv]
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-17 02:31:36 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
typedef struct __user_cap_data_struct {
|
|
|
|
__u32 effective;
|
|
|
|
__u32 permitted;
|
|
|
|
__u32 inheritable;
|
|
|
|
} __user *cap_user_data_t;
|
|
|
|
|
2008-02-05 01:29:42 -05:00
|
|
|
|
Implement file posix capabilities
Implement file posix capabilities. This allows programs to be given a
subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them, without having to use
setuid and giving the binary all of root's powers.
This version works with Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools, found at
http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php. For more information on how to use this
patch, Chris Friedhoff has posted a nice page at
http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.
Changelog:
Nov 27:
Incorporate fixes from Andrew Morton
(security-introduce-file-caps-tweaks and
security-introduce-file-caps-warning-fix)
Fix Kconfig dependency.
Fix change signaling behavior when file caps are not compiled in.
Nov 13:
Integrate comments from Alexey: Remove CONFIG_ ifdef from
capability.h, and use %zd for printing a size_t.
Nov 13:
Fix endianness warnings by sparse as suggested by Alexey
Dobriyan.
Nov 09:
Address warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security
when file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean
up the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper
function.
Nov 08:
For pointers to required userspace tools and how to use
them, see http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.
Nov 07:
Fix the calculation of the highest bit checked in
check_cap_sanity().
Nov 07:
Allow file caps to be enabled without CONFIG_SECURITY, since
capabilities are the default.
Hook cap_task_setscheduler when !CONFIG_SECURITY.
Move capable(TASK_KILL) to end of cap_task_kill to reduce
audit messages.
Nov 05:
Add secondary calls in selinux/hooks.c to task_setioprio and
task_setscheduler so that selinux and capabilities with file
cap support can be stacked.
Sep 05:
As Seth Arnold points out, uid checks are out of place
for capability code.
Sep 01:
Define task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, cap_task_kill, and
task_setnice to make sure a user cannot affect a process in which
they called a program with some fscaps.
One remaining question is the note under task_setscheduler: are we
ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being sufficient to confine a process to a
cpuset?
It is a semantic change, as without fsccaps, attach_task doesn't
allow CAP_SYS_NICE to override the uid equivalence check. But since
it uses security_task_setscheduler, which elsewhere is used where
CAP_SYS_NICE can be used to override the uid equivalence check,
fixing it might be tough.
task_setscheduler
note: this also controls cpuset:attach_task. Are we ok with
CAP_SYS_NICE being used to confine to a cpuset?
task_setioprio
task_setnice
sys_setpriority uses this (through set_one_prio) for another
process. Need same checks as setrlimit
Aug 21:
Updated secureexec implementation to reflect the fact that
euid and uid might be the same and nonzero, but the process
might still have elevated caps.
Aug 15:
Handle endianness of xattrs.
Enforce capability version match between kernel and disk.
Enforce that no bits beyond the known max capability are
set, else return -EPERM.
With this extra processing, it may be worth reconsidering
doing all the work at bprm_set_security rather than
d_instantiate.
Aug 10:
Always call getxattr at bprm_set_security, rather than
caching it at d_instantiate.
[morgan@kernel.org: file-caps clean up for linux/capability.h]
[bunk@kernel.org: unexport cap_inode_killpriv]
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-17 02:31:36 -04:00
|
|
|
#define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability"
|
|
|
|
#define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK 0xFF000000
|
2008-02-05 01:29:42 -05:00
|
|
|
#define VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK ~VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK
|
|
|
|
#define VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE 0x000001
|
|
|
|
|
Implement file posix capabilities
Implement file posix capabilities. This allows programs to be given a
subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them, without having to use
setuid and giving the binary all of root's powers.
This version works with Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools, found at
http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php. For more information on how to use this
patch, Chris Friedhoff has posted a nice page at
http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.
Changelog:
Nov 27:
Incorporate fixes from Andrew Morton
(security-introduce-file-caps-tweaks and
security-introduce-file-caps-warning-fix)
Fix Kconfig dependency.
Fix change signaling behavior when file caps are not compiled in.
Nov 13:
Integrate comments from Alexey: Remove CONFIG_ ifdef from
capability.h, and use %zd for printing a size_t.
Nov 13:
Fix endianness warnings by sparse as suggested by Alexey
Dobriyan.
Nov 09:
Address warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security
when file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean
up the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper
function.
Nov 08:
For pointers to required userspace tools and how to use
them, see http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.
Nov 07:
Fix the calculation of the highest bit checked in
check_cap_sanity().
Nov 07:
Allow file caps to be enabled without CONFIG_SECURITY, since
capabilities are the default.
Hook cap_task_setscheduler when !CONFIG_SECURITY.
Move capable(TASK_KILL) to end of cap_task_kill to reduce
audit messages.
Nov 05:
Add secondary calls in selinux/hooks.c to task_setioprio and
task_setscheduler so that selinux and capabilities with file
cap support can be stacked.
Sep 05:
As Seth Arnold points out, uid checks are out of place
for capability code.
Sep 01:
Define task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, cap_task_kill, and
task_setnice to make sure a user cannot affect a process in which
they called a program with some fscaps.
One remaining question is the note under task_setscheduler: are we
ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being sufficient to confine a process to a
cpuset?
It is a semantic change, as without fsccaps, attach_task doesn't
allow CAP_SYS_NICE to override the uid equivalence check. But since
it uses security_task_setscheduler, which elsewhere is used where
CAP_SYS_NICE can be used to override the uid equivalence check,
fixing it might be tough.
task_setscheduler
note: this also controls cpuset:attach_task. Are we ok with
CAP_SYS_NICE being used to confine to a cpuset?
task_setioprio
task_setnice
sys_setpriority uses this (through set_one_prio) for another
process. Need same checks as setrlimit
Aug 21:
Updated secureexec implementation to reflect the fact that
euid and uid might be the same and nonzero, but the process
might still have elevated caps.
Aug 15:
Handle endianness of xattrs.
Enforce capability version match between kernel and disk.
Enforce that no bits beyond the known max capability are
set, else return -EPERM.
With this extra processing, it may be worth reconsidering
doing all the work at bprm_set_security rather than
d_instantiate.
Aug 10:
Always call getxattr at bprm_set_security, rather than
caching it at d_instantiate.
[morgan@kernel.org: file-caps clean up for linux/capability.h]
[bunk@kernel.org: unexport cap_inode_killpriv]
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-17 02:31:36 -04:00
|
|
|
#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_1 0x01000000
|
2008-02-05 01:29:42 -05:00
|
|
|
#define VFS_CAP_U32_1 1
|
|
|
|
#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ_1 (sizeof(__le32)*(1 + 2*VFS_CAP_U32_1))
|
Implement file posix capabilities
Implement file posix capabilities. This allows programs to be given a
subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them, without having to use
setuid and giving the binary all of root's powers.
This version works with Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools, found at
http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php. For more information on how to use this
patch, Chris Friedhoff has posted a nice page at
http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.
Changelog:
Nov 27:
Incorporate fixes from Andrew Morton
(security-introduce-file-caps-tweaks and
security-introduce-file-caps-warning-fix)
Fix Kconfig dependency.
Fix change signaling behavior when file caps are not compiled in.
Nov 13:
Integrate comments from Alexey: Remove CONFIG_ ifdef from
capability.h, and use %zd for printing a size_t.
Nov 13:
Fix endianness warnings by sparse as suggested by Alexey
Dobriyan.
Nov 09:
Address warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security
when file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean
up the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper
function.
Nov 08:
For pointers to required userspace tools and how to use
them, see http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.
Nov 07:
Fix the calculation of the highest bit checked in
check_cap_sanity().
Nov 07:
Allow file caps to be enabled without CONFIG_SECURITY, since
capabilities are the default.
Hook cap_task_setscheduler when !CONFIG_SECURITY.
Move capable(TASK_KILL) to end of cap_task_kill to reduce
audit messages.
Nov 05:
Add secondary calls in selinux/hooks.c to task_setioprio and
task_setscheduler so that selinux and capabilities with file
cap support can be stacked.
Sep 05:
As Seth Arnold points out, uid checks are out of place
for capability code.
Sep 01:
Define task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, cap_task_kill, and
task_setnice to make sure a user cannot affect a process in which
they called a program with some fscaps.
One remaining question is the note under task_setscheduler: are we
ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being sufficient to confine a process to a
cpuset?
It is a semantic change, as without fsccaps, attach_task doesn't
allow CAP_SYS_NICE to override the uid equivalence check. But since
it uses security_task_setscheduler, which elsewhere is used where
CAP_SYS_NICE can be used to override the uid equivalence check,
fixing it might be tough.
task_setscheduler
note: this also controls cpuset:attach_task. Are we ok with
CAP_SYS_NICE being used to confine to a cpuset?
task_setioprio
task_setnice
sys_setpriority uses this (through set_one_prio) for another
process. Need same checks as setrlimit
Aug 21:
Updated secureexec implementation to reflect the fact that
euid and uid might be the same and nonzero, but the process
might still have elevated caps.
Aug 15:
Handle endianness of xattrs.
Enforce capability version match between kernel and disk.
Enforce that no bits beyond the known max capability are
set, else return -EPERM.
With this extra processing, it may be worth reconsidering
doing all the work at bprm_set_security rather than
d_instantiate.
Aug 10:
Always call getxattr at bprm_set_security, rather than
caching it at d_instantiate.
[morgan@kernel.org: file-caps clean up for linux/capability.h]
[bunk@kernel.org: unexport cap_inode_killpriv]
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-17 02:31:36 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2008-02-05 01:29:42 -05:00
|
|
|
#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_2 0x02000000
|
|
|
|
#define VFS_CAP_U32_2 2
|
|
|
|
#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2 (sizeof(__le32)*(1 + 2*VFS_CAP_U32_2))
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2
|
|
|
|
#define VFS_CAP_U32 VFS_CAP_U32_2
|
|
|
|
#define VFS_CAP_REVISION VFS_CAP_REVISION_2
|
Implement file posix capabilities
Implement file posix capabilities. This allows programs to be given a
subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them, without having to use
setuid and giving the binary all of root's powers.
This version works with Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools, found at
http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php. For more information on how to use this
patch, Chris Friedhoff has posted a nice page at
http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.
Changelog:
Nov 27:
Incorporate fixes from Andrew Morton
(security-introduce-file-caps-tweaks and
security-introduce-file-caps-warning-fix)
Fix Kconfig dependency.
Fix change signaling behavior when file caps are not compiled in.
Nov 13:
Integrate comments from Alexey: Remove CONFIG_ ifdef from
capability.h, and use %zd for printing a size_t.
Nov 13:
Fix endianness warnings by sparse as suggested by Alexey
Dobriyan.
Nov 09:
Address warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security
when file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean
up the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper
function.
Nov 08:
For pointers to required userspace tools and how to use
them, see http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.
Nov 07:
Fix the calculation of the highest bit checked in
check_cap_sanity().
Nov 07:
Allow file caps to be enabled without CONFIG_SECURITY, since
capabilities are the default.
Hook cap_task_setscheduler when !CONFIG_SECURITY.
Move capable(TASK_KILL) to end of cap_task_kill to reduce
audit messages.
Nov 05:
Add secondary calls in selinux/hooks.c to task_setioprio and
task_setscheduler so that selinux and capabilities with file
cap support can be stacked.
Sep 05:
As Seth Arnold points out, uid checks are out of place
for capability code.
Sep 01:
Define task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, cap_task_kill, and
task_setnice to make sure a user cannot affect a process in which
they called a program with some fscaps.
One remaining question is the note under task_setscheduler: are we
ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being sufficient to confine a process to a
cpuset?
It is a semantic change, as without fsccaps, attach_task doesn't
allow CAP_SYS_NICE to override the uid equivalence check. But since
it uses security_task_setscheduler, which elsewhere is used where
CAP_SYS_NICE can be used to override the uid equivalence check,
fixing it might be tough.
task_setscheduler
note: this also controls cpuset:attach_task. Are we ok with
CAP_SYS_NICE being used to confine to a cpuset?
task_setioprio
task_setnice
sys_setpriority uses this (through set_one_prio) for another
process. Need same checks as setrlimit
Aug 21:
Updated secureexec implementation to reflect the fact that
euid and uid might be the same and nonzero, but the process
might still have elevated caps.
Aug 15:
Handle endianness of xattrs.
Enforce capability version match between kernel and disk.
Enforce that no bits beyond the known max capability are
set, else return -EPERM.
With this extra processing, it may be worth reconsidering
doing all the work at bprm_set_security rather than
d_instantiate.
Aug 10:
Always call getxattr at bprm_set_security, rather than
caching it at d_instantiate.
[morgan@kernel.org: file-caps clean up for linux/capability.h]
[bunk@kernel.org: unexport cap_inode_killpriv]
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-17 02:31:36 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct vfs_cap_data {
|
2008-02-05 01:29:42 -05:00
|
|
|
__le32 magic_etc; /* Little endian */
|
2008-02-05 01:29:41 -05:00
|
|
|
struct {
|
2008-02-05 01:29:42 -05:00
|
|
|
__le32 permitted; /* Little endian */
|
|
|
|
__le32 inheritable; /* Little endian */
|
|
|
|
} data[VFS_CAP_U32];
|
Implement file posix capabilities
Implement file posix capabilities. This allows programs to be given a
subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them, without having to use
setuid and giving the binary all of root's powers.
This version works with Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools, found at
http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php. For more information on how to use this
patch, Chris Friedhoff has posted a nice page at
http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.
Changelog:
Nov 27:
Incorporate fixes from Andrew Morton
(security-introduce-file-caps-tweaks and
security-introduce-file-caps-warning-fix)
Fix Kconfig dependency.
Fix change signaling behavior when file caps are not compiled in.
Nov 13:
Integrate comments from Alexey: Remove CONFIG_ ifdef from
capability.h, and use %zd for printing a size_t.
Nov 13:
Fix endianness warnings by sparse as suggested by Alexey
Dobriyan.
Nov 09:
Address warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security
when file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean
up the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper
function.
Nov 08:
For pointers to required userspace tools and how to use
them, see http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.
Nov 07:
Fix the calculation of the highest bit checked in
check_cap_sanity().
Nov 07:
Allow file caps to be enabled without CONFIG_SECURITY, since
capabilities are the default.
Hook cap_task_setscheduler when !CONFIG_SECURITY.
Move capable(TASK_KILL) to end of cap_task_kill to reduce
audit messages.
Nov 05:
Add secondary calls in selinux/hooks.c to task_setioprio and
task_setscheduler so that selinux and capabilities with file
cap support can be stacked.
Sep 05:
As Seth Arnold points out, uid checks are out of place
for capability code.
Sep 01:
Define task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, cap_task_kill, and
task_setnice to make sure a user cannot affect a process in which
they called a program with some fscaps.
One remaining question is the note under task_setscheduler: are we
ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being sufficient to confine a process to a
cpuset?
It is a semantic change, as without fsccaps, attach_task doesn't
allow CAP_SYS_NICE to override the uid equivalence check. But since
it uses security_task_setscheduler, which elsewhere is used where
CAP_SYS_NICE can be used to override the uid equivalence check,
fixing it might be tough.
task_setscheduler
note: this also controls cpuset:attach_task. Are we ok with
CAP_SYS_NICE being used to confine to a cpuset?
task_setioprio
task_setnice
sys_setpriority uses this (through set_one_prio) for another
process. Need same checks as setrlimit
Aug 21:
Updated secureexec implementation to reflect the fact that
euid and uid might be the same and nonzero, but the process
might still have elevated caps.
Aug 15:
Handle endianness of xattrs.
Enforce capability version match between kernel and disk.
Enforce that no bits beyond the known max capability are
set, else return -EPERM.
With this extra processing, it may be worth reconsidering
doing all the work at bprm_set_security rather than
d_instantiate.
Aug 10:
Always call getxattr at bprm_set_security, rather than
caching it at d_instantiate.
[morgan@kernel.org: file-caps clean up for linux/capability.h]
[bunk@kernel.org: unexport cap_inode_killpriv]
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-17 02:31:36 -04:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef __KERNEL__
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {
|
2008-02-05 01:29:42 -05:00
|
|
|
__u32 cap[_LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S];
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
} kernel_cap_t;
|
|
|
|
|
2008-02-05 01:29:42 -05:00
|
|
|
#define _USER_CAP_HEADER_SIZE (sizeof(struct __user_cap_header_struct))
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
#define _KERNEL_CAP_T_SIZE (sizeof(kernel_cap_t))
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
Implement file posix capabilities
Implement file posix capabilities. This allows programs to be given a
subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them, without having to use
setuid and giving the binary all of root's powers.
This version works with Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools, found at
http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php. For more information on how to use this
patch, Chris Friedhoff has posted a nice page at
http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.
Changelog:
Nov 27:
Incorporate fixes from Andrew Morton
(security-introduce-file-caps-tweaks and
security-introduce-file-caps-warning-fix)
Fix Kconfig dependency.
Fix change signaling behavior when file caps are not compiled in.
Nov 13:
Integrate comments from Alexey: Remove CONFIG_ ifdef from
capability.h, and use %zd for printing a size_t.
Nov 13:
Fix endianness warnings by sparse as suggested by Alexey
Dobriyan.
Nov 09:
Address warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security
when file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean
up the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper
function.
Nov 08:
For pointers to required userspace tools and how to use
them, see http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.
Nov 07:
Fix the calculation of the highest bit checked in
check_cap_sanity().
Nov 07:
Allow file caps to be enabled without CONFIG_SECURITY, since
capabilities are the default.
Hook cap_task_setscheduler when !CONFIG_SECURITY.
Move capable(TASK_KILL) to end of cap_task_kill to reduce
audit messages.
Nov 05:
Add secondary calls in selinux/hooks.c to task_setioprio and
task_setscheduler so that selinux and capabilities with file
cap support can be stacked.
Sep 05:
As Seth Arnold points out, uid checks are out of place
for capability code.
Sep 01:
Define task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, cap_task_kill, and
task_setnice to make sure a user cannot affect a process in which
they called a program with some fscaps.
One remaining question is the note under task_setscheduler: are we
ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being sufficient to confine a process to a
cpuset?
It is a semantic change, as without fsccaps, attach_task doesn't
allow CAP_SYS_NICE to override the uid equivalence check. But since
it uses security_task_setscheduler, which elsewhere is used where
CAP_SYS_NICE can be used to override the uid equivalence check,
fixing it might be tough.
task_setscheduler
note: this also controls cpuset:attach_task. Are we ok with
CAP_SYS_NICE being used to confine to a cpuset?
task_setioprio
task_setnice
sys_setpriority uses this (through set_one_prio) for another
process. Need same checks as setrlimit
Aug 21:
Updated secureexec implementation to reflect the fact that
euid and uid might be the same and nonzero, but the process
might still have elevated caps.
Aug 15:
Handle endianness of xattrs.
Enforce capability version match between kernel and disk.
Enforce that no bits beyond the known max capability are
set, else return -EPERM.
With this extra processing, it may be worth reconsidering
doing all the work at bprm_set_security rather than
d_instantiate.
Aug 10:
Always call getxattr at bprm_set_security, rather than
caching it at d_instantiate.
[morgan@kernel.org: file-caps clean up for linux/capability.h]
[bunk@kernel.org: unexport cap_inode_killpriv]
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-17 02:31:36 -04:00
|
|
|
** POSIX-draft defined capabilities.
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
**/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* In a system with the [_POSIX_CHOWN_RESTRICTED] option defined, this
|
|
|
|
overrides the restriction of changing file ownership and group
|
|
|
|
ownership. */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_CHOWN 0
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Override all DAC access, including ACL execute access if
|
|
|
|
[_POSIX_ACL] is defined. Excluding DAC access covered by
|
|
|
|
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE. */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE 1
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Overrides all DAC restrictions regarding read and search on files
|
|
|
|
and directories, including ACL restrictions if [_POSIX_ACL] is
|
|
|
|
defined. Excluding DAC access covered by CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE. */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH 2
|
Implement file posix capabilities
Implement file posix capabilities. This allows programs to be given a
subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them, without having to use
setuid and giving the binary all of root's powers.
This version works with Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools, found at
http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php. For more information on how to use this
patch, Chris Friedhoff has posted a nice page at
http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.
Changelog:
Nov 27:
Incorporate fixes from Andrew Morton
(security-introduce-file-caps-tweaks and
security-introduce-file-caps-warning-fix)
Fix Kconfig dependency.
Fix change signaling behavior when file caps are not compiled in.
Nov 13:
Integrate comments from Alexey: Remove CONFIG_ ifdef from
capability.h, and use %zd for printing a size_t.
Nov 13:
Fix endianness warnings by sparse as suggested by Alexey
Dobriyan.
Nov 09:
Address warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security
when file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean
up the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper
function.
Nov 08:
For pointers to required userspace tools and how to use
them, see http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.
Nov 07:
Fix the calculation of the highest bit checked in
check_cap_sanity().
Nov 07:
Allow file caps to be enabled without CONFIG_SECURITY, since
capabilities are the default.
Hook cap_task_setscheduler when !CONFIG_SECURITY.
Move capable(TASK_KILL) to end of cap_task_kill to reduce
audit messages.
Nov 05:
Add secondary calls in selinux/hooks.c to task_setioprio and
task_setscheduler so that selinux and capabilities with file
cap support can be stacked.
Sep 05:
As Seth Arnold points out, uid checks are out of place
for capability code.
Sep 01:
Define task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, cap_task_kill, and
task_setnice to make sure a user cannot affect a process in which
they called a program with some fscaps.
One remaining question is the note under task_setscheduler: are we
ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being sufficient to confine a process to a
cpuset?
It is a semantic change, as without fsccaps, attach_task doesn't
allow CAP_SYS_NICE to override the uid equivalence check. But since
it uses security_task_setscheduler, which elsewhere is used where
CAP_SYS_NICE can be used to override the uid equivalence check,
fixing it might be tough.
task_setscheduler
note: this also controls cpuset:attach_task. Are we ok with
CAP_SYS_NICE being used to confine to a cpuset?
task_setioprio
task_setnice
sys_setpriority uses this (through set_one_prio) for another
process. Need same checks as setrlimit
Aug 21:
Updated secureexec implementation to reflect the fact that
euid and uid might be the same and nonzero, but the process
might still have elevated caps.
Aug 15:
Handle endianness of xattrs.
Enforce capability version match between kernel and disk.
Enforce that no bits beyond the known max capability are
set, else return -EPERM.
With this extra processing, it may be worth reconsidering
doing all the work at bprm_set_security rather than
d_instantiate.
Aug 10:
Always call getxattr at bprm_set_security, rather than
caching it at d_instantiate.
[morgan@kernel.org: file-caps clean up for linux/capability.h]
[bunk@kernel.org: unexport cap_inode_killpriv]
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-17 02:31:36 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
/* Overrides all restrictions about allowed operations on files, where
|
|
|
|
file owner ID must be equal to the user ID, except where CAP_FSETID
|
|
|
|
is applicable. It doesn't override MAC and DAC restrictions. */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_FOWNER 3
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Overrides the following restrictions that the effective user ID
|
|
|
|
shall match the file owner ID when setting the S_ISUID and S_ISGID
|
|
|
|
bits on that file; that the effective group ID (or one of the
|
|
|
|
supplementary group IDs) shall match the file owner ID when setting
|
|
|
|
the S_ISGID bit on that file; that the S_ISUID and S_ISGID bits are
|
|
|
|
cleared on successful return from chown(2) (not implemented). */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_FSETID 4
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Overrides the restriction that the real or effective user ID of a
|
|
|
|
process sending a signal must match the real or effective user ID
|
|
|
|
of the process receiving the signal. */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_KILL 5
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Allows setgid(2) manipulation */
|
|
|
|
/* Allows setgroups(2) */
|
|
|
|
/* Allows forged gids on socket credentials passing. */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_SETGID 6
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Allows set*uid(2) manipulation (including fsuid). */
|
|
|
|
/* Allows forged pids on socket credentials passing. */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_SETUID 7
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
** Linux-specific capabilities
|
|
|
|
**/
|
|
|
|
|
2008-02-05 01:29:42 -05:00
|
|
|
/* Without VFS support for capabilities:
|
|
|
|
* Transfer any capability in your permitted set to any pid,
|
|
|
|
* remove any capability in your permitted set from any pid
|
|
|
|
* With VFS support for capabilities (neither of above, but)
|
|
|
|
* Add any capability to the current process' inheritable set
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_SETPCAP 8
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Allow modification of S_IMMUTABLE and S_APPEND file attributes */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE 9
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Allows binding to TCP/UDP sockets below 1024 */
|
|
|
|
/* Allows binding to ATM VCIs below 32 */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE 10
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Allow broadcasting, listen to multicast */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_NET_BROADCAST 11
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Allow interface configuration */
|
|
|
|
/* Allow administration of IP firewall, masquerading and accounting */
|
|
|
|
/* Allow setting debug option on sockets */
|
|
|
|
/* Allow modification of routing tables */
|
|
|
|
/* Allow setting arbitrary process / process group ownership on
|
|
|
|
sockets */
|
|
|
|
/* Allow binding to any address for transparent proxying */
|
|
|
|
/* Allow setting TOS (type of service) */
|
|
|
|
/* Allow setting promiscuous mode */
|
|
|
|
/* Allow clearing driver statistics */
|
|
|
|
/* Allow multicasting */
|
|
|
|
/* Allow read/write of device-specific registers */
|
|
|
|
/* Allow activation of ATM control sockets */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_NET_ADMIN 12
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Allow use of RAW sockets */
|
|
|
|
/* Allow use of PACKET sockets */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_NET_RAW 13
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Allow locking of shared memory segments */
|
|
|
|
/* Allow mlock and mlockall (which doesn't really have anything to do
|
|
|
|
with IPC) */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_IPC_LOCK 14
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Override IPC ownership checks */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_IPC_OWNER 15
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Insert and remove kernel modules - modify kernel without limit */
|
|
|
|
/* Modify cap_bset */
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_SYS_MODULE 16
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Allow ioperm/iopl access */
|
|
|
|
/* Allow sending USB messages to any device via /proc/bus/usb */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_SYS_RAWIO 17
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Allow use of chroot() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_SYS_CHROOT 18
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Allow ptrace() of any process */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_SYS_PTRACE 19
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Allow configuration of process accounting */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_SYS_PACCT 20
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Allow configuration of the secure attention key */
|
|
|
|
/* Allow administration of the random device */
|
|
|
|
/* Allow examination and configuration of disk quotas */
|
|
|
|
/* Allow configuring the kernel's syslog (printk behaviour) */
|
|
|
|
/* Allow setting the domainname */
|
|
|
|
/* Allow setting the hostname */
|
|
|
|
/* Allow calling bdflush() */
|
|
|
|
/* Allow mount() and umount(), setting up new smb connection */
|
|
|
|
/* Allow some autofs root ioctls */
|
|
|
|
/* Allow nfsservctl */
|
|
|
|
/* Allow VM86_REQUEST_IRQ */
|
|
|
|
/* Allow to read/write pci config on alpha */
|
|
|
|
/* Allow irix_prctl on mips (setstacksize) */
|
|
|
|
/* Allow flushing all cache on m68k (sys_cacheflush) */
|
|
|
|
/* Allow removing semaphores */
|
|
|
|
/* Used instead of CAP_CHOWN to "chown" IPC message queues, semaphores
|
|
|
|
and shared memory */
|
|
|
|
/* Allow locking/unlocking of shared memory segment */
|
|
|
|
/* Allow turning swap on/off */
|
|
|
|
/* Allow forged pids on socket credentials passing */
|
|
|
|
/* Allow setting readahead and flushing buffers on block devices */
|
|
|
|
/* Allow setting geometry in floppy driver */
|
|
|
|
/* Allow turning DMA on/off in xd driver */
|
|
|
|
/* Allow administration of md devices (mostly the above, but some
|
|
|
|
extra ioctls) */
|
|
|
|
/* Allow tuning the ide driver */
|
|
|
|
/* Allow access to the nvram device */
|
|
|
|
/* Allow administration of apm_bios, serial and bttv (TV) device */
|
|
|
|
/* Allow manufacturer commands in isdn CAPI support driver */
|
|
|
|
/* Allow reading non-standardized portions of pci configuration space */
|
|
|
|
/* Allow DDI debug ioctl on sbpcd driver */
|
|
|
|
/* Allow setting up serial ports */
|
|
|
|
/* Allow sending raw qic-117 commands */
|
|
|
|
/* Allow enabling/disabling tagged queuing on SCSI controllers and sending
|
|
|
|
arbitrary SCSI commands */
|
|
|
|
/* Allow setting encryption key on loopback filesystem */
|
2005-09-03 18:54:50 -04:00
|
|
|
/* Allow setting zone reclaim policy */
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_SYS_ADMIN 21
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Allow use of reboot() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_SYS_BOOT 22
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Allow raising priority and setting priority on other (different
|
|
|
|
UID) processes */
|
|
|
|
/* Allow use of FIFO and round-robin (realtime) scheduling on own
|
|
|
|
processes and setting the scheduling algorithm used by another
|
|
|
|
process. */
|
|
|
|
/* Allow setting cpu affinity on other processes */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_SYS_NICE 23
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Override resource limits. Set resource limits. */
|
|
|
|
/* Override quota limits. */
|
|
|
|
/* Override reserved space on ext2 filesystem */
|
|
|
|
/* Modify data journaling mode on ext3 filesystem (uses journaling
|
|
|
|
resources) */
|
Implement file posix capabilities
Implement file posix capabilities. This allows programs to be given a
subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them, without having to use
setuid and giving the binary all of root's powers.
This version works with Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools, found at
http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php. For more information on how to use this
patch, Chris Friedhoff has posted a nice page at
http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.
Changelog:
Nov 27:
Incorporate fixes from Andrew Morton
(security-introduce-file-caps-tweaks and
security-introduce-file-caps-warning-fix)
Fix Kconfig dependency.
Fix change signaling behavior when file caps are not compiled in.
Nov 13:
Integrate comments from Alexey: Remove CONFIG_ ifdef from
capability.h, and use %zd for printing a size_t.
Nov 13:
Fix endianness warnings by sparse as suggested by Alexey
Dobriyan.
Nov 09:
Address warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security
when file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean
up the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper
function.
Nov 08:
For pointers to required userspace tools and how to use
them, see http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.
Nov 07:
Fix the calculation of the highest bit checked in
check_cap_sanity().
Nov 07:
Allow file caps to be enabled without CONFIG_SECURITY, since
capabilities are the default.
Hook cap_task_setscheduler when !CONFIG_SECURITY.
Move capable(TASK_KILL) to end of cap_task_kill to reduce
audit messages.
Nov 05:
Add secondary calls in selinux/hooks.c to task_setioprio and
task_setscheduler so that selinux and capabilities with file
cap support can be stacked.
Sep 05:
As Seth Arnold points out, uid checks are out of place
for capability code.
Sep 01:
Define task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, cap_task_kill, and
task_setnice to make sure a user cannot affect a process in which
they called a program with some fscaps.
One remaining question is the note under task_setscheduler: are we
ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being sufficient to confine a process to a
cpuset?
It is a semantic change, as without fsccaps, attach_task doesn't
allow CAP_SYS_NICE to override the uid equivalence check. But since
it uses security_task_setscheduler, which elsewhere is used where
CAP_SYS_NICE can be used to override the uid equivalence check,
fixing it might be tough.
task_setscheduler
note: this also controls cpuset:attach_task. Are we ok with
CAP_SYS_NICE being used to confine to a cpuset?
task_setioprio
task_setnice
sys_setpriority uses this (through set_one_prio) for another
process. Need same checks as setrlimit
Aug 21:
Updated secureexec implementation to reflect the fact that
euid and uid might be the same and nonzero, but the process
might still have elevated caps.
Aug 15:
Handle endianness of xattrs.
Enforce capability version match between kernel and disk.
Enforce that no bits beyond the known max capability are
set, else return -EPERM.
With this extra processing, it may be worth reconsidering
doing all the work at bprm_set_security rather than
d_instantiate.
Aug 10:
Always call getxattr at bprm_set_security, rather than
caching it at d_instantiate.
[morgan@kernel.org: file-caps clean up for linux/capability.h]
[bunk@kernel.org: unexport cap_inode_killpriv]
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-17 02:31:36 -04:00
|
|
|
/* NOTE: ext2 honors fsuid when checking for resource overrides, so
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
you can override using fsuid too */
|
|
|
|
/* Override size restrictions on IPC message queues */
|
|
|
|
/* Allow more than 64hz interrupts from the real-time clock */
|
|
|
|
/* Override max number of consoles on console allocation */
|
|
|
|
/* Override max number of keymaps */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_SYS_RESOURCE 24
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Allow manipulation of system clock */
|
|
|
|
/* Allow irix_stime on mips */
|
|
|
|
/* Allow setting the real-time clock */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_SYS_TIME 25
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Allow configuration of tty devices */
|
|
|
|
/* Allow vhangup() of tty */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG 26
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Allow the privileged aspects of mknod() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_MKNOD 27
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Allow taking of leases on files */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_LEASE 28
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_AUDIT_WRITE 29
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL 30
|
|
|
|
|
Implement file posix capabilities
Implement file posix capabilities. This allows programs to be given a
subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them, without having to use
setuid and giving the binary all of root's powers.
This version works with Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools, found at
http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php. For more information on how to use this
patch, Chris Friedhoff has posted a nice page at
http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.
Changelog:
Nov 27:
Incorporate fixes from Andrew Morton
(security-introduce-file-caps-tweaks and
security-introduce-file-caps-warning-fix)
Fix Kconfig dependency.
Fix change signaling behavior when file caps are not compiled in.
Nov 13:
Integrate comments from Alexey: Remove CONFIG_ ifdef from
capability.h, and use %zd for printing a size_t.
Nov 13:
Fix endianness warnings by sparse as suggested by Alexey
Dobriyan.
Nov 09:
Address warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security
when file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean
up the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper
function.
Nov 08:
For pointers to required userspace tools and how to use
them, see http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.
Nov 07:
Fix the calculation of the highest bit checked in
check_cap_sanity().
Nov 07:
Allow file caps to be enabled without CONFIG_SECURITY, since
capabilities are the default.
Hook cap_task_setscheduler when !CONFIG_SECURITY.
Move capable(TASK_KILL) to end of cap_task_kill to reduce
audit messages.
Nov 05:
Add secondary calls in selinux/hooks.c to task_setioprio and
task_setscheduler so that selinux and capabilities with file
cap support can be stacked.
Sep 05:
As Seth Arnold points out, uid checks are out of place
for capability code.
Sep 01:
Define task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, cap_task_kill, and
task_setnice to make sure a user cannot affect a process in which
they called a program with some fscaps.
One remaining question is the note under task_setscheduler: are we
ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being sufficient to confine a process to a
cpuset?
It is a semantic change, as without fsccaps, attach_task doesn't
allow CAP_SYS_NICE to override the uid equivalence check. But since
it uses security_task_setscheduler, which elsewhere is used where
CAP_SYS_NICE can be used to override the uid equivalence check,
fixing it might be tough.
task_setscheduler
note: this also controls cpuset:attach_task. Are we ok with
CAP_SYS_NICE being used to confine to a cpuset?
task_setioprio
task_setnice
sys_setpriority uses this (through set_one_prio) for another
process. Need same checks as setrlimit
Aug 21:
Updated secureexec implementation to reflect the fact that
euid and uid might be the same and nonzero, but the process
might still have elevated caps.
Aug 15:
Handle endianness of xattrs.
Enforce capability version match between kernel and disk.
Enforce that no bits beyond the known max capability are
set, else return -EPERM.
With this extra processing, it may be worth reconsidering
doing all the work at bprm_set_security rather than
d_instantiate.
Aug 10:
Always call getxattr at bprm_set_security, rather than
caching it at d_instantiate.
[morgan@kernel.org: file-caps clean up for linux/capability.h]
[bunk@kernel.org: unexport cap_inode_killpriv]
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-17 02:31:36 -04:00
|
|
|
#define CAP_SETFCAP 31
|
|
|
|
|
2008-02-05 01:29:42 -05:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Bit location of each capability (used by user-space library and kernel)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_TO_INDEX(x) ((x) >> 5) /* 1 << 5 == bits in __u32 */
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_TO_MASK(x) (1 << ((x) & 31)) /* mask for indexed __u32 */
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef __KERNEL__
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Internal kernel functions only
|
|
|
|
*/
|
Implement file posix capabilities
Implement file posix capabilities. This allows programs to be given a
subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them, without having to use
setuid and giving the binary all of root's powers.
This version works with Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools, found at
http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php. For more information on how to use this
patch, Chris Friedhoff has posted a nice page at
http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.
Changelog:
Nov 27:
Incorporate fixes from Andrew Morton
(security-introduce-file-caps-tweaks and
security-introduce-file-caps-warning-fix)
Fix Kconfig dependency.
Fix change signaling behavior when file caps are not compiled in.
Nov 13:
Integrate comments from Alexey: Remove CONFIG_ ifdef from
capability.h, and use %zd for printing a size_t.
Nov 13:
Fix endianness warnings by sparse as suggested by Alexey
Dobriyan.
Nov 09:
Address warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security
when file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean
up the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper
function.
Nov 08:
For pointers to required userspace tools and how to use
them, see http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.
Nov 07:
Fix the calculation of the highest bit checked in
check_cap_sanity().
Nov 07:
Allow file caps to be enabled without CONFIG_SECURITY, since
capabilities are the default.
Hook cap_task_setscheduler when !CONFIG_SECURITY.
Move capable(TASK_KILL) to end of cap_task_kill to reduce
audit messages.
Nov 05:
Add secondary calls in selinux/hooks.c to task_setioprio and
task_setscheduler so that selinux and capabilities with file
cap support can be stacked.
Sep 05:
As Seth Arnold points out, uid checks are out of place
for capability code.
Sep 01:
Define task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, cap_task_kill, and
task_setnice to make sure a user cannot affect a process in which
they called a program with some fscaps.
One remaining question is the note under task_setscheduler: are we
ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being sufficient to confine a process to a
cpuset?
It is a semantic change, as without fsccaps, attach_task doesn't
allow CAP_SYS_NICE to override the uid equivalence check. But since
it uses security_task_setscheduler, which elsewhere is used where
CAP_SYS_NICE can be used to override the uid equivalence check,
fixing it might be tough.
task_setscheduler
note: this also controls cpuset:attach_task. Are we ok with
CAP_SYS_NICE being used to confine to a cpuset?
task_setioprio
task_setnice
sys_setpriority uses this (through set_one_prio) for another
process. Need same checks as setrlimit
Aug 21:
Updated secureexec implementation to reflect the fact that
euid and uid might be the same and nonzero, but the process
might still have elevated caps.
Aug 15:
Handle endianness of xattrs.
Enforce capability version match between kernel and disk.
Enforce that no bits beyond the known max capability are
set, else return -EPERM.
With this extra processing, it may be worth reconsidering
doing all the work at bprm_set_security rather than
d_instantiate.
Aug 10:
Always call getxattr at bprm_set_security, rather than
caching it at d_instantiate.
[morgan@kernel.org: file-caps clean up for linux/capability.h]
[bunk@kernel.org: unexport cap_inode_killpriv]
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-17 02:31:36 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2008-02-05 01:29:42 -05:00
|
|
|
#define CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) \
|
|
|
|
for (__capi = 0; __capi < _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S; ++__capi)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# define CAP_FS_MASK_B0 (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_CHOWN) \
|
|
|
|
| CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE) \
|
|
|
|
| CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) \
|
|
|
|
| CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FOWNER) \
|
|
|
|
| CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FSETID))
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2
|
|
|
|
# error Fix up hand-coded capability macro initializers
|
|
|
|
#else /* HAND-CODED capability initializers */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# define CAP_EMPTY_SET {{ 0, 0 }}
|
|
|
|
# define CAP_FULL_SET {{ ~0, ~0 }}
|
|
|
|
# define CAP_INIT_EFF_SET {{ ~CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETPCAP), ~0 }}
|
|
|
|
# define CAP_FS_SET {{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0, 0 }}
|
|
|
|
# define CAP_NFSD_SET {{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0|CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE), 0 }}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#endif /* _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2 */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_INIT_INH_SET CAP_EMPTY_SET
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# define cap_clear(c) do { (c) = __cap_empty_set; } while (0)
|
|
|
|
# define cap_set_full(c) do { (c) = __cap_full_set; } while (0)
|
|
|
|
# define cap_set_init_eff(c) do { (c) = __cap_init_eff_set; } while (0)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define cap_raise(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] |= CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
|
|
|
|
#define cap_lower(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] &= ~CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
|
|
|
|
#define cap_raised(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] & CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_BOP_ALL(c, a, b, OP) \
|
|
|
|
do { \
|
|
|
|
unsigned __capi; \
|
|
|
|
CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) { \
|
|
|
|
c.cap[__capi] = a.cap[__capi] OP b.cap[__capi]; \
|
|
|
|
} \
|
|
|
|
} while (0)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_UOP_ALL(c, a, OP) \
|
|
|
|
do { \
|
|
|
|
unsigned __capi; \
|
|
|
|
CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) { \
|
|
|
|
c.cap[__capi] = OP a.cap[__capi]; \
|
|
|
|
} \
|
|
|
|
} while (0)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline kernel_cap_t cap_combine(const kernel_cap_t a,
|
|
|
|
const kernel_cap_t b)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
kernel_cap_t dest;
|
|
|
|
CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, |);
|
|
|
|
return dest;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2008-02-05 01:29:42 -05:00
|
|
|
static inline kernel_cap_t cap_intersect(const kernel_cap_t a,
|
|
|
|
const kernel_cap_t b)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
kernel_cap_t dest;
|
|
|
|
CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, &);
|
|
|
|
return dest;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2008-02-05 01:29:42 -05:00
|
|
|
static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop(const kernel_cap_t a,
|
|
|
|
const kernel_cap_t drop)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
kernel_cap_t dest;
|
|
|
|
CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, drop, &~);
|
|
|
|
return dest;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2008-02-05 01:29:42 -05:00
|
|
|
static inline kernel_cap_t cap_invert(const kernel_cap_t c)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
kernel_cap_t dest;
|
|
|
|
CAP_UOP_ALL(dest, c, ~);
|
|
|
|
return dest;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2008-02-05 01:29:42 -05:00
|
|
|
static inline int cap_isclear(const kernel_cap_t a)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned __capi;
|
|
|
|
CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) {
|
|
|
|
if (a.cap[__capi] != 0)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2008-02-05 01:29:42 -05:00
|
|
|
static inline int cap_issubset(const kernel_cap_t a, const kernel_cap_t set)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
kernel_cap_t dest;
|
|
|
|
dest = cap_drop(a, set);
|
|
|
|
return cap_isclear(dest);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2008-02-05 01:29:42 -05:00
|
|
|
/* Used to decide between falling back on the old suser() or fsuser(). */
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2008-02-05 01:29:42 -05:00
|
|
|
static inline int cap_is_fs_cap(int cap)
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
{
|
2008-02-05 01:29:42 -05:00
|
|
|
const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
|
|
|
|
return !!(CAP_TO_MASK(cap) & __cap_fs_set.cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)]);
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-02-05 01:29:42 -05:00
|
|
|
static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a)
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
{
|
2008-02-05 01:29:42 -05:00
|
|
|
const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
|
|
|
|
return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set);
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-02-05 01:29:42 -05:00
|
|
|
static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a,
|
|
|
|
const kernel_cap_t permitted)
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
{
|
2008-02-05 01:29:42 -05:00
|
|
|
const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
|
|
|
|
return cap_combine(a,
|
|
|
|
cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_fs_set));
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-02-05 01:29:42 -05:00
|
|
|
static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a)
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
{
|
2008-02-05 01:29:42 -05:00
|
|
|
const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_NFSD_SET;
|
|
|
|
return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set);
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-02-05 01:29:42 -05:00
|
|
|
static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a,
|
|
|
|
const kernel_cap_t permitted)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
const kernel_cap_t __cap_nfsd_set = CAP_NFSD_SET;
|
|
|
|
return cap_combine(a,
|
|
|
|
cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_nfsd_set));
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2008-02-05 01:29:42 -05:00
|
|
|
extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set;
|
|
|
|
extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_full_set;
|
|
|
|
extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2006-03-25 06:07:41 -05:00
|
|
|
int capable(int cap);
|
|
|
|
int __capable(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
|
2006-01-11 15:17:46 -05:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#endif /* !_LINUX_CAPABILITY_H */
|