android_kernel_xiaomi_sm8350/security/root_plug.c

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/*
* Root Plug sample LSM module
*
* Originally written for a Linux Journal.
*
* Copyright (C) 2002 Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>
*
* Prevents any programs running with egid == 0 if a specific USB device
* is not present in the system. Yes, it can be gotten around, but is a
* nice starting point for people to play with, and learn the LSM
* interface.
*
* If you want to turn this into something with a semblance of security,
* you need to hook the task_* functions also.
*
* See http://www.linuxjournal.com/article.php?sid=6279 for more information
* about this code.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
* published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
* License.
*/
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/usb.h>
#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
/* default is a generic type of usb to serial converter */
static int vendor_id = 0x0557;
static int product_id = 0x2008;
module_param(vendor_id, uint, 0400);
module_param(product_id, uint, 0400);
/* should we print out debug messages */
static int debug = 0;
module_param(debug, bool, 0600);
#define MY_NAME "root_plug"
#define root_dbg(fmt, arg...) \
do { \
if (debug) \
printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: %s: " fmt , \
MY_NAME , __func__ , \
## arg); \
} while (0)
static int rootplug_bprm_check_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
struct usb_device *dev;
root_dbg("file %s, e_uid = %d, e_gid = %d\n",
bprm->filename, bprm->e_uid, bprm->e_gid);
if (bprm->e_gid == 0) {
dev = usb_find_device(vendor_id, product_id);
if (!dev) {
root_dbg("e_gid = 0, and device not found, "
"task not allowed to run...\n");
return -EPERM;
}
usb_put_dev(dev);
}
return 0;
}
static struct security_operations rootplug_security_ops = {
/* Use the capability functions for some of the hooks */
security: Fix setting of PF_SUPERPRIV by __capable() Fix the setting of PF_SUPERPRIV by __capable() as it could corrupt the flags the target process if that is not the current process and it is trying to change its own flags in a different way at the same time. __capable() is using neither atomic ops nor locking to protect t->flags. This patch removes __capable() and introduces has_capability() that doesn't set PF_SUPERPRIV on the process being queried. This patch further splits security_ptrace() in two: (1) security_ptrace_may_access(). This passes judgement on whether one process may access another only (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH for ptrace() and PTRACE_MODE_READ for /proc), and takes a pointer to the child process. current is the parent. (2) security_ptrace_traceme(). This passes judgement on PTRACE_TRACEME only, and takes only a pointer to the parent process. current is the child. In Smack and commoncap, this uses has_capability() to determine whether the parent will be permitted to use PTRACE_ATTACH if normal checks fail. This does not set PF_SUPERPRIV. Two of the instances of __capable() actually only act on current, and so have been changed to calls to capable(). Of the places that were using __capable(): (1) The OOM killer calls __capable() thrice when weighing the killability of a process. All of these now use has_capability(). (2) cap_ptrace() and smack_ptrace() were using __capable() to check to see whether the parent was allowed to trace any process. As mentioned above, these have been split. For PTRACE_ATTACH and /proc, capable() is now used, and for PTRACE_TRACEME, has_capability() is used. (3) cap_safe_nice() only ever saw current, so now uses capable(). (4) smack_setprocattr() rejected accesses to tasks other than current just after calling __capable(), so the order of these two tests have been switched and capable() is used instead. (5) In smack_file_send_sigiotask(), we need to allow privileged processes to receive SIGIO on files they're manipulating. (6) In smack_task_wait(), we let a process wait for a privileged process, whether or not the process doing the waiting is privileged. I've tested this with the LTP SELinux and syscalls testscripts. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-14 06:37:28 -04:00
.ptrace_may_access = cap_ptrace_may_access,
.ptrace_traceme = cap_ptrace_traceme,
.capget = cap_capget,
.capset_check = cap_capset_check,
.capset_set = cap_capset_set,
.capable = cap_capable,
.bprm_apply_creds = cap_bprm_apply_creds,
.bprm_set_security = cap_bprm_set_security,
.task_post_setuid = cap_task_post_setuid,
.task_reparent_to_init = cap_task_reparent_to_init,
.task_prctl = cap_task_prctl,
.bprm_check_security = rootplug_bprm_check_security,
};
static int __init rootplug_init (void)
{
/* register ourselves with the security framework */
if (register_security (&rootplug_security_ops)) {
printk (KERN_INFO
"Failure registering Root Plug module with the kernel\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
printk (KERN_INFO "Root Plug module initialized, "
"vendor_id = %4.4x, product id = %4.4x\n", vendor_id, product_id);
return 0;
}
security_initcall (rootplug_init);