2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
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/* keyring.c: keyring handling
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*
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[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 01:00:56 -04:00
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* Copyright (C) 2004-5 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
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* Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
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* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
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* 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
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*/
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/init.h>
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#include <linux/sched.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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2005-10-30 18:02:44 -05:00
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#include <linux/security.h>
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2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
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#include <linux/seq_file.h>
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#include <linux/err.h>
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#include <asm/uaccess.h>
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#include "internal.h"
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/*
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* when plumbing the depths of the key tree, this sets a hard limit set on how
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* deep we're willing to go
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*/
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#define KEYRING_SEARCH_MAX_DEPTH 6
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/*
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* we keep all named keyrings in a hash to speed looking them up
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*/
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#define KEYRING_NAME_HASH_SIZE (1 << 5)
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static struct list_head keyring_name_hash[KEYRING_NAME_HASH_SIZE];
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static DEFINE_RWLOCK(keyring_name_lock);
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static inline unsigned keyring_hash(const char *desc)
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{
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unsigned bucket = 0;
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for (; *desc; desc++)
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bucket += (unsigned char) *desc;
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return bucket & (KEYRING_NAME_HASH_SIZE - 1);
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}
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/*
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* the keyring type definition
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*/
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static int keyring_instantiate(struct key *keyring,
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const void *data, size_t datalen);
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static int keyring_match(const struct key *keyring, const void *criterion);
|
2006-06-26 03:24:51 -04:00
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static void keyring_revoke(struct key *keyring);
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2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
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static void keyring_destroy(struct key *keyring);
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static void keyring_describe(const struct key *keyring, struct seq_file *m);
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static long keyring_read(const struct key *keyring,
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char __user *buffer, size_t buflen);
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struct key_type key_type_keyring = {
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.name = "keyring",
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.def_datalen = sizeof(struct keyring_list),
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.instantiate = keyring_instantiate,
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.match = keyring_match,
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2006-06-26 03:24:51 -04:00
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.revoke = keyring_revoke,
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2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
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.destroy = keyring_destroy,
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.describe = keyring_describe,
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.read = keyring_read,
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};
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2007-04-26 18:46:23 -04:00
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_type_keyring);
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2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
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/*
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* semaphore to serialise link/link calls to prevent two link calls in parallel
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* introducing a cycle
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*/
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2006-01-06 03:11:25 -05:00
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static DECLARE_RWSEM(keyring_serialise_link_sem);
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2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
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/*****************************************************************************/
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/*
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* publish the name of a keyring so that it can be found by name (if it has
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* one)
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*/
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void keyring_publish_name(struct key *keyring)
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{
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int bucket;
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if (keyring->description) {
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bucket = keyring_hash(keyring->description);
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write_lock(&keyring_name_lock);
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if (!keyring_name_hash[bucket].next)
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INIT_LIST_HEAD(&keyring_name_hash[bucket]);
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list_add_tail(&keyring->type_data.link,
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&keyring_name_hash[bucket]);
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write_unlock(&keyring_name_lock);
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}
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} /* end keyring_publish_name() */
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/*****************************************************************************/
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/*
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* initialise a keyring
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* - we object if we were given any data
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*/
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static int keyring_instantiate(struct key *keyring,
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const void *data, size_t datalen)
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{
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int ret;
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ret = -EINVAL;
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if (datalen == 0) {
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/* make the keyring available by name if it has one */
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keyring_publish_name(keyring);
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ret = 0;
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}
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return ret;
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} /* end keyring_instantiate() */
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/*****************************************************************************/
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/*
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* match keyrings on their name
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*/
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static int keyring_match(const struct key *keyring, const void *description)
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{
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return keyring->description &&
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strcmp(keyring->description, description) == 0;
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} /* end keyring_match() */
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/*****************************************************************************/
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/*
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* dispose of the data dangling from the corpse of a keyring
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*/
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static void keyring_destroy(struct key *keyring)
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{
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struct keyring_list *klist;
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int loop;
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if (keyring->description) {
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write_lock(&keyring_name_lock);
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2005-08-04 16:07:07 -04:00
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if (keyring->type_data.link.next != NULL &&
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!list_empty(&keyring->type_data.link))
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list_del(&keyring->type_data.link);
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2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
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write_unlock(&keyring_name_lock);
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}
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2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
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klist = rcu_dereference(keyring->payload.subscriptions);
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2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
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if (klist) {
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for (loop = klist->nkeys - 1; loop >= 0; loop--)
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key_put(klist->keys[loop]);
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kfree(klist);
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}
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} /* end keyring_destroy() */
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/*****************************************************************************/
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/*
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* describe the keyring
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*/
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static void keyring_describe(const struct key *keyring, struct seq_file *m)
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{
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struct keyring_list *klist;
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if (keyring->description) {
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seq_puts(m, keyring->description);
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}
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else {
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seq_puts(m, "[anon]");
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}
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2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
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rcu_read_lock();
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klist = rcu_dereference(keyring->payload.subscriptions);
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2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
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if (klist)
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seq_printf(m, ": %u/%u", klist->nkeys, klist->maxkeys);
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else
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seq_puts(m, ": empty");
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2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
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rcu_read_unlock();
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2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
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} /* end keyring_describe() */
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/*****************************************************************************/
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/*
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* read a list of key IDs from the keyring's contents
|
2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
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* - the keyring's semaphore is read-locked
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
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*/
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static long keyring_read(const struct key *keyring,
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char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
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{
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struct keyring_list *klist;
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struct key *key;
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size_t qty, tmp;
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int loop, ret;
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ret = 0;
|
2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
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klist = rcu_dereference(keyring->payload.subscriptions);
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
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if (klist) {
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/* calculate how much data we could return */
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qty = klist->nkeys * sizeof(key_serial_t);
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if (buffer && buflen > 0) {
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if (buflen > qty)
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buflen = qty;
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/* copy the IDs of the subscribed keys into the
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* buffer */
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ret = -EFAULT;
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for (loop = 0; loop < klist->nkeys; loop++) {
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key = klist->keys[loop];
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tmp = sizeof(key_serial_t);
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if (tmp > buflen)
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tmp = buflen;
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if (copy_to_user(buffer,
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&key->serial,
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tmp) != 0)
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goto error;
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buflen -= tmp;
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if (buflen == 0)
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break;
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buffer += tmp;
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}
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}
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ret = qty;
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}
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error:
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return ret;
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} /* end keyring_read() */
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/*****************************************************************************/
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/*
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* allocate a keyring and link into the destination keyring
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*/
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struct key *keyring_alloc(const char *description, uid_t uid, gid_t gid,
|
2006-06-26 03:24:50 -04:00
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struct task_struct *ctx, unsigned long flags,
|
2006-06-22 17:47:17 -04:00
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struct key *dest)
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
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{
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struct key *keyring;
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int ret;
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keyring = key_alloc(&key_type_keyring, description,
|
2006-06-22 17:47:17 -04:00
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uid, gid, ctx,
|
2005-10-30 18:02:44 -05:00
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(KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_ALL,
|
2006-06-26 03:24:50 -04:00
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flags);
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
|
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if (!IS_ERR(keyring)) {
|
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 01:00:56 -04:00
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|
ret = key_instantiate_and_link(keyring, NULL, 0, dest, NULL);
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
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|
|
key_put(keyring);
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|
keyring = ERR_PTR(ret);
|
|
|
|
}
|
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|
|
}
|
|
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|
return keyring;
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end keyring_alloc() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* search the supplied keyring tree for a key that matches the criterion
|
|
|
|
* - perform a breadth-then-depth search up to the prescribed limit
|
|
|
|
* - we only find keys on which we have search permission
|
|
|
|
* - we use the supplied match function to see if the description (or other
|
|
|
|
* feature of interest) matches
|
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 01:00:56 -04:00
|
|
|
* - we rely on RCU to prevent the keyring lists from disappearing on us
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
* - we return -EAGAIN if we didn't find any matching key
|
|
|
|
* - we return -ENOKEY if we only found negative matching keys
|
2005-09-28 12:03:15 -04:00
|
|
|
* - we propagate the possession attribute from the keyring ref to the key ref
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-09-28 12:03:15 -04:00
|
|
|
key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
|
|
|
|
struct task_struct *context,
|
|
|
|
struct key_type *type,
|
|
|
|
const void *description,
|
|
|
|
key_match_func_t match)
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct {
|
2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
|
|
|
struct keyring_list *keylist;
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
int kix;
|
|
|
|
} stack[KEYRING_SEARCH_MAX_DEPTH];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct keyring_list *keylist;
|
|
|
|
struct timespec now;
|
2005-09-28 12:03:15 -04:00
|
|
|
unsigned long possessed;
|
|
|
|
struct key *keyring, *key;
|
|
|
|
key_ref_t key_ref;
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
long err;
|
2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
|
|
|
int sp, kix;
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2005-09-28 12:03:15 -04:00
|
|
|
keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref);
|
|
|
|
possessed = is_key_possessed(keyring_ref);
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
key_check(keyring);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* top keyring must have search permission to begin the search */
|
2005-10-30 18:02:44 -05:00
|
|
|
err = key_task_permission(keyring_ref, context, KEY_SEARCH);
|
|
|
|
if (err < 0) {
|
|
|
|
key_ref = ERR_PTR(err);
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2005-10-30 18:02:44 -05:00
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2005-09-28 12:03:15 -04:00
|
|
|
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOTDIR);
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
if (keyring->type != &key_type_keyring)
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-09-28 12:03:15 -04:00
|
|
|
rcu_read_lock();
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
now = current_kernel_time();
|
|
|
|
err = -EAGAIN;
|
|
|
|
sp = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* start processing a new keyring */
|
2005-09-28 12:03:15 -04:00
|
|
|
descend:
|
2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
|
|
|
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &keyring->flags))
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
goto not_this_keyring;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
|
|
|
keylist = rcu_dereference(keyring->payload.subscriptions);
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
if (!keylist)
|
|
|
|
goto not_this_keyring;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* iterate through the keys in this keyring first */
|
|
|
|
for (kix = 0; kix < keylist->nkeys; kix++) {
|
|
|
|
key = keylist->keys[kix];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* ignore keys not of this type */
|
|
|
|
if (key->type != type)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* skip revoked keys and expired keys */
|
2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
|
|
|
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &key->flags))
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (key->expiry && now.tv_sec >= key->expiry)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* keys that don't match */
|
|
|
|
if (!match(key, description))
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* key must have search permissions */
|
2005-10-30 18:02:44 -05:00
|
|
|
if (key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, possessed),
|
|
|
|
context, KEY_SEARCH) < 0)
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* we set a different error code if we find a negative key */
|
2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
|
|
|
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags)) {
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
err = -ENOKEY;
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
goto found;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* search through the keyrings nested in this one */
|
|
|
|
kix = 0;
|
2005-09-28 12:03:15 -04:00
|
|
|
ascend:
|
2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
|
|
|
for (; kix < keylist->nkeys; kix++) {
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
key = keylist->keys[kix];
|
|
|
|
if (key->type != &key_type_keyring)
|
2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* recursively search nested keyrings
|
|
|
|
* - only search keyrings for which we have search permission
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (sp >= KEYRING_SEARCH_MAX_DEPTH)
|
2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2005-11-07 03:59:30 -05:00
|
|
|
if (key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, possessed),
|
|
|
|
context, KEY_SEARCH) < 0)
|
2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* stack the current position */
|
2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
|
|
|
stack[sp].keylist = keylist;
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
stack[sp].kix = kix;
|
|
|
|
sp++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* begin again with the new keyring */
|
|
|
|
keyring = key;
|
|
|
|
goto descend;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* the keyring we're looking at was disqualified or didn't contain a
|
|
|
|
* matching key */
|
2005-09-28 12:03:15 -04:00
|
|
|
not_this_keyring:
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
if (sp > 0) {
|
|
|
|
/* resume the processing of a keyring higher up in the tree */
|
|
|
|
sp--;
|
2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
|
|
|
keylist = stack[sp].keylist;
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
kix = stack[sp].kix + 1;
|
|
|
|
goto ascend;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-09-28 12:03:15 -04:00
|
|
|
key_ref = ERR_PTR(err);
|
|
|
|
goto error_2;
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* we found a viable match */
|
2005-09-28 12:03:15 -04:00
|
|
|
found:
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
|
|
|
|
key_check(key);
|
2005-09-28 12:03:15 -04:00
|
|
|
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, possessed);
|
|
|
|
error_2:
|
2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
|
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
2005-09-28 12:03:15 -04:00
|
|
|
error:
|
|
|
|
return key_ref;
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end keyring_search_aux() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* search the supplied keyring tree for a key that matches the criterion
|
|
|
|
* - perform a breadth-then-depth search up to the prescribed limit
|
|
|
|
* - we only find keys on which we have search permission
|
|
|
|
* - we readlock the keyrings as we search down the tree
|
|
|
|
* - we return -EAGAIN if we didn't find any matching key
|
|
|
|
* - we return -ENOKEY if we only found negative matching keys
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-09-28 12:03:15 -04:00
|
|
|
key_ref_t keyring_search(key_ref_t keyring,
|
|
|
|
struct key_type *type,
|
|
|
|
const char *description)
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
{
|
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 01:00:56 -04:00
|
|
|
if (!type->match)
|
|
|
|
return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return keyring_search_aux(keyring, current,
|
|
|
|
type, description, type->match);
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end keyring_search() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_search);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* search the given keyring only (no recursion)
|
|
|
|
* - keyring must be locked by caller
|
2006-04-10 10:15:21 -04:00
|
|
|
* - caller must guarantee that the keyring is a keyring
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-09-28 12:03:15 -04:00
|
|
|
key_ref_t __keyring_search_one(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
|
|
|
|
const struct key_type *ktype,
|
|
|
|
const char *description,
|
|
|
|
key_perm_t perm)
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct keyring_list *klist;
|
2005-09-28 12:03:15 -04:00
|
|
|
unsigned long possessed;
|
|
|
|
struct key *keyring, *key;
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
int loop;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-09-28 12:03:15 -04:00
|
|
|
keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref);
|
|
|
|
possessed = is_key_possessed(keyring_ref);
|
|
|
|
|
2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
|
|
|
rcu_read_lock();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
klist = rcu_dereference(keyring->payload.subscriptions);
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
if (klist) {
|
|
|
|
for (loop = 0; loop < klist->nkeys; loop++) {
|
|
|
|
key = klist->keys[loop];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (key->type == ktype &&
|
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 01:00:56 -04:00
|
|
|
(!key->type->match ||
|
|
|
|
key->type->match(key, description)) &&
|
2005-09-28 12:03:15 -04:00
|
|
|
key_permission(make_key_ref(key, possessed),
|
2005-12-01 03:51:18 -05:00
|
|
|
perm) == 0 &&
|
2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
|
|
|
!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &key->flags)
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
goto found;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-09-28 12:03:15 -04:00
|
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
|
|
|
return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
found:
|
|
|
|
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
|
2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
|
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
2005-09-28 12:03:15 -04:00
|
|
|
return make_key_ref(key, possessed);
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end __keyring_search_one() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* find a keyring with the specified name
|
|
|
|
* - all named keyrings are searched
|
|
|
|
* - only find keyrings with search permission for the process
|
|
|
|
* - only find keyrings with a serial number greater than the one specified
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, key_serial_t bound)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct key *keyring;
|
|
|
|
int bucket;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
keyring = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
if (!name)
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bucket = keyring_hash(name);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
read_lock(&keyring_name_lock);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (keyring_name_hash[bucket].next) {
|
|
|
|
/* search this hash bucket for a keyring with a matching name
|
|
|
|
* that's readable and that hasn't been revoked */
|
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry(keyring,
|
|
|
|
&keyring_name_hash[bucket],
|
|
|
|
type_data.link
|
|
|
|
) {
|
2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
|
|
|
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &keyring->flags))
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(keyring->description, name) != 0)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-11-07 03:59:30 -05:00
|
|
|
if (key_permission(make_key_ref(keyring, 0),
|
|
|
|
KEY_SEARCH) < 0)
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* found a potential candidate, but we still need to
|
|
|
|
* check the serial number */
|
|
|
|
if (keyring->serial <= bound)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* we've got a match */
|
|
|
|
atomic_inc(&keyring->usage);
|
|
|
|
read_unlock(&keyring_name_lock);
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
read_unlock(&keyring_name_lock);
|
|
|
|
keyring = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
|
|
return keyring;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end find_keyring_by_name() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* see if a cycle will will be created by inserting acyclic tree B in acyclic
|
|
|
|
* tree A at the topmost level (ie: as a direct child of A)
|
|
|
|
* - since we are adding B to A at the top level, checking for cycles should
|
|
|
|
* just be a matter of seeing if node A is somewhere in tree B
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int keyring_detect_cycle(struct key *A, struct key *B)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct {
|
2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
|
|
|
struct keyring_list *keylist;
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
int kix;
|
|
|
|
} stack[KEYRING_SEARCH_MAX_DEPTH];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct keyring_list *keylist;
|
|
|
|
struct key *subtree, *key;
|
|
|
|
int sp, kix, ret;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
|
|
|
rcu_read_lock();
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
ret = -EDEADLK;
|
|
|
|
if (A == B)
|
2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
|
|
|
goto cycle_detected;
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
subtree = B;
|
|
|
|
sp = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* start processing a new keyring */
|
|
|
|
descend:
|
2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
|
|
|
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &subtree->flags))
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
goto not_this_keyring;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
|
|
|
keylist = rcu_dereference(subtree->payload.subscriptions);
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
if (!keylist)
|
|
|
|
goto not_this_keyring;
|
|
|
|
kix = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ascend:
|
|
|
|
/* iterate through the remaining keys in this keyring */
|
|
|
|
for (; kix < keylist->nkeys; kix++) {
|
|
|
|
key = keylist->keys[kix];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (key == A)
|
|
|
|
goto cycle_detected;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* recursively check nested keyrings */
|
|
|
|
if (key->type == &key_type_keyring) {
|
|
|
|
if (sp >= KEYRING_SEARCH_MAX_DEPTH)
|
|
|
|
goto too_deep;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* stack the current position */
|
2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
|
|
|
stack[sp].keylist = keylist;
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
stack[sp].kix = kix;
|
|
|
|
sp++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* begin again with the new keyring */
|
|
|
|
subtree = key;
|
|
|
|
goto descend;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* the keyring we're looking at was disqualified or didn't contain a
|
|
|
|
* matching key */
|
|
|
|
not_this_keyring:
|
|
|
|
if (sp > 0) {
|
|
|
|
/* resume the checking of a keyring higher up in the tree */
|
|
|
|
sp--;
|
2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
|
|
|
keylist = stack[sp].keylist;
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
kix = stack[sp].kix + 1;
|
|
|
|
goto ascend;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = 0; /* no cycles detected */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error:
|
2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
|
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
too_deep:
|
|
|
|
ret = -ELOOP;
|
2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
cycle_detected:
|
|
|
|
ret = -EDEADLK;
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end keyring_detect_cycle() */
|
|
|
|
|
2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* dispose of a keyring list after the RCU grace period
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void keyring_link_rcu_disposal(struct rcu_head *rcu)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct keyring_list *klist =
|
|
|
|
container_of(rcu, struct keyring_list, rcu);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
kfree(klist);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end keyring_link_rcu_disposal() */
|
|
|
|
|
2006-01-08 04:02:45 -05:00
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* dispose of a keyring list after the RCU grace period, freeing the unlinked
|
|
|
|
* key
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void keyring_unlink_rcu_disposal(struct rcu_head *rcu)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct keyring_list *klist =
|
|
|
|
container_of(rcu, struct keyring_list, rcu);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
key_put(klist->keys[klist->delkey]);
|
|
|
|
kfree(klist);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end keyring_unlink_rcu_disposal() */
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* link a key into to a keyring
|
2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
|
|
|
* - must be called with the keyring's semaphore write-locked
|
2006-01-08 04:02:45 -05:00
|
|
|
* - discard already extant link to matching key if there is one
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int __key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct keyring_list *klist, *nklist;
|
|
|
|
unsigned max;
|
|
|
|
size_t size;
|
2006-01-08 04:02:45 -05:00
|
|
|
int loop, ret;
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = -EKEYREVOKED;
|
2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
|
|
|
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &keyring->flags))
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = -ENOTDIR;
|
|
|
|
if (keyring->type != &key_type_keyring)
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* serialise link/link calls to prevent parallel calls causing a
|
|
|
|
* cycle when applied to two keyring in opposite orders */
|
|
|
|
down_write(&keyring_serialise_link_sem);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* check that we aren't going to create a cycle adding one keyring to
|
|
|
|
* another */
|
|
|
|
if (key->type == &key_type_keyring) {
|
|
|
|
ret = keyring_detect_cycle(keyring, key);
|
|
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
|
|
goto error2;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-01-08 04:02:45 -05:00
|
|
|
/* see if there's a matching key we can displace */
|
|
|
|
klist = keyring->payload.subscriptions;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (klist && klist->nkeys > 0) {
|
|
|
|
struct key_type *type = key->type;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (loop = klist->nkeys - 1; loop >= 0; loop--) {
|
|
|
|
if (klist->keys[loop]->type == type &&
|
|
|
|
strcmp(klist->keys[loop]->description,
|
|
|
|
key->description) == 0
|
|
|
|
) {
|
|
|
|
/* found a match - replace with new key */
|
|
|
|
size = sizeof(struct key *) * klist->maxkeys;
|
|
|
|
size += sizeof(*klist);
|
|
|
|
BUG_ON(size > PAGE_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = -ENOMEM;
|
2006-12-06 23:33:47 -05:00
|
|
|
nklist = kmemdup(klist, size, GFP_KERNEL);
|
2006-01-08 04:02:45 -05:00
|
|
|
if (!nklist)
|
|
|
|
goto error2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* replace matched key */
|
|
|
|
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
|
|
|
|
nklist->keys[loop] = key;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rcu_assign_pointer(
|
|
|
|
keyring->payload.subscriptions,
|
|
|
|
nklist);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* dispose of the old keyring list and the
|
|
|
|
* displaced key */
|
|
|
|
klist->delkey = loop;
|
|
|
|
call_rcu(&klist->rcu,
|
|
|
|
keyring_unlink_rcu_disposal);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
/* check that we aren't going to overrun the user's quota */
|
|
|
|
ret = key_payload_reserve(keyring,
|
|
|
|
keyring->datalen + KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES);
|
|
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
|
|
goto error2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
klist = keyring->payload.subscriptions;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (klist && klist->nkeys < klist->maxkeys) {
|
|
|
|
/* there's sufficient slack space to add directly */
|
|
|
|
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
|
|
|
|
|
2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
|
|
|
klist->keys[klist->nkeys] = key;
|
|
|
|
smp_wmb();
|
|
|
|
klist->nkeys++;
|
|
|
|
smp_wmb();
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else {
|
|
|
|
/* grow the key list */
|
|
|
|
max = 4;
|
|
|
|
if (klist)
|
|
|
|
max += klist->maxkeys;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = -ENFILE;
|
2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
|
|
|
if (max > 65535)
|
|
|
|
goto error3;
|
2005-07-07 20:57:03 -04:00
|
|
|
size = sizeof(*klist) + sizeof(struct key *) * max;
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
if (size > PAGE_SIZE)
|
|
|
|
goto error3;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
nklist = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
|
|
if (!nklist)
|
|
|
|
goto error3;
|
|
|
|
nklist->maxkeys = max;
|
|
|
|
nklist->nkeys = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (klist) {
|
|
|
|
nklist->nkeys = klist->nkeys;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(nklist->keys,
|
|
|
|
klist->keys,
|
|
|
|
sizeof(struct key *) * klist->nkeys);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* add the key into the new space */
|
|
|
|
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
|
|
|
|
nklist->keys[nklist->nkeys++] = key;
|
2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rcu_assign_pointer(keyring->payload.subscriptions, nklist);
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* dispose of the old keyring list */
|
2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
|
|
|
if (klist)
|
|
|
|
call_rcu(&klist->rcu, keyring_link_rcu_disposal);
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-01-08 04:02:45 -05:00
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
error2:
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
up_write(&keyring_serialise_link_sem);
|
2006-01-08 04:02:45 -05:00
|
|
|
error:
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
|
2006-01-08 04:02:45 -05:00
|
|
|
error3:
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
/* undo the quota changes */
|
|
|
|
key_payload_reserve(keyring,
|
|
|
|
keyring->datalen - KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES);
|
|
|
|
goto error2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end __key_link() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* link a key to a keyring
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
key_check(keyring);
|
|
|
|
key_check(key);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
down_write(&keyring->sem);
|
|
|
|
ret = __key_link(keyring, key);
|
|
|
|
up_write(&keyring->sem);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end key_link() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_link);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* unlink the first link to a key from a keyring
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int key_unlink(struct key *keyring, struct key *key)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
|
|
|
struct keyring_list *klist, *nklist;
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
int loop, ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
key_check(keyring);
|
|
|
|
key_check(key);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = -ENOTDIR;
|
|
|
|
if (keyring->type != &key_type_keyring)
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
down_write(&keyring->sem);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
klist = keyring->payload.subscriptions;
|
|
|
|
if (klist) {
|
|
|
|
/* search the keyring for the key */
|
|
|
|
for (loop = 0; loop < klist->nkeys; loop++)
|
|
|
|
if (klist->keys[loop] == key)
|
|
|
|
goto key_is_present;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
up_write(&keyring->sem);
|
|
|
|
ret = -ENOENT;
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
|
|
|
key_is_present:
|
|
|
|
/* we need to copy the key list for RCU purposes */
|
2005-07-07 20:57:03 -04:00
|
|
|
nklist = kmalloc(sizeof(*klist) +
|
|
|
|
sizeof(struct key *) * klist->maxkeys,
|
2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
|
|
|
GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
|
|
if (!nklist)
|
|
|
|
goto nomem;
|
|
|
|
nklist->maxkeys = klist->maxkeys;
|
|
|
|
nklist->nkeys = klist->nkeys - 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (loop > 0)
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&nklist->keys[0],
|
|
|
|
&klist->keys[0],
|
2005-07-07 20:57:03 -04:00
|
|
|
loop * sizeof(struct key *));
|
2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (loop < nklist->nkeys)
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&nklist->keys[loop],
|
|
|
|
&klist->keys[loop + 1],
|
2005-07-07 20:57:03 -04:00
|
|
|
(nklist->nkeys - loop) * sizeof(struct key *));
|
2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
/* adjust the user's quota */
|
|
|
|
key_payload_reserve(keyring,
|
|
|
|
keyring->datalen - KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES);
|
|
|
|
|
2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
|
|
|
rcu_assign_pointer(keyring->payload.subscriptions, nklist);
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
|
|
|
up_write(&keyring->sem);
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
|
|
|
/* schedule for later cleanup */
|
|
|
|
klist->delkey = loop;
|
|
|
|
call_rcu(&klist->rcu, keyring_unlink_rcu_disposal);
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
|
|
|
error:
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
|
|
|
nomem:
|
|
|
|
ret = -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
up_write(&keyring->sem);
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end key_unlink() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_unlink);
|
|
|
|
|
2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* dispose of a keyring list after the RCU grace period, releasing the keys it
|
|
|
|
* links to
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void keyring_clear_rcu_disposal(struct rcu_head *rcu)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct keyring_list *klist;
|
|
|
|
int loop;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
klist = container_of(rcu, struct keyring_list, rcu);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (loop = klist->nkeys - 1; loop >= 0; loop--)
|
|
|
|
key_put(klist->keys[loop]);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
kfree(klist);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end keyring_clear_rcu_disposal() */
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* clear the specified process keyring
|
|
|
|
* - implements keyctl(KEYCTL_CLEAR)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int keyring_clear(struct key *keyring)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct keyring_list *klist;
|
2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
|
|
|
int ret;
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = -ENOTDIR;
|
|
|
|
if (keyring->type == &key_type_keyring) {
|
|
|
|
/* detach the pointer block with the locks held */
|
|
|
|
down_write(&keyring->sem);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
klist = keyring->payload.subscriptions;
|
|
|
|
if (klist) {
|
|
|
|
/* adjust the quota */
|
|
|
|
key_payload_reserve(keyring,
|
|
|
|
sizeof(struct keyring_list));
|
|
|
|
|
2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
|
|
|
rcu_assign_pointer(keyring->payload.subscriptions,
|
|
|
|
NULL);
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
up_write(&keyring->sem);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* free the keys after the locks have been dropped */
|
2005-06-24 01:00:49 -04:00
|
|
|
if (klist)
|
|
|
|
call_rcu(&klist->rcu, keyring_clear_rcu_disposal);
|
2005-04-16 18:20:36 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end keyring_clear() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_clear);
|
2006-06-26 03:24:51 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* dispose of the links from a revoked keyring
|
|
|
|
* - called with the key sem write-locked
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void keyring_revoke(struct key *keyring)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct keyring_list *klist = keyring->payload.subscriptions;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* adjust the quota */
|
|
|
|
key_payload_reserve(keyring, 0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (klist) {
|
|
|
|
rcu_assign_pointer(keyring->payload.subscriptions, NULL);
|
|
|
|
call_rcu(&klist->rcu, keyring_clear_rcu_disposal);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end keyring_revoke() */
|