Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel
Smack is the Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel.
Smack implements mandatory access control (MAC) using labels
attached to tasks and data containers, including files, SVIPC,
and other tasks. Smack is a kernel based scheme that requires
an absolute minimum of application support and a very small
amount of configuration data.
Smack uses extended attributes and
provides a set of general mount options, borrowing technics used
elsewhere. Smack uses netlabel for CIPSO labeling. Smack provides
a pseudo-filesystem smackfs that is used for manipulation of
system Smack attributes.
The patch, patches for ls and sshd, a README, a startup script,
and x86 binaries for ls and sshd are also available on
http://www.schaufler-ca.com
Development has been done using Fedora Core 7 in a virtual machine
environment and on an old Sony laptop.
Smack provides mandatory access controls based on the label attached
to a task and the label attached to the object it is attempting to
access. Smack labels are deliberately short (1-23 characters) text
strings. Single character labels using special characters are reserved
for system use. The only operation applied to Smack labels is equality
comparison. No wildcards or expressions, regular or otherwise, are
used. Smack labels are composed of printable characters and may not
include "/".
A file always gets the Smack label of the task that created it.
Smack defines and uses these labels:
"*" - pronounced "star"
"_" - pronounced "floor"
"^" - pronounced "hat"
"?" - pronounced "huh"
The access rules enforced by Smack are, in order:
1. Any access requested by a task labeled "*" is denied.
2. A read or execute access requested by a task labeled "^"
is permitted.
3. A read or execute access requested on an object labeled "_"
is permitted.
4. Any access requested on an object labeled "*" is permitted.
5. Any access requested by a task on an object with the same
label is permitted.
6. Any access requested that is explicitly defined in the loaded
rule set is permitted.
7. Any other access is denied.
Rules may be explicitly defined by writing subject,object,access
triples to /smack/load.
Smack rule sets can be easily defined that describe Bell&LaPadula
sensitivity, Biba integrity, and a variety of interesting
configurations. Smack rule sets can be modified on the fly to
accommodate changes in the operating environment or even the time
of day.
Some practical use cases:
Hierarchical levels. The less common of the two usual uses
for MLS systems is to define hierarchical levels, often
unclassified, confidential, secret, and so on. To set up smack
to support this, these rules could be defined:
C Unclass rx
S C rx
S Unclass rx
TS S rx
TS C rx
TS Unclass rx
A TS process can read S, C, and Unclass data, but cannot write it.
An S process can read C and Unclass. Note that specifying that
TS can read S and S can read C does not imply TS can read C, it
has to be explicitly stated.
Non-hierarchical categories. This is the more common of the
usual uses for an MLS system. Since the default rule is that a
subject cannot access an object with a different label no
access rules are required to implement compartmentalization.
A case that the Bell & LaPadula policy does not allow is demonstrated
with this Smack access rule:
A case that Bell&LaPadula does not allow that Smack does:
ESPN ABC r
ABC ESPN r
On my portable video device I have two applications, one that
shows ABC programming and the other ESPN programming. ESPN wants
to show me sport stories that show up as news, and ABC will
only provide minimal information about a sports story if ESPN
is covering it. Each side can look at the other's info, neither
can change the other. Neither can see what FOX is up to, which
is just as well all things considered.
Another case that I especially like:
SatData Guard w
Guard Publish w
A program running with the Guard label opens a UDP socket and
accepts messages sent by a program running with a SatData label.
The Guard program inspects the message to ensure it is wholesome
and if it is sends it to a program running with the Publish label.
This program then puts the information passed in an appropriate
place. Note that the Guard program cannot write to a Publish
file system object because file system semanitic require read as
well as write.
The four cases (categories, levels, mutual read, guardbox) here
are all quite real, and problems I've been asked to solve over
the years. The first two are easy to do with traditonal MLS systems
while the last two you can't without invoking privilege, at least
for a while.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Joshua Brindle <method@manicmethod.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-05 01:29:50 -05:00
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/*
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* Copyright (C) 2007 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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* the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
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*
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* Author:
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* Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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*
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*/
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#include <linux/types.h>
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#include <linux/fs.h>
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#include <linux/sched.h>
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#include "smack.h"
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struct smack_known smack_known_huh = {
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2008-12-31 12:54:12 -05:00
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.smk_next = NULL,
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Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel
Smack is the Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel.
Smack implements mandatory access control (MAC) using labels
attached to tasks and data containers, including files, SVIPC,
and other tasks. Smack is a kernel based scheme that requires
an absolute minimum of application support and a very small
amount of configuration data.
Smack uses extended attributes and
provides a set of general mount options, borrowing technics used
elsewhere. Smack uses netlabel for CIPSO labeling. Smack provides
a pseudo-filesystem smackfs that is used for manipulation of
system Smack attributes.
The patch, patches for ls and sshd, a README, a startup script,
and x86 binaries for ls and sshd are also available on
http://www.schaufler-ca.com
Development has been done using Fedora Core 7 in a virtual machine
environment and on an old Sony laptop.
Smack provides mandatory access controls based on the label attached
to a task and the label attached to the object it is attempting to
access. Smack labels are deliberately short (1-23 characters) text
strings. Single character labels using special characters are reserved
for system use. The only operation applied to Smack labels is equality
comparison. No wildcards or expressions, regular or otherwise, are
used. Smack labels are composed of printable characters and may not
include "/".
A file always gets the Smack label of the task that created it.
Smack defines and uses these labels:
"*" - pronounced "star"
"_" - pronounced "floor"
"^" - pronounced "hat"
"?" - pronounced "huh"
The access rules enforced by Smack are, in order:
1. Any access requested by a task labeled "*" is denied.
2. A read or execute access requested by a task labeled "^"
is permitted.
3. A read or execute access requested on an object labeled "_"
is permitted.
4. Any access requested on an object labeled "*" is permitted.
5. Any access requested by a task on an object with the same
label is permitted.
6. Any access requested that is explicitly defined in the loaded
rule set is permitted.
7. Any other access is denied.
Rules may be explicitly defined by writing subject,object,access
triples to /smack/load.
Smack rule sets can be easily defined that describe Bell&LaPadula
sensitivity, Biba integrity, and a variety of interesting
configurations. Smack rule sets can be modified on the fly to
accommodate changes in the operating environment or even the time
of day.
Some practical use cases:
Hierarchical levels. The less common of the two usual uses
for MLS systems is to define hierarchical levels, often
unclassified, confidential, secret, and so on. To set up smack
to support this, these rules could be defined:
C Unclass rx
S C rx
S Unclass rx
TS S rx
TS C rx
TS Unclass rx
A TS process can read S, C, and Unclass data, but cannot write it.
An S process can read C and Unclass. Note that specifying that
TS can read S and S can read C does not imply TS can read C, it
has to be explicitly stated.
Non-hierarchical categories. This is the more common of the
usual uses for an MLS system. Since the default rule is that a
subject cannot access an object with a different label no
access rules are required to implement compartmentalization.
A case that the Bell & LaPadula policy does not allow is demonstrated
with this Smack access rule:
A case that Bell&LaPadula does not allow that Smack does:
ESPN ABC r
ABC ESPN r
On my portable video device I have two applications, one that
shows ABC programming and the other ESPN programming. ESPN wants
to show me sport stories that show up as news, and ABC will
only provide minimal information about a sports story if ESPN
is covering it. Each side can look at the other's info, neither
can change the other. Neither can see what FOX is up to, which
is just as well all things considered.
Another case that I especially like:
SatData Guard w
Guard Publish w
A program running with the Guard label opens a UDP socket and
accepts messages sent by a program running with a SatData label.
The Guard program inspects the message to ensure it is wholesome
and if it is sends it to a program running with the Publish label.
This program then puts the information passed in an appropriate
place. Note that the Guard program cannot write to a Publish
file system object because file system semanitic require read as
well as write.
The four cases (categories, levels, mutual read, guardbox) here
are all quite real, and problems I've been asked to solve over
the years. The first two are easy to do with traditonal MLS systems
while the last two you can't without invoking privilege, at least
for a while.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Joshua Brindle <method@manicmethod.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-05 01:29:50 -05:00
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.smk_known = "?",
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.smk_secid = 2,
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.smk_cipso = NULL,
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};
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struct smack_known smack_known_hat = {
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.smk_next = &smack_known_huh,
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.smk_known = "^",
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.smk_secid = 3,
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.smk_cipso = NULL,
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};
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struct smack_known smack_known_star = {
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.smk_next = &smack_known_hat,
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.smk_known = "*",
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.smk_secid = 4,
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.smk_cipso = NULL,
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};
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struct smack_known smack_known_floor = {
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.smk_next = &smack_known_star,
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.smk_known = "_",
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.smk_secid = 5,
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.smk_cipso = NULL,
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};
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struct smack_known smack_known_invalid = {
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.smk_next = &smack_known_floor,
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.smk_known = "",
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.smk_secid = 6,
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.smk_cipso = NULL,
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};
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2008-12-31 12:54:12 -05:00
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struct smack_known smack_known_web = {
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.smk_next = &smack_known_invalid,
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.smk_known = "@",
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.smk_secid = 7,
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.smk_cipso = NULL,
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};
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struct smack_known *smack_known = &smack_known_web;
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Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel
Smack is the Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel.
Smack implements mandatory access control (MAC) using labels
attached to tasks and data containers, including files, SVIPC,
and other tasks. Smack is a kernel based scheme that requires
an absolute minimum of application support and a very small
amount of configuration data.
Smack uses extended attributes and
provides a set of general mount options, borrowing technics used
elsewhere. Smack uses netlabel for CIPSO labeling. Smack provides
a pseudo-filesystem smackfs that is used for manipulation of
system Smack attributes.
The patch, patches for ls and sshd, a README, a startup script,
and x86 binaries for ls and sshd are also available on
http://www.schaufler-ca.com
Development has been done using Fedora Core 7 in a virtual machine
environment and on an old Sony laptop.
Smack provides mandatory access controls based on the label attached
to a task and the label attached to the object it is attempting to
access. Smack labels are deliberately short (1-23 characters) text
strings. Single character labels using special characters are reserved
for system use. The only operation applied to Smack labels is equality
comparison. No wildcards or expressions, regular or otherwise, are
used. Smack labels are composed of printable characters and may not
include "/".
A file always gets the Smack label of the task that created it.
Smack defines and uses these labels:
"*" - pronounced "star"
"_" - pronounced "floor"
"^" - pronounced "hat"
"?" - pronounced "huh"
The access rules enforced by Smack are, in order:
1. Any access requested by a task labeled "*" is denied.
2. A read or execute access requested by a task labeled "^"
is permitted.
3. A read or execute access requested on an object labeled "_"
is permitted.
4. Any access requested on an object labeled "*" is permitted.
5. Any access requested by a task on an object with the same
label is permitted.
6. Any access requested that is explicitly defined in the loaded
rule set is permitted.
7. Any other access is denied.
Rules may be explicitly defined by writing subject,object,access
triples to /smack/load.
Smack rule sets can be easily defined that describe Bell&LaPadula
sensitivity, Biba integrity, and a variety of interesting
configurations. Smack rule sets can be modified on the fly to
accommodate changes in the operating environment or even the time
of day.
Some practical use cases:
Hierarchical levels. The less common of the two usual uses
for MLS systems is to define hierarchical levels, often
unclassified, confidential, secret, and so on. To set up smack
to support this, these rules could be defined:
C Unclass rx
S C rx
S Unclass rx
TS S rx
TS C rx
TS Unclass rx
A TS process can read S, C, and Unclass data, but cannot write it.
An S process can read C and Unclass. Note that specifying that
TS can read S and S can read C does not imply TS can read C, it
has to be explicitly stated.
Non-hierarchical categories. This is the more common of the
usual uses for an MLS system. Since the default rule is that a
subject cannot access an object with a different label no
access rules are required to implement compartmentalization.
A case that the Bell & LaPadula policy does not allow is demonstrated
with this Smack access rule:
A case that Bell&LaPadula does not allow that Smack does:
ESPN ABC r
ABC ESPN r
On my portable video device I have two applications, one that
shows ABC programming and the other ESPN programming. ESPN wants
to show me sport stories that show up as news, and ABC will
only provide minimal information about a sports story if ESPN
is covering it. Each side can look at the other's info, neither
can change the other. Neither can see what FOX is up to, which
is just as well all things considered.
Another case that I especially like:
SatData Guard w
Guard Publish w
A program running with the Guard label opens a UDP socket and
accepts messages sent by a program running with a SatData label.
The Guard program inspects the message to ensure it is wholesome
and if it is sends it to a program running with the Publish label.
This program then puts the information passed in an appropriate
place. Note that the Guard program cannot write to a Publish
file system object because file system semanitic require read as
well as write.
The four cases (categories, levels, mutual read, guardbox) here
are all quite real, and problems I've been asked to solve over
the years. The first two are easy to do with traditonal MLS systems
while the last two you can't without invoking privilege, at least
for a while.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Joshua Brindle <method@manicmethod.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-05 01:29:50 -05:00
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/*
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* The initial value needs to be bigger than any of the
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* known values above.
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*/
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static u32 smack_next_secid = 10;
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/**
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* smk_access - determine if a subject has a specific access to an object
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* @subject_label: a pointer to the subject's Smack label
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* @object_label: a pointer to the object's Smack label
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* @request: the access requested, in "MAY" format
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*
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* This function looks up the subject/object pair in the
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* access rule list and returns 0 if the access is permitted,
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* non zero otherwise.
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*
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* Even though Smack labels are usually shared on smack_list
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* labels that come in off the network can't be imported
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* and added to the list for locking reasons.
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*
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* Therefore, it is necessary to check the contents of the labels,
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* not just the pointer values. Of course, in most cases the labels
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* will be on the list, so checking the pointers may be a worthwhile
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* optimization.
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*/
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int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request)
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{
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u32 may = MAY_NOT;
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struct smk_list_entry *sp;
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struct smack_rule *srp;
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/*
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* Hardcoded comparisons.
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*
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* A star subject can't access any object.
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*/
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if (subject_label == smack_known_star.smk_known ||
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strcmp(subject_label, smack_known_star.smk_known) == 0)
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return -EACCES;
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2008-12-31 12:54:12 -05:00
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/*
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* An internet object can be accessed by any subject.
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* Tasks cannot be assigned the internet label.
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* An internet subject can access any object.
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*/
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if (object_label == smack_known_web.smk_known ||
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subject_label == smack_known_web.smk_known ||
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strcmp(object_label, smack_known_web.smk_known) == 0 ||
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strcmp(subject_label, smack_known_web.smk_known) == 0)
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return 0;
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Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel
Smack is the Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel.
Smack implements mandatory access control (MAC) using labels
attached to tasks and data containers, including files, SVIPC,
and other tasks. Smack is a kernel based scheme that requires
an absolute minimum of application support and a very small
amount of configuration data.
Smack uses extended attributes and
provides a set of general mount options, borrowing technics used
elsewhere. Smack uses netlabel for CIPSO labeling. Smack provides
a pseudo-filesystem smackfs that is used for manipulation of
system Smack attributes.
The patch, patches for ls and sshd, a README, a startup script,
and x86 binaries for ls and sshd are also available on
http://www.schaufler-ca.com
Development has been done using Fedora Core 7 in a virtual machine
environment and on an old Sony laptop.
Smack provides mandatory access controls based on the label attached
to a task and the label attached to the object it is attempting to
access. Smack labels are deliberately short (1-23 characters) text
strings. Single character labels using special characters are reserved
for system use. The only operation applied to Smack labels is equality
comparison. No wildcards or expressions, regular or otherwise, are
used. Smack labels are composed of printable characters and may not
include "/".
A file always gets the Smack label of the task that created it.
Smack defines and uses these labels:
"*" - pronounced "star"
"_" - pronounced "floor"
"^" - pronounced "hat"
"?" - pronounced "huh"
The access rules enforced by Smack are, in order:
1. Any access requested by a task labeled "*" is denied.
2. A read or execute access requested by a task labeled "^"
is permitted.
3. A read or execute access requested on an object labeled "_"
is permitted.
4. Any access requested on an object labeled "*" is permitted.
5. Any access requested by a task on an object with the same
label is permitted.
6. Any access requested that is explicitly defined in the loaded
rule set is permitted.
7. Any other access is denied.
Rules may be explicitly defined by writing subject,object,access
triples to /smack/load.
Smack rule sets can be easily defined that describe Bell&LaPadula
sensitivity, Biba integrity, and a variety of interesting
configurations. Smack rule sets can be modified on the fly to
accommodate changes in the operating environment or even the time
of day.
Some practical use cases:
Hierarchical levels. The less common of the two usual uses
for MLS systems is to define hierarchical levels, often
unclassified, confidential, secret, and so on. To set up smack
to support this, these rules could be defined:
C Unclass rx
S C rx
S Unclass rx
TS S rx
TS C rx
TS Unclass rx
A TS process can read S, C, and Unclass data, but cannot write it.
An S process can read C and Unclass. Note that specifying that
TS can read S and S can read C does not imply TS can read C, it
has to be explicitly stated.
Non-hierarchical categories. This is the more common of the
usual uses for an MLS system. Since the default rule is that a
subject cannot access an object with a different label no
access rules are required to implement compartmentalization.
A case that the Bell & LaPadula policy does not allow is demonstrated
with this Smack access rule:
A case that Bell&LaPadula does not allow that Smack does:
ESPN ABC r
ABC ESPN r
On my portable video device I have two applications, one that
shows ABC programming and the other ESPN programming. ESPN wants
to show me sport stories that show up as news, and ABC will
only provide minimal information about a sports story if ESPN
is covering it. Each side can look at the other's info, neither
can change the other. Neither can see what FOX is up to, which
is just as well all things considered.
Another case that I especially like:
SatData Guard w
Guard Publish w
A program running with the Guard label opens a UDP socket and
accepts messages sent by a program running with a SatData label.
The Guard program inspects the message to ensure it is wholesome
and if it is sends it to a program running with the Publish label.
This program then puts the information passed in an appropriate
place. Note that the Guard program cannot write to a Publish
file system object because file system semanitic require read as
well as write.
The four cases (categories, levels, mutual read, guardbox) here
are all quite real, and problems I've been asked to solve over
the years. The first two are easy to do with traditonal MLS systems
while the last two you can't without invoking privilege, at least
for a while.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Joshua Brindle <method@manicmethod.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-05 01:29:50 -05:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* A star object can be accessed by any subject.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (object_label == smack_known_star.smk_known ||
|
|
|
|
strcmp(object_label, smack_known_star.smk_known) == 0)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* An object can be accessed in any way by a subject
|
|
|
|
* with the same label.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (subject_label == object_label ||
|
|
|
|
strcmp(subject_label, object_label) == 0)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* A hat subject can read any object.
|
|
|
|
* A floor object can be read by any subject.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if ((request & MAY_ANYREAD) == request) {
|
|
|
|
if (object_label == smack_known_floor.smk_known ||
|
|
|
|
strcmp(object_label, smack_known_floor.smk_known) == 0)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (subject_label == smack_known_hat.smk_known ||
|
|
|
|
strcmp(subject_label, smack_known_hat.smk_known) == 0)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Beyond here an explicit relationship is required.
|
|
|
|
* If the requested access is contained in the available
|
|
|
|
* access (e.g. read is included in readwrite) it's
|
|
|
|
* good.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
for (sp = smack_list; sp != NULL; sp = sp->smk_next) {
|
|
|
|
srp = &sp->smk_rule;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (srp->smk_subject == subject_label ||
|
|
|
|
strcmp(srp->smk_subject, subject_label) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
if (srp->smk_object == object_label ||
|
|
|
|
strcmp(srp->smk_object, object_label) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
may = srp->smk_access;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* This is a bit map operation.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if ((request & may) == request)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return -EACCES;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* smk_curacc - determine if current has a specific access to an object
|
|
|
|
* @object_label: a pointer to the object's Smack label
|
|
|
|
* @request: the access requested, in "MAY" format
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This function checks the current subject label/object label pair
|
|
|
|
* in the access rule list and returns 0 if the access is permitted,
|
2008-07-30 18:37:11 -04:00
|
|
|
* non zero otherwise. It allows that current may have the capability
|
Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel
Smack is the Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel.
Smack implements mandatory access control (MAC) using labels
attached to tasks and data containers, including files, SVIPC,
and other tasks. Smack is a kernel based scheme that requires
an absolute minimum of application support and a very small
amount of configuration data.
Smack uses extended attributes and
provides a set of general mount options, borrowing technics used
elsewhere. Smack uses netlabel for CIPSO labeling. Smack provides
a pseudo-filesystem smackfs that is used for manipulation of
system Smack attributes.
The patch, patches for ls and sshd, a README, a startup script,
and x86 binaries for ls and sshd are also available on
http://www.schaufler-ca.com
Development has been done using Fedora Core 7 in a virtual machine
environment and on an old Sony laptop.
Smack provides mandatory access controls based on the label attached
to a task and the label attached to the object it is attempting to
access. Smack labels are deliberately short (1-23 characters) text
strings. Single character labels using special characters are reserved
for system use. The only operation applied to Smack labels is equality
comparison. No wildcards or expressions, regular or otherwise, are
used. Smack labels are composed of printable characters and may not
include "/".
A file always gets the Smack label of the task that created it.
Smack defines and uses these labels:
"*" - pronounced "star"
"_" - pronounced "floor"
"^" - pronounced "hat"
"?" - pronounced "huh"
The access rules enforced by Smack are, in order:
1. Any access requested by a task labeled "*" is denied.
2. A read or execute access requested by a task labeled "^"
is permitted.
3. A read or execute access requested on an object labeled "_"
is permitted.
4. Any access requested on an object labeled "*" is permitted.
5. Any access requested by a task on an object with the same
label is permitted.
6. Any access requested that is explicitly defined in the loaded
rule set is permitted.
7. Any other access is denied.
Rules may be explicitly defined by writing subject,object,access
triples to /smack/load.
Smack rule sets can be easily defined that describe Bell&LaPadula
sensitivity, Biba integrity, and a variety of interesting
configurations. Smack rule sets can be modified on the fly to
accommodate changes in the operating environment or even the time
of day.
Some practical use cases:
Hierarchical levels. The less common of the two usual uses
for MLS systems is to define hierarchical levels, often
unclassified, confidential, secret, and so on. To set up smack
to support this, these rules could be defined:
C Unclass rx
S C rx
S Unclass rx
TS S rx
TS C rx
TS Unclass rx
A TS process can read S, C, and Unclass data, but cannot write it.
An S process can read C and Unclass. Note that specifying that
TS can read S and S can read C does not imply TS can read C, it
has to be explicitly stated.
Non-hierarchical categories. This is the more common of the
usual uses for an MLS system. Since the default rule is that a
subject cannot access an object with a different label no
access rules are required to implement compartmentalization.
A case that the Bell & LaPadula policy does not allow is demonstrated
with this Smack access rule:
A case that Bell&LaPadula does not allow that Smack does:
ESPN ABC r
ABC ESPN r
On my portable video device I have two applications, one that
shows ABC programming and the other ESPN programming. ESPN wants
to show me sport stories that show up as news, and ABC will
only provide minimal information about a sports story if ESPN
is covering it. Each side can look at the other's info, neither
can change the other. Neither can see what FOX is up to, which
is just as well all things considered.
Another case that I especially like:
SatData Guard w
Guard Publish w
A program running with the Guard label opens a UDP socket and
accepts messages sent by a program running with a SatData label.
The Guard program inspects the message to ensure it is wholesome
and if it is sends it to a program running with the Publish label.
This program then puts the information passed in an appropriate
place. Note that the Guard program cannot write to a Publish
file system object because file system semanitic require read as
well as write.
The four cases (categories, levels, mutual read, guardbox) here
are all quite real, and problems I've been asked to solve over
the years. The first two are easy to do with traditonal MLS systems
while the last two you can't without invoking privilege, at least
for a while.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Joshua Brindle <method@manicmethod.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-05 01:29:50 -05:00
|
|
|
* to override the rules.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
|
2008-11-13 18:39:18 -05:00
|
|
|
rc = smk_access(current_security(), obj_label, mode);
|
Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel
Smack is the Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel.
Smack implements mandatory access control (MAC) using labels
attached to tasks and data containers, including files, SVIPC,
and other tasks. Smack is a kernel based scheme that requires
an absolute minimum of application support and a very small
amount of configuration data.
Smack uses extended attributes and
provides a set of general mount options, borrowing technics used
elsewhere. Smack uses netlabel for CIPSO labeling. Smack provides
a pseudo-filesystem smackfs that is used for manipulation of
system Smack attributes.
The patch, patches for ls and sshd, a README, a startup script,
and x86 binaries for ls and sshd are also available on
http://www.schaufler-ca.com
Development has been done using Fedora Core 7 in a virtual machine
environment and on an old Sony laptop.
Smack provides mandatory access controls based on the label attached
to a task and the label attached to the object it is attempting to
access. Smack labels are deliberately short (1-23 characters) text
strings. Single character labels using special characters are reserved
for system use. The only operation applied to Smack labels is equality
comparison. No wildcards or expressions, regular or otherwise, are
used. Smack labels are composed of printable characters and may not
include "/".
A file always gets the Smack label of the task that created it.
Smack defines and uses these labels:
"*" - pronounced "star"
"_" - pronounced "floor"
"^" - pronounced "hat"
"?" - pronounced "huh"
The access rules enforced by Smack are, in order:
1. Any access requested by a task labeled "*" is denied.
2. A read or execute access requested by a task labeled "^"
is permitted.
3. A read or execute access requested on an object labeled "_"
is permitted.
4. Any access requested on an object labeled "*" is permitted.
5. Any access requested by a task on an object with the same
label is permitted.
6. Any access requested that is explicitly defined in the loaded
rule set is permitted.
7. Any other access is denied.
Rules may be explicitly defined by writing subject,object,access
triples to /smack/load.
Smack rule sets can be easily defined that describe Bell&LaPadula
sensitivity, Biba integrity, and a variety of interesting
configurations. Smack rule sets can be modified on the fly to
accommodate changes in the operating environment or even the time
of day.
Some practical use cases:
Hierarchical levels. The less common of the two usual uses
for MLS systems is to define hierarchical levels, often
unclassified, confidential, secret, and so on. To set up smack
to support this, these rules could be defined:
C Unclass rx
S C rx
S Unclass rx
TS S rx
TS C rx
TS Unclass rx
A TS process can read S, C, and Unclass data, but cannot write it.
An S process can read C and Unclass. Note that specifying that
TS can read S and S can read C does not imply TS can read C, it
has to be explicitly stated.
Non-hierarchical categories. This is the more common of the
usual uses for an MLS system. Since the default rule is that a
subject cannot access an object with a different label no
access rules are required to implement compartmentalization.
A case that the Bell & LaPadula policy does not allow is demonstrated
with this Smack access rule:
A case that Bell&LaPadula does not allow that Smack does:
ESPN ABC r
ABC ESPN r
On my portable video device I have two applications, one that
shows ABC programming and the other ESPN programming. ESPN wants
to show me sport stories that show up as news, and ABC will
only provide minimal information about a sports story if ESPN
is covering it. Each side can look at the other's info, neither
can change the other. Neither can see what FOX is up to, which
is just as well all things considered.
Another case that I especially like:
SatData Guard w
Guard Publish w
A program running with the Guard label opens a UDP socket and
accepts messages sent by a program running with a SatData label.
The Guard program inspects the message to ensure it is wholesome
and if it is sends it to a program running with the Publish label.
This program then puts the information passed in an appropriate
place. Note that the Guard program cannot write to a Publish
file system object because file system semanitic require read as
well as write.
The four cases (categories, levels, mutual read, guardbox) here
are all quite real, and problems I've been asked to solve over
the years. The first two are easy to do with traditonal MLS systems
while the last two you can't without invoking privilege, at least
for a while.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Joshua Brindle <method@manicmethod.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-05 01:29:50 -05:00
|
|
|
if (rc == 0)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2008-07-30 18:37:11 -04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Return if a specific label has been designated as the
|
|
|
|
* only one that gets privilege and current does not
|
|
|
|
* have that label.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2008-11-13 18:39:16 -05:00
|
|
|
if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != current->cred->security)
|
2008-07-30 18:37:11 -04:00
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel
Smack is the Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel.
Smack implements mandatory access control (MAC) using labels
attached to tasks and data containers, including files, SVIPC,
and other tasks. Smack is a kernel based scheme that requires
an absolute minimum of application support and a very small
amount of configuration data.
Smack uses extended attributes and
provides a set of general mount options, borrowing technics used
elsewhere. Smack uses netlabel for CIPSO labeling. Smack provides
a pseudo-filesystem smackfs that is used for manipulation of
system Smack attributes.
The patch, patches for ls and sshd, a README, a startup script,
and x86 binaries for ls and sshd are also available on
http://www.schaufler-ca.com
Development has been done using Fedora Core 7 in a virtual machine
environment and on an old Sony laptop.
Smack provides mandatory access controls based on the label attached
to a task and the label attached to the object it is attempting to
access. Smack labels are deliberately short (1-23 characters) text
strings. Single character labels using special characters are reserved
for system use. The only operation applied to Smack labels is equality
comparison. No wildcards or expressions, regular or otherwise, are
used. Smack labels are composed of printable characters and may not
include "/".
A file always gets the Smack label of the task that created it.
Smack defines and uses these labels:
"*" - pronounced "star"
"_" - pronounced "floor"
"^" - pronounced "hat"
"?" - pronounced "huh"
The access rules enforced by Smack are, in order:
1. Any access requested by a task labeled "*" is denied.
2. A read or execute access requested by a task labeled "^"
is permitted.
3. A read or execute access requested on an object labeled "_"
is permitted.
4. Any access requested on an object labeled "*" is permitted.
5. Any access requested by a task on an object with the same
label is permitted.
6. Any access requested that is explicitly defined in the loaded
rule set is permitted.
7. Any other access is denied.
Rules may be explicitly defined by writing subject,object,access
triples to /smack/load.
Smack rule sets can be easily defined that describe Bell&LaPadula
sensitivity, Biba integrity, and a variety of interesting
configurations. Smack rule sets can be modified on the fly to
accommodate changes in the operating environment or even the time
of day.
Some practical use cases:
Hierarchical levels. The less common of the two usual uses
for MLS systems is to define hierarchical levels, often
unclassified, confidential, secret, and so on. To set up smack
to support this, these rules could be defined:
C Unclass rx
S C rx
S Unclass rx
TS S rx
TS C rx
TS Unclass rx
A TS process can read S, C, and Unclass data, but cannot write it.
An S process can read C and Unclass. Note that specifying that
TS can read S and S can read C does not imply TS can read C, it
has to be explicitly stated.
Non-hierarchical categories. This is the more common of the
usual uses for an MLS system. Since the default rule is that a
subject cannot access an object with a different label no
access rules are required to implement compartmentalization.
A case that the Bell & LaPadula policy does not allow is demonstrated
with this Smack access rule:
A case that Bell&LaPadula does not allow that Smack does:
ESPN ABC r
ABC ESPN r
On my portable video device I have two applications, one that
shows ABC programming and the other ESPN programming. ESPN wants
to show me sport stories that show up as news, and ABC will
only provide minimal information about a sports story if ESPN
is covering it. Each side can look at the other's info, neither
can change the other. Neither can see what FOX is up to, which
is just as well all things considered.
Another case that I especially like:
SatData Guard w
Guard Publish w
A program running with the Guard label opens a UDP socket and
accepts messages sent by a program running with a SatData label.
The Guard program inspects the message to ensure it is wholesome
and if it is sends it to a program running with the Publish label.
This program then puts the information passed in an appropriate
place. Note that the Guard program cannot write to a Publish
file system object because file system semanitic require read as
well as write.
The four cases (categories, levels, mutual read, guardbox) here
are all quite real, and problems I've been asked to solve over
the years. The first two are easy to do with traditonal MLS systems
while the last two you can't without invoking privilege, at least
for a while.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Joshua Brindle <method@manicmethod.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-05 01:29:50 -05:00
|
|
|
if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_known_lock);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* smk_import_entry - import a label, return the list entry
|
|
|
|
* @string: a text string that might be a Smack label
|
|
|
|
* @len: the maximum size, or zero if it is NULL terminated.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Returns a pointer to the entry in the label list that
|
|
|
|
* matches the passed string, adding it if necessary.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct smack_known *smk_import_entry(const char *string, int len)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct smack_known *skp;
|
|
|
|
char smack[SMK_LABELLEN];
|
|
|
|
int found;
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (len <= 0 || len > SMK_MAXLEN)
|
|
|
|
len = SMK_MAXLEN;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0, found = 0; i < SMK_LABELLEN; i++) {
|
|
|
|
if (found)
|
|
|
|
smack[i] = '\0';
|
|
|
|
else if (i >= len || string[i] > '~' || string[i] <= ' ' ||
|
|
|
|
string[i] == '/') {
|
|
|
|
smack[i] = '\0';
|
|
|
|
found = 1;
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
smack[i] = string[i];
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (smack[0] == '\0')
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mutex_lock(&smack_known_lock);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (skp = smack_known; skp != NULL; skp = skp->smk_next)
|
|
|
|
if (strncmp(skp->smk_known, smack, SMK_MAXLEN) == 0)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (skp == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
skp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_known), GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
|
|
if (skp != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
skp->smk_next = smack_known;
|
|
|
|
strncpy(skp->smk_known, smack, SMK_MAXLEN);
|
|
|
|
skp->smk_secid = smack_next_secid++;
|
|
|
|
skp->smk_cipso = NULL;
|
|
|
|
spin_lock_init(&skp->smk_cipsolock);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Make sure that the entry is actually
|
|
|
|
* filled before putting it on the list.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
smp_mb();
|
|
|
|
smack_known = skp;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mutex_unlock(&smack_known_lock);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return skp;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* smk_import - import a smack label
|
|
|
|
* @string: a text string that might be a Smack label
|
|
|
|
* @len: the maximum size, or zero if it is NULL terminated.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Returns a pointer to the label in the label list that
|
|
|
|
* matches the passed string, adding it if necessary.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
char *smk_import(const char *string, int len)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct smack_known *skp;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
skp = smk_import_entry(string, len);
|
|
|
|
if (skp == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
return skp->smk_known;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* smack_from_secid - find the Smack label associated with a secid
|
|
|
|
* @secid: an integer that might be associated with a Smack label
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Returns a pointer to the appropraite Smack label if there is one,
|
|
|
|
* otherwise a pointer to the invalid Smack label.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
char *smack_from_secid(const u32 secid)
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{
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struct smack_known *skp;
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for (skp = smack_known; skp != NULL; skp = skp->smk_next)
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if (skp->smk_secid == secid)
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return skp->smk_known;
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/*
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* If we got this far someone asked for the translation
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* of a secid that is not on the list.
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*/
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return smack_known_invalid.smk_known;
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}
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/**
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* smack_to_secid - find the secid associated with a Smack label
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* @smack: the Smack label
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*
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* Returns the appropriate secid if there is one,
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* otherwise 0
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*/
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u32 smack_to_secid(const char *smack)
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|
{
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|
struct smack_known *skp;
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for (skp = smack_known; skp != NULL; skp = skp->smk_next)
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if (strncmp(skp->smk_known, smack, SMK_MAXLEN) == 0)
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return skp->smk_secid;
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|
return 0;
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}
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/**
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* smack_from_cipso - find the Smack label associated with a CIPSO option
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|
* @level: Bell & LaPadula level from the network
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|
* @cp: Bell & LaPadula categories from the network
|
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|
|
* @result: where to put the Smack value
|
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|
*
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|
|
* This is a simple lookup in the label table.
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|
*
|
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|
|
* This is an odd duck as far as smack handling goes in that
|
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|
|
* it sends back a copy of the smack label rather than a pointer
|
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|
|
* to the master list. This is done because it is possible for
|
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|
|
* a foreign host to send a smack label that is new to this
|
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|
|
* machine and hence not on the list. That would not be an
|
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|
* issue except that adding an entry to the master list can't
|
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|
|
* be done at that point.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void smack_from_cipso(u32 level, char *cp, char *result)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct smack_known *kp;
|
|
|
|
char *final = NULL;
|
|
|
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|
|
for (kp = smack_known; final == NULL && kp != NULL; kp = kp->smk_next) {
|
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|
|
if (kp->smk_cipso == NULL)
|
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|
|
continue;
|
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|
|
spin_lock_bh(&kp->smk_cipsolock);
|
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|
|
if (kp->smk_cipso->smk_level == level &&
|
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|
|
memcmp(kp->smk_cipso->smk_catset, cp, SMK_LABELLEN) == 0)
|
|
|
|
final = kp->smk_known;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock_bh(&kp->smk_cipsolock);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (final == NULL)
|
|
|
|
final = smack_known_huh.smk_known;
|
|
|
|
strncpy(result, final, SMK_MAXLEN);
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* smack_to_cipso - find the CIPSO option to go with a Smack label
|
|
|
|
* @smack: a pointer to the smack label in question
|
|
|
|
* @cp: where to put the result
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Returns zero if a value is available, non-zero otherwise.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int smack_to_cipso(const char *smack, struct smack_cipso *cp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct smack_known *kp;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (kp = smack_known; kp != NULL; kp = kp->smk_next)
|
|
|
|
if (kp->smk_known == smack ||
|
|
|
|
strcmp(kp->smk_known, smack) == 0)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (kp == NULL || kp->smk_cipso == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return -ENOENT;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(cp, kp->smk_cipso, sizeof(struct smack_cipso));
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|