From 5d3975e36c64eed8168007a5b3d0c4700706307f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christian Brauner Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2023 18:17:04 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] tmpfs: verify {g,u}id mount options correctly [ Upstream commit 0200679fc7953177941e41c2a4241d0b6c2c5de8 ] A while ago we received the following report: "The other outstanding issue I noticed comes from the fact that fsconfig syscalls may occur in a different userns than that which called fsopen. That means that resolving the uid/gid via current_user_ns() can save a kuid that isn't mapped in the associated namespace when the filesystem is finally mounted. This means that it is possible for an unprivileged user to create files owned by any group in a tmpfs mount (since we can set the SUID bit on the tmpfs directory), or a tmpfs that is owned by any user, including the root group/user." The contract for {g,u}id mount options and {g,u}id values in general set from userspace has always been that they are translated according to the caller's idmapping. In so far, tmpfs has been doing the correct thing. But since tmpfs is mountable in unprivileged contexts it is also necessary to verify that the resulting {k,g}uid is representable in the namespace of the superblock to avoid such bugs as above. The new mount api's cross-namespace delegation abilities are already widely used. After having talked to a bunch of userspace this is the most faithful solution with minimal regression risks. I know of one users - systemd - that makes use of the new mount api in this way and they don't set unresolable {g,u}ids. So the regression risk is minimal. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CALxfFW4BXhEwxR0Q5LSkg-8Vb4r2MONKCcUCVioehXQKr35eHg@mail.gmail.com Fixes: f32356261d44 ("vfs: Convert ramfs, shmem, tmpfs, devtmpfs, rootfs to use the new mount API") Reviewed-by: "Seth Forshee (DigitalOcean)" Reported-by: Seth Jenkins Message-Id: <20230801-vfs-fs_context-uidgid-v1-1-daf46a050bbf@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- mm/shmem.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/shmem.c b/mm/shmem.c index aae2f408f905..264229680ad7 100644 --- a/mm/shmem.c +++ b/mm/shmem.c @@ -3417,6 +3417,8 @@ static int shmem_parse_one(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param) unsigned long long size; char *rest; int opt; + kuid_t kuid; + kgid_t kgid; opt = fs_parse(fc, &shmem_fs_parameters, param, &result); if (opt < 0) @@ -3452,14 +3454,32 @@ static int shmem_parse_one(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param) ctx->mode = result.uint_32 & 07777; break; case Opt_uid: - ctx->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), result.uint_32); - if (!uid_valid(ctx->uid)) + kuid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), result.uint_32); + if (!uid_valid(kuid)) goto bad_value; + + /* + * The requested uid must be representable in the + * filesystem's idmapping. + */ + if (!kuid_has_mapping(fc->user_ns, kuid)) + goto bad_value; + + ctx->uid = kuid; break; case Opt_gid: - ctx->gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), result.uint_32); - if (!gid_valid(ctx->gid)) + kgid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), result.uint_32); + if (!gid_valid(kgid)) goto bad_value; + + /* + * The requested gid must be representable in the + * filesystem's idmapping. + */ + if (!kgid_has_mapping(fc->user_ns, kgid)) + goto bad_value; + + ctx->gid = kgid; break; case Opt_huge: ctx->huge = result.uint_32;