arm64: errata: Fix KVM Spectre-v2 mitigation selection for Cortex-A57/A72
Both the Spectre-v2 and Spectre-BHB mitigations involve running a sequence
immediately after exiting a guest, before any branches. In the stable
kernels these sequences are built by copying templates into an empty vector
slot.
For Spectre-BHB, Cortex-A57 and A72 require the branchy loop with k=8.
If Spectre-v2 needs mitigating at the same time, a firmware call to EL3 is
needed. The work EL3 does at this point is also enough to mitigate
Spectre-BHB.
When enabling the Spectre-BHB mitigation, spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation()
should check if a slot has already been allocated for Spectre-v2, meaning
no work is needed for Spectre-BHB.
This check was missed in the earlier backport, add it.
Fixes: 9013fd4bc9
("arm64: Mitigate spectre style branch history side channels")
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
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@ -1363,6 +1363,12 @@ void spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry)
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} else if (spectre_bhb_loop_affected(SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) {
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switch (spectre_bhb_loop_affected(SCOPE_SYSTEM)) {
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case 8:
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/*
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* A57/A72-r0 will already have selected the
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* spectre-indirect vector, which is sufficient
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* for BHB too.
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*/
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if (!__this_cpu_read(bp_hardening_data.fn))
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kvm_setup_bhb_slot(__spectre_bhb_loop_k8_start);
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break;
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case 24:
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