crypto: ecdh_helper - Ensure 'len >= secret.len' in decode_key()
[ Upstream commit a53ab94eb6850c3657392e2d2ce9b38c387a2633 ]
The length ('len' parameter) passed to crypto_ecdh_decode_key() is never
checked against the length encoded in the passed buffer ('buf'
parameter). This could lead to an out-of-bounds access when the passed
length is less than the encoded length.
Add a check to prevent that.
Fixes: 3c4b23901a
("crypto: ecdh - Add ECDH software support")
Signed-off-by: Daniele Alessandrelli <daniele.alessandrelli@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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@ -67,6 +67,9 @@ int crypto_ecdh_decode_key(const char *buf, unsigned int len,
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if (secret.type != CRYPTO_KPP_SECRET_TYPE_ECDH)
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return -EINVAL;
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if (unlikely(len < secret.len))
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return -EINVAL;
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ptr = ecdh_unpack_data(¶ms->curve_id, ptr, sizeof(params->curve_id));
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ptr = ecdh_unpack_data(¶ms->key_size, ptr, sizeof(params->key_size));
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if (secret.len != crypto_ecdh_key_len(params))
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