ipv6: make exception cache less predictible
[ Upstream commit a00df2caffed3883c341d5685f830434312e4a43 ]
Even after commit 4785305c05b2 ("ipv6: use siphash in rt6_exception_hash()"),
an attacker can still use brute force to learn some secrets from a victim
linux host.
One way to defeat these attacks is to make the max depth of the hash
table bucket a random value.
Before this patch, each bucket of the hash table used to store exceptions
could contain 6 items under attack.
After the patch, each bucket would contains a random number of items,
between 6 and 10. The attacker can no longer infer secrets.
This is slightly increasing memory size used by the hash table,
we do not expect this to be a problem.
Following patch is dealing with the same issue in IPv4.
Fixes: 35732d01fe
("ipv6: introduce a hash table to store dst cache")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Keyu Man <kman001@ucr.edu>
Cc: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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parent
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@ -1667,6 +1667,7 @@ static int rt6_insert_exception(struct rt6_info *nrt,
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struct in6_addr *src_key = NULL;
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struct rt6_exception *rt6_ex;
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struct fib6_nh *nh = res->nh;
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int max_depth;
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int err = 0;
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spin_lock_bh(&rt6_exception_lock);
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@ -1721,7 +1722,9 @@ static int rt6_insert_exception(struct rt6_info *nrt,
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bucket->depth++;
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net->ipv6.rt6_stats->fib_rt_cache++;
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if (bucket->depth > FIB6_MAX_DEPTH)
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/* Randomize max depth to avoid some side channels attacks. */
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max_depth = FIB6_MAX_DEPTH + prandom_u32_max(FIB6_MAX_DEPTH);
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while (bucket->depth > max_depth)
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rt6_exception_remove_oldest(bucket);
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out:
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