Otherwise we could be attempting to flush data for a writeback
thread and bdi that have already disappeared.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
We do this automatically in get_sb_bdev() from the set_bdev_super()
callback. Filesystems that have their own private backing_dev_info
must assign that in ->fill_super().
Note that ->s_bdi assignment is required for proper writeback!
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
When mounting an "nfs" type file system, recognize "v4," "vers=4," or
"nfsvers=4" mount options, and convert the file system to "nfs4" under
the covers.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
[trondmy: fixed up binary mount code so it sets the 'version' field too]
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Clean up: Refactor nfs4_get_sb() to allow its guts to be invoked by
nfs_get_sb().
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Clean up: Refactor the part of nfs4_validate_mount_options() that
handles text-based options, so we can call it from the NFSv2/v3
option validation function.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
The meaning of not specifying the "port=" mount option is different
for "-t nfs" and "-t nfs4" mounts. The default port value for
NFSv2/v3 mounts is 0, but the default for NFSv4 mounts is 2049.
To support "-t nfs -o vers=4", the mount option parser must detect
when "port=" is missing so that the correct default port value can be
set depending on which NFS version is requested.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Some releases of Linux rpc.mountd (nfs-utils 1.1.4 and later) return an
empty auth flavor list if no sec= was specified for the export. This is
notably broken server behavior.
The new auth flavor list checking added in a recent commit rejects this
case. The OpenSolaris client does too.
The broken mountd implementation is already widely deployed. To avoid
a behavioral regression, the kernel's mount client skips flavor checking
(ie reverts to the pre-2.6.32 behavior) if mountd returns an empty
flavor list.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Clean up: Use the common routine now provided in sunrpc.ko for parsing mount
addresses.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Commit a14017db added support in the kernel's NFS mount client to
decode the authentication flavor list returned by mountd.
The NFS client can now use this list to determine whether the
authentication flavor requested by the user is actually supported
by the server.
Note we don't actually negotiate the security flavor if none was
specified by the user. Instead, we try to use AUTH_SYS, and fail if
the server does not support it. This prevents us from negotiating
an inappropriate security flavor (some servers list AUTH_NULL first).
If the server does not support AUTH_SYS, the user must provide an
appropriate security flavor by specifying the "sec=" mount option.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Previous logic in the NFS mount parsing code path assumed
auth_flavor_len was set to zero for simple authentication flavors
(like AUTH_UNIX), and 1 for compound flavors (like AUTH_GSS).
At some earlier point (maybe even before the option parsers were
merged?) specific checks for auth_flavor_len being zero were removed
from the functions that validate the mount option that sets the mount
point's authentication flavor.
Since we are populating an array for authentication flavors, the
auth_flavor_len should always be set to the number of flavors. Let's
eliminate some cleverness here, and prepare for new logic that needs
to know the number of flavors in the auth_flavors[] array.
(auth_flavors[] is an array because at some point we want to allow a
list of acceptable authentication flavors to be specified via the sec=
mount option. For now it remains a single element array).
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
The new minorversion= mount option (commit 3fd5be9e) was merged at
the same time as the recent sloppy parser fixes (commit a5a16bae),
so minorversion= still uses the old value parsing logic.
If the minorversion= option specifies a bogus value, it should fail
with "bad value" not "bad option."
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
As noted in the previous patch, the NFSv4 client mount code currently
has several limitations. If the mount path contains symlinks, or
referrals, or even if it just contains a '..', then the client code in
nfs4_path_walk() will fail with an error.
This patch replaces the nfs4_path_walk()-based lookup with a helper
function that sets up a private namespace to represent the namespace on the
server, then uses the ordinary VFS and NFS path lookup code to walk down the
mount path in that namespace.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Specifying "port=-5" with the kernel's current mount option parser
generates "unrecognized mount option". If "sloppy" is set, this
causes the mount to succeed and use the default values; the desired
behavior is that, since this is a valid option with an invalid value,
the mount should fail, even with "sloppy."
To properly handle "sloppy" parsing, we need to distinguish between
correct options with invalid values, and incorrect options. We will
need to parse integer values by hand, therefore, and not rely on
match_token().
For instance, these must all fail with "invalid value":
port=12345678
port=-5
port=samuel
and not with "unrecognized option," as they do currently.
Thus, for the sake of match_token() we need to treat the values for
these options as strings, and do the conversion to integers using
strict_strtol().
This is basically the same solution we used for the earlier "retry="
fix (commit ecbb3845), except in this case the kernel actually has to
parse the value, rather than ignore it.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Ian Kent reports:
"I've noticed a couple of other regressions with the options vers
and proto option of mount.nfs(8).
The commands:
mount -t nfs -o vers=<invalid version> <server>:/<path> /<mountpoint>
mount -t nfs -o proto=<invalid proto> <server>:/<path> /<mountpoint>
both immediately fail.
But if the "-s" option is also used they both succeed with the
mount falling back to defaults (by the look of it).
In the past these failed even when the sloppy option was given, as
I think they should. I believe the sloppy option is meant to allow
the mount command to still function for mount options (for example
in shared autofs maps) that exist on other Unix implementations but
aren't present in the Linux mount.nfs(8). So, an invalid value
specified for a known mount option is different to an unknown mount
option and should fail appropriately."
See RH bugzilla 486266.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Solder xdr_stream-based XDR decoding functions into the in-kernel mountd
client that are more careful about checking data types and watching for
buffer overflows. The new MNT3 decoder includes support for auth-flavor
list decoding.
The "_sz" macro for MNT3 replies was missing the size of the file handle.
I've added this back, and included the size of the auth flavor array.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
The "intr" mount option has been deprecated for a while, but
/proc/mounts continues to display "nointr" whether "intr" or "nointr"
has been specified for a mount point.
Since these options do not have any effect, simply do not display
them.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Frees the preallocated backchannel resources that are associated with
this session when the session is destroyed.
A backchannel is currently created once per session. Destroy the backchannel
only when the session is destroyed.
Signed-off-by: Ricardo Labiaga <ricardo.labiaga@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson<andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Benny Halevy <bhalevy@panasas.com>
NFSv4 should just ignore the 'nolock' option. It is an NFSv2/v3 thing...
This fixes the Oops in http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13330
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
mount -t nfs4 -o minorversion=[0|1] specifies whether to use 4.0 or 4.1.
By default, the minorversion is set to 0.
Signed-off-by: Mike Sager <sager@netapp.com>
[set default minorversion to 0 as per Trond and SteveD's request]
Signed-off-by: Benny Halevy <bhalevy@panasas.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Due to an apparent typo, commit a67d18f89f
(NFS: load the rpc/rdma transport module automatically) lead to the
'proto=' mount option doing a double free, while Opt_mountproto leaks a
string.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Add NFS mount options to allow the local caching support to be enabled.
The attached patch makes it possible for the NFS filesystem to be told to make
use of the network filesystem local caching service (FS-Cache).
To be able to use this, a recent nfsutils package is required.
There are three variant NFS mount options that can be added to a mount command
to control caching for a mount. Only the last one specified takes effect:
(*) Adding "fsc" will request caching.
(*) Adding "fsc=<string>" will request caching and also specify a uniquifier.
(*) Adding "nofsc" will disable caching.
For example:
mount warthog:/ /a -o fsc
The cache of a particular superblock (NFS FSID) will be shared between all
mounts of that volume, provided they have the same connection parameters and
are not marked 'nosharecache'.
Where it is otherwise impossible to distinguish superblocks because all the
parameters are identical, but the 'nosharecache' option is supplied, a
uniquifying string must be supplied, else only the first mount will be
permitted to use the cache.
If there's a key collision, then the second mount will disable caching and give
a warning into the kernel log.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Tested-by: Daire Byrne <Daire.Byrne@framestore.com>
Add some new NFS I/O counters for FS-Cache doing things for NFS. A new line is
emitted into /proc/pid/mountstats if caching is enabled that looks like:
fsc: <rok> <rfl> <wok> <wfl> <unc>
Where <rok> is the number of pages read successfully from the cache, <rfl> is
the number of failed page reads against the cache, <wok> is the number of
successful page writes to the cache, <wfl> is the number of failed page writes
to the cache, and <unc> is the number of NFS pages that have been disconnected
from the cache.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Tested-by: Daire Byrne <Daire.Byrne@framestore.com>
Define and create superblock-level cache index objects (as managed by
nfs_server structs).
Each superblock object is created in a server level index object and is itself
an index into which inode-level objects are inserted.
Ideally there would be one superblock-level object per server, and the former
would be folded into the latter; however, since the "nosharecache" option
exists this isn't possible.
The superblock object key is a sequence consisting of:
(1) Certain superblock s_flags.
(2) Various connection parameters that serve to distinguish superblocks for
sget().
(3) The volume FSID.
(4) The security flavour.
(5) The uniquifier length.
(6) The uniquifier text. This is normally an empty string, unless the fsc=xyz
mount option was used to explicitly specify a uniquifier.
The key blob is of variable length, depending on the length of (6).
The superblock object is given no coherency data to carry in the auxiliary data
permitted by the cache. It is assumed that the superblock is always coherent.
This patch also adds uniquification handling such that two otherwise identical
superblocks, at least one of which is marked "nosharecache", won't end up
trying to share the on-disk cache. It will be possible to manually provide a
uniquifier through a mount option with a later patch to avoid the error
otherwise produced.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Tested-by: Daire Byrne <Daire.Byrne@framestore.com>
When mounting an NFS/RDMA server with the "-o proto=rdma" or
"-o rdma" options, attempt to dynamically load the necessary
"xprtrdma" client transport module. Doing so improves usability,
while avoiding a static module dependency and any unnecesary
resources.
Signed-off-by: Tom Talpey <tmtalpey@gmail.com>
Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Add a flag to mark delegations as requiring return, then run a garbage
collector. In the future, this will allow for more flexible delegation
management, where delegations may be marked for return if it turns out
that they are not being referenced.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
If the admin has specified the "noresvport" option for an NFS mount
point, the kernel's NFS client uses an unprivileged source port for
the main NFS transport. The kernel's mountd client should use an
unprivileged port in this case as well.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
The standard default security setting for NFS is AUTH_SYS. An NFS
client connects to NFS servers via a privileged source port and a
fixed standard destination port (2049). The client sends raw uid and
gid numbers to identify users making NFS requests, and the server
assumes an appropriate authority on the client has vetted these
values because the source port is privileged.
On Linux, by default in-kernel RPC services use a privileged port in
the range between 650 and 1023 to avoid using source ports of well-
known IP services. Using such a small range limits the number of NFS
mount points and the number of unique NFS servers to which a client
can connect concurrently.
An NFS client can use unprivileged source ports to expand the range of
source port numbers, allowing more concurrent server connections and
more NFS mount points. Servers must explicitly allow NFS connections
from unprivileged ports for this to work.
In the past, bumping the value of the sunrpc.max_resvport sysctl on
the client would permit the NFS client to use unprivileged ports.
Bumping this setting also changes the maximum port number used by
other in-kernel RPC services, some of which still required a port
number less than 1023.
This is exacerbated by the way source port numbers are chosen by the
Linux RPC client, which starts at the top of the range and works
downwards. It means that bumping the maximum means all RPC services
requesting a source port will likely get an unprivileged port instead
of a privileged one.
Changing this setting effects all NFS mount points on a client. A
sysadmin could not selectively choose which mount points would use
non-privileged ports and which could not.
Lastly, this mechanism of expanding the limit on the number of NFS
mount points was entirely undocumented.
To address the need for the NFS client to use a large range of source
ports without interfering with the activity of other in-kernel RPC
services, we introduce a new NFS mount option. This option explicitly
tells only the NFS client to use a non-privileged source port when
communicating with the NFS server for one specific mount point.
This new mount option is called "resvport," like the similar NFS mount
option on FreeBSD and Mac OS X. A sister patch for nfs-utils will be
submitted that documents this new option in nfs(5).
The default setting for this new mount option requires the NFS client
to use a privileged port, as before. Explicitly specifying the
"noresvport" mount option allows the NFS client to use an unprivileged
source port for this mount point when connecting to the NFS server
port.
This mount option is supported only for text-based NFS mounts.
[ Sidebar: it is widely known that security mechanisms based on the
use of privileged source ports are ineffective. However, the NFS
client can combine the use of unprivileged ports with the use of
secure authentication mechanisms, such as Kerberos. This allows a
large number of connections and mount points while ensuring a useful
level of security.
Eventually we may change the default setting for this option
depending on the security flavor used for the mount. For example,
if the mount is using only AUTH_SYS, then the default setting will
be "resvport;" if the mount is using a strong security flavor such
as krb5, the default setting will be "noresvport." ]
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
[Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com: Fixed a bug whereby nfs4_init_client()
was being called with incorrect arguments.]
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Clean up: convert nfs_mount() to take a single data structure argument to make
it simpler to add more arguments.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Using NIPQUAD() with NIPQUAD_FMT, %d.%d.%d.%d or %u.%u.%u.%u
can be replaced with %pI4
Signed-off-by: Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The iscsi_ibft.c changes are almost certainly a bugfix as the
pointer 'ip' is a u8 *, so they never print the last 8 bytes
of the IPv6 address, and the eight bytes they do print have
a zero byte with them in each 16-bit word.
Other than that, this should cause no difference in functionality.
Signed-off-by: Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This is a much better version of a previous patch to make the parser
tables constant. Rather than changing the typedef, we put the "const" in
all the various places where its required, allowing the __initconst
exception for nfsroot which was the cause of the previous trouble.
This was posted for review some time ago and I believe its been in -mm
since then.
Signed-off-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <aviro@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Bruce observed that nfs_parse_ip_address() will successfully parse an
IPv6 address that looks like this:
"::1%"
A scope delimiter is present, but there is no scope ID following it.
This is harmless, as it would simply set the scope ID to zero. However,
in some cases we would like to flag this as an improperly formed
address.
We are now also careful to reject addresses where garbage follows the
address (up to the length of the string), instead of ignoring the
non-address characters; and where the scope ID is nonsense (not a valid
device name, but also not numeric). Before, both of these cases would
result in a harmless zero scope ID.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
The code incorrectly assumes here that the server name (or ip address)
is null-terminated. This can cause referrals to fail in some cases.
Also support ipv6 addresses.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
We plan to use this function elsewhere.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
The point of introducing text-based mounts was to allow us to add
functionality without having to worry about legacy binary mount formats.
The mask should be there in order to ensure that binary formats don't start
enabling features that they cannot support. There is no justification for
applying it to the text mount path.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
