All ->doit handlers want a struct rtattr **, so pass down the right
type.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
An audit message occurs when an ipsec SA
or ipsec policy is created/deleted.
Signed-off-by: Joy Latten <latten@austin.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Since we never checked the ->family value of templates
before, many applications simply leave it at zero.
Detect this and fix it up to be the pol->family value.
Also, do not clobber xp->family while reading in templates,
that is not necessary.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
aevents can not uniquely identify an SA. We break the ABI with this
patch, but consensus is that since it is not yet utilized by any
(known) application then it is fine (better do it now than later).
Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <hadi@cyberus.ca>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Miika Komu <miika@iki.fi>
Signed-off-by: Diego Beltrami <Diego.Beltrami@hiit.fi>
Signed-off-by: Kazunori Miyazawa <miyazawa@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Might as well make flush notifier prettier when subpolicy used
Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <hadi@cyberus.ca>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The destination PID is passed directly to netlink_unicast()
respectively netlink_multicast().
Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Make copy_to_user_policy_type take a type instead a policy and
fix its users to pass the type
Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <hadi@cyberus.ca>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
When application uses XFRM_MSG_GETSA to get state entry through
netlink socket and kernel has no matching one, the application expects
reply message with error status by kernel.
Kernel doesn't send the message back in the case of Mobile IPv6 route
optimization protocols (i.e. routing header or destination options
header). This is caused by incorrect return code "0" from
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c(xfrm_user_state_lookup) and it makes kernel skip
to acknowledge at net/netlink/af_netlink.c(netlink_rcv_skb).
This patch fix to reply ESRCH to application.
Signed-off-by: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: TAKAMIYA Noriaki <takamiya@po.ntts.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
I actually dont have a test case for these; i just found them by
inspection. Refer to patch "[XFRM]: Sub-policies broke policy events"
for more info
Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <hadi@cyberus.ca>
Acked-by: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
XFRM policy events are broken when sub-policy feature is turned on.
A simple test to verify this:
run ip xfrm mon on one window and add then delete a policy on another
window ..
Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <hadi@cyberus.ca>
Acked-by: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Use memcpy() to move xfrm_address_t objects in and out
of netlink messages. The vast majority of xfrm_user was
doing this properly, except for copy_from_user_state()
and copy_to_user_state().
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Currently when an IPSec policy rule doesn't specify a security
context, it is assumed to be "unlabeled" by SELinux, and so
the IPSec policy rule fails to match to a flow that it would
otherwise match to, unless one has explicitly added an SELinux
policy rule allowing the flow to "polmatch" to the "unlabeled"
IPSec policy rules. In the absence of such an explicitly added
SELinux policy rule, the IPSec policy rule fails to match and
so the packet(s) flow in clear text without the otherwise applicable
xfrm(s) applied.
The above SELinux behavior violates the SELinux security notion of
"deny by default" which should actually translate to "encrypt by
default" in the above case.
This was first reported by Evgeniy Polyakov and the way James Morris
was seeing the problem was when connecting via IPsec to a
confined service on an SELinux box (vsftpd), which did not have the
appropriate SELinux policy permissions to send packets via IPsec.
With this patch applied, SELinux "polmatching" of flows Vs. IPSec
policy rules will only come into play when there's a explicit context
specified for the IPSec policy rule (which also means there's corresponding
SELinux policy allowing appropriate domains/flows to polmatch to this context).
Secondly, when a security module is loaded (in this case, SELinux), the
security_xfrm_policy_lookup() hook can return errors other than access denied,
such as -EINVAL. We were not handling that correctly, and in fact
inverting the return logic and propagating a false "ok" back up to
xfrm_lookup(), which then allowed packets to pass as if they were not
associated with an xfrm policy.
The solution for this is to first ensure that errno values are
correctly propagated all the way back up through the various call chains
from security_xfrm_policy_lookup(), and handled correctly.
Then, flow_cache_lookup() is modified, so that if the policy resolver
fails (typically a permission denied via the security module), the flow
cache entry is killed rather than having a null policy assigned (which
indicates that the packet can pass freely). This also forces any future
lookups for the same flow to consult the security module (e.g. SELinux)
for current security policy (rather than, say, caching the error on the
flow cache entry).
This patch: Fix the selinux side of things.
This makes sure SELinux polmatching of flow contexts to IPSec policy
rules comes into play only when an explicit context is associated
with the IPSec policy rule.
Also, this no longer defaults the context of a socket policy to
the context of the socket since the "no explicit context" case
is now handled properly.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch introduces the BEET mode (Bound End-to-End Tunnel) with as
specified by the ietf draft at the following link:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-nikander-esp-beet-mode-06.txt
The patch provides only single family support (i.e. inner family =
outer family).
Signed-off-by: Diego Beltrami <diego.beltrami@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miika Komu <miika@iki.fi>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Abhinav Pathak <abhinav.pathak@hiit.fi>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Ahrenholz <ahrenholz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Sub policy can be used through netlink socket.
PF_KEY uses main only and it is TODO to support sub.
Signed-off-by: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
XFRM_MSG_REPORT is a message as notification of state protocol and
selector from kernel to user-space.
Mobile IPv6 will use it when inbound reject is occurred at route
optimization to make user-space know a binding error requirement.
Based on MIPL2 kernel patch.
Signed-off-by: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Add Mobile IPv6 route optimization protocols to netlink interface.
Route optimization states carry care-of address.
Based on MIPL2 kernel patch.
Signed-off-by: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Transformation user interface is not only for IPsec.
Based on MIPL2 kernel patch.
Signed-off-by: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
With this patch transformation state is updated last used time
for each sending. Xtime is used for it like other state lifetime
expiration.
Mobile IPv6 enabled nodes will want to know traffic status of each
binding (e.g. judgement to request binding refresh by correspondent node,
or to keep home/care-of nonce alive by mobile node).
The last used timestamp is an important hint about it.
Based on MIPL2 kernel patch.
This patch was also written by: Henrik Petander <petander@tcs.hut.fi>
Signed-off-by: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Care-of address is carried by state as a transformation option like
IPsec encryption/authentication algorithm.
Based on MIPL2 kernel patch.
Signed-off-by: Noriaki TAKAMIYA <takamiya@po.ntts.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
This is a support to search transformation states by its addresses
by using source address list for Mobile IPv6 usage.
To use it from user-space, it is also added a message type for
source address as a xfrm state option.
Based on MIPL2 kernel patch.
Signed-off-by: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
It will be added two more transformation protocols (routing header
and destination options header) for Mobile IPv6.
xfrm_id_proto_match() can be handle zero as all, IPSEC_PROTO_ANY as
all IPsec and otherwise as exact one.
Based on MIPL2 kernel patch.
Signed-off-by: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Transformation mode is used as either IPsec transport or tunnel.
It is required to add two more items, route optimization and inbound trigger
for Mobile IPv6.
Based on MIPL2 kernel patch.
This patch was also written by: Ville Nuorvala <vnuorval@tcs.hut.fi>
Signed-off-by: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This defaults the label of socket-specific IPSec policies to be the
same as the socket they are set on.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This includes the security context of a security association created
for use by IKE in the acquire messages sent to IKE daemons using
netlink/xfrm_user. This would allow the daemons to include the
security context in the negotiation, so that the resultant association
is unique to that security context.
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch adds a compatibility name field for each IPsec algorithm. This
is needed when parameterised algorithms are used. For example, "md5" will
become "hmac(md5)", and "aes" will become "cbc(aes)".
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The header file linux/crypto.h is only needed by a few files so including
it in net/xfrm.h (which is included by half of the networking stack) is a
waste. This patch moves it out of net/xfrm.h and into the specific header
files that actually need it.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch encapsulates the usage of eff_cap (in netlink_skb_params) within
the security framework by extending security_netlink_recv to include a required
capability parameter and converting all direct usage of eff_caps outside
of the lsm modules to use the interface. It also updates the SELinux
implementation of the security_netlink_send and security_netlink_recv
hooks to take advantage of the sid in the netlink_skb_params struct.
This also enables SELinux to perform auditing of netlink capability checks.
Please apply, for 2.6.18 if possible.
Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Assignment used as truth value in xfrm_del_sa()
and xfrm_get_policy().
Wrong argument type declared for security_xfrm_state_delete()
when SELINUX is disabled.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch contains a fix for the previous patch that adds security
contexts to IPsec policies and security associations. In the previous
patch, no authorization (besides the check for write permissions to
SAD and SPD) is required to delete IPsec policies and security
assocations with security contexts. Thus a user authorized to change
SAD and SPD can bypass the IPsec policy authorization by simply
deleteing policies with security contexts. To fix this security hole,
an additional authorization check is added for removing security
policies and security associations with security contexts.
Note that if no security context is supplied on add or present on
policy to be deleted, the SELinux module allows the change
unconditionally. The hook is called on deletion when no context is
present, which we may want to change. At present, I left it up to the
module.
LSM changes:
The patch adds two new LSM hooks: xfrm_policy_delete and
xfrm_state_delete. The new hooks are necessary to authorize deletion
of IPsec policies that have security contexts. The existing hooks
xfrm_policy_free and xfrm_state_free lack the context to do the
authorization, so I decided to split authorization of deletion and
memory management of security data, as is typical in the LSM
interface.
Use:
The new delete hooks are checked when xfrm_policy or xfrm_state are
deleted by either the xfrm_user interface (xfrm_get_policy,
xfrm_del_sa) or the pfkey interface (pfkey_spddelete, pfkey_delete).
SELinux changes:
The new policy_delete and state_delete functions are added.
Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
When xfrm_user isn't loaded xfrm_nl is NULL, which makes IPsec crash because
xfrm_aevent_is_on passes the NULL pointer to netlink_has_listeners as socket.
A second problem is that the xfrm_nl pointer is not cleared when the socket
is releases at module unload time.
Protect references of xfrm_nl from outside of xfrm_user by RCU, check
that the socket is present in xfrm_aevent_is_on and set it to NULL
when unloading xfrm_user.
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Semaphore to mutex conversion.
The conversion was generated via scripts, and the result was validated
automatically via a script as well.
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
First, it warns when PAGE_SIZE >= 64K because the ctx_len
field is 16-bits.
Secondly, if there are any real length limitations it can
be verified by the security layer security_xfrm_state_alloc()
call.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This is similar to the SA expire insertion patch - only it inserts
expires for SP.
Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <hadi@cyberus.ca>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch allows a user to insert SA expires. This is useful to
do on an HA backup for the case of byte counts but may not be very
useful for the case of time based expiry.
Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <hadi@cyberus.ca>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This introduces a feature similar to the one described in RFC 2367:
"
... the application needing an SA sends a PF_KEY
SADB_ACQUIRE message down to the Key Engine, which then either
returns an error or sends a similar SADB_ACQUIRE message up to one or
more key management applications capable of creating such SAs.
...
...
The third is where an application-layer consumer of security
associations (e.g. an OSPFv2 or RIPv2 daemon) needs a security
association.
Send an SADB_ACQUIRE message from a user process to the kernel.
<base, address(SD), (address(P),) (identity(SD),) (sensitivity,)
proposal>
The kernel returns an SADB_ACQUIRE message to registered
sockets.
<base, address(SD), (address(P),) (identity(SD),) (sensitivity,)
proposal>
The user-level consumer waits for an SADB_UPDATE or SADB_ADD
message for its particular type, and then can use that
association by using SADB_GET messages.
"
An app such as OSPF could then use ipsec KM to get keys
Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <hadi@cyberus.ca>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch provides the core functionality needed for sync events
for ipsec. Derived work of Krisztian KOVACS <hidden@balabit.hu>
Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <hadi@cyberus.ca>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
We often just do an atomic_dec(&x->refcnt) on an xfrm_state object
because we know there is more than 1 reference remaining and thus
we can elide the heavier xfrm_state_put() call.
Do this behind an inline function called __xfrm_state_put() so that is
more obvious and also to allow us to more cleanly add refcount
debugging later.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch contains two corrections to the LSM-IPsec Nethooks patches
previously applied.
(1) free a security context on a failed insert via xfrm_user
interface in xfrm_add_policy. Memory leak.
(2) change the authorization of the allocation of a security context
in a xfrm_policy or xfrm_state from both relabelfrom and relabelto
to setcontext.
Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch series implements per packet access control via the
extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in
the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security
associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are
included that leverage the patch for this purpose.
This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem,
pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a
socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security
association) to send/receive network packets.
Patch purpose:
The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on
the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access
controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP
address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be
spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote
hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism.
This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application
if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to
enforce the access control policy.
Patch design approach:
The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by
user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a
security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM
subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via
security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those
policies.
A presentation available at
www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf
from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach.
Patch implementation details:
On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or
xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of
the socket and the same security context is required for resultant
security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in
ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find.
On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket
(at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must
also match the security association being used.
The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec.
The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as
before.
Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is
minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the
combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec
processing proceeds as in the original case.
Testing:
The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have
been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version
0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security
associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation
using the security contexts via racoon.
The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set
security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and
contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing
this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel
behavior.
Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Most netlink families make no use of the done() callback, making
it optional gets rid of all unnecessary dummy implementations.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
netlink_broadcast users must initialize NETLINK_CB(skb).dst_groups to the
destination group mask for netlink_recvmsg.
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
- Remove bogus code for compiling netlink as module
- Add module refcounting support for modules implementing a netlink
protocol
- Add support for autoloading modules that implement a netlink protocol
as soon as someone opens a socket for that protocol
Signed-off-by: Harald Welte <laforge@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
