This eliminates the i_blksize field from struct inode. Filesystems that want
to provide a per-inode st_blksize can do so by providing their own getattr
routine instead of using the generic_fillattr() function.
Note that some filesystems were providing pretty much random (and incorrect)
values for i_blksize.
[bunk@stusta.de: cleanup]
[akpm@osdl.org: generic_fillattr() fix]
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
The following patches reduce the size of the VFS inode structure by 28 bytes
on a UP x86. (It would be more on an x86_64 system). This is a 10% reduction
in the inode size on a UP kernel that is configured in a production mode
(i.e., with no spinlock or other debugging functions enabled; if you want to
save memory taken up by in-core inodes, the first thing you should do is
disable the debugging options; they are responsible for a huge amount of bloat
in the VFS inode structure).
This patch:
The filesystem or device-specific pointer in the inode is inside a union,
which is pretty pointless given that all 30+ users of this field have been
using the void pointer. Get rid of the union and rename it to i_private, with
a comment to explain who is allowed to use the void pointer. This is just a
cleanup, but it allows us to reuse the union 'u' for something something where
the union will actually be used.
[judith@osdl.org: powerpc build fix]
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Judith Lebzelter <judith@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Take tty_mutex when accessing ->signal->tty in selinux code. Noted by Alan
Cox. Longer term, we are looking at refactoring the code to provide better
encapsulation of the tty layer, but this is a simple fix that addresses the
immediate bug.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch converts the semaphore in the superblock security struct to a
mutex. No locking changes or other code changes are done.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch converts the remaining isec->sem into a mutex. Very similar
locking is provided as before only in the faster smaller mutex rather than a
semaphore. An out_unlock path is introduced rather than the conditional
unlocking found in the original code.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
inode_security_set_sid is only called by security_inode_init_security, which
is called when a new file is being created and needs to have its incore
security state initialized and its security xattr set. This helper used to be
called in other places in the past, but now only has the one. So this patch
rolls inode_security_set_sid directly back into security_inode_init_security.
There also is no need to hold the isec->sem while doing this, as the inode is
not available to other threads at this point in time.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Introduces support for policy version 21. This version of the binary
kernel policy allows for defining range transitions on security classes
other than the process security class. As always, backwards compatibility
for older formats is retained. The security class is read in as specified
when using the new format, while the "process" security class is assumed
when using an older policy format.
Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Enable configuration of SELinux maximum supported policy version to support
legacy userland (init) that does not gracefully handle kernels that support
newer policy versions two or more beyond the installed policy, as in FC3
and FC4.
[bunk@stusta.de: improve Kconfig help text]
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Replace ctxid with sid in selinux_audit_rule_match interface for
consistency with other interfaces.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Rename selinux_ctxid_to_string to selinux_sid_to_string to be
consistent with other interfaces.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Eliminate selinux_task_ctxid since it duplicates selinux_task_get_sid.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Change NetLabel to use the 'recvfrom' socket permission and the
SECINITSID_NETMSG SELinux SID as the NetLabel base SID for incoming packets.
This patch effectively makes the old, and currently unused, SELinux NETMSG
permissions NetLabel permissions.
Signed-of-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Fix a problem where NetLabel would always set the value of
sk_security_struct->peer_sid in selinux_netlbl_sock_graft() to the context of
the socket, causing problems when users would query the context of the
connection. This patch fixes this so that the value in
sk_security_struct->peer_sid is only set when the connection is NetLabel based,
otherwise the value is untouched.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The following fixes a bug where random mem is being tampered with in the
non-mls case; encountered by Jashua Brindle on a gentoo box.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Add some missing include files to the NetLabel related header files.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Uninline the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() at the request of
Andrew Morton.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Rewrite ebitmap_import() so it is a bit cleaner and easier to read.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Fix a problem where the NetLabel specific fields of the sk_security_struct
structure were not being initialized early enough in some cases.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch makes four needlessly global functions static.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Add NetLabel support to the SELinux LSM and modify the
socket_post_create() LSM hook to return an error code. The most
significant part of this patch is the addition of NetLabel hooks into
the following SELinux LSM hooks:
* selinux_file_permission()
* selinux_socket_sendmsg()
* selinux_socket_post_create()
* selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb()
* selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream()
* selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram()
* selinux_sock_graft()
* selinux_inet_conn_request()
The basic reasoning behind this patch is that outgoing packets are
"NetLabel'd" by labeling their socket and the NetLabel security
attributes are checked via the additional hook in
selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(). NetLabel itself is only a labeling
mechanism, similar to filesystem extended attributes, it is up to the
SELinux enforcement mechanism to perform the actual access checks.
In addition to the changes outlined above this patch also includes
some changes to the extended bitmap (ebitmap) and multi-level security
(mls) code to import and export SELinux TE/MLS attributes into and out
of NetLabel.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The following patch will fix the build problem (encountered by Andrew
Morton) when SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM is not enabled.
As compared to git-net-selinux_xfrm_decode_session-build-fix.patch in
-mm, this patch sets the return parameter sid to SECSID_NULL in
selinux_xfrm_decode_session() and handles this value in the caller
selinux_inet_conn_request() appropriately.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This automatically labels the TCP, Unix stream, and dccp child sockets
as well as openreqs to be at the same MLS level as the peer. This will
result in the selection of appropriately labeled IPSec Security
Associations.
This also uses the sock's sid (as opposed to the isec sid) in SELinux
enforcement of secmark in rcv_skb and postroute_last hooks.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This defaults the label of socket-specific IPSec policies to be the
same as the socket they are set on.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This labels the flows that could utilize IPSec xfrms at the points the
flows are defined so that IPSec policy and SAs at the right label can
be used.
The following protos are currently not handled, but they should
continue to be able to use single-labeled IPSec like they currently
do.
ipmr
ip_gre
ipip
igmp
sit
sctp
ip6_tunnel (IPv6 over IPv6 tunnel device)
decnet
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This implements a seemless mechanism for xfrm policy selection and
state matching based on the flow sid. This also includes the necessary
SELinux enforcement pieces.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This adds security for IP sockets at the sock level. Security at the
sock level is needed to enforce the SELinux security policy for
security associations even when a sock is orphaned (such as in the TCP
LAST_ACK state).
This will also be used to enforce SELinux controls over data arriving
at or leaving a child socket while it's still waiting to be accepted.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This defines a routine that combines the Type Enforcement portion of
one sid with the MLS portion from the other sid to arrive at a new
sid. This would be used to define a sid for a security association
that is to be negotiated by IKE as well as for determing the sid for
open requests and connection-oriented child sockets.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The current approach to labeling Security Associations for SELinux
purposes uses a one-to-one mapping between xfrm policy rules and
security associations.
This doesn't address the needs of real world MLS (Multi-level System,
traditional Bell-LaPadula) environments where a single xfrm policy
rule (pertaining to a range, classified to secret for example) might
need to map to multiple Security Associations (one each for
classified, secret, top secret and all the compartments applicable to
these security levels).
This patch set addresses the above problem by allowing for the mapping
of a single xfrm policy rule to multiple security associations, with
each association used in the security context it is defined for. It
also includes the security context to be used in IKE negotiation in
the acquire messages sent to the IKE daemon so that a unique SA can be
negotiated for each unique security context. A couple of bug fixes are
also included; checks to make sure the SAs used by a packet match
policy (security context-wise) on the inbound and also that the bundle
used for the outbound matches the security context of the flow. This
patch set also makes the use of the SELinux sid in flow cache lookups
seemless by including the sid in the flow key itself. Also, open
requests as well as connection-oriented child sockets are labeled
automatically to be at the same level as the peer to allow for use of
appropriately labeled IPSec associations.
Description of changes:
A "sid" member has been added to the flow cache key resulting in the
sid being available at all needed locations and the flow cache lookups
automatically using the sid. The flow sid is derived from the socket
on the outbound and the SAs (unlabeled where an SA was not used) on
the inbound.
Outbound case:
1. Find policy for the socket.
2. OLD: Find an SA that matches the policy.
NEW: Find an SA that matches BOTH the policy and the flow/socket.
This is necessary since not every SA that matches the policy
can be used for the flow/socket. Consider policy range Secret-TS,
and SAs each for Secret and TS. We don't want a TS socket to
use the Secret SA. Hence the additional check for the SA Vs. flow/socket.
3. NEW: When looking thru bundles for a policy, make sure the
flow/socket can use the bundle. If a bundle is not found,
create one, calling for IKE if necessary. If using IKE,
include the security context in the acquire message to the IKE
daemon.
Inbound case:
1. OLD: Find policy for the socket.
NEW: Find policy for the incoming packet based on the sid of the
SA(s) it used or the unlabeled sid if no SAs were
used. (Consider a case where a socket is "authorized" for two
policies (unclassified-confidential, secret-top_secret). If the
packet has come in using a secret SA, we really ought to be
using the latter policy (secret-top_secret).)
2. OLD: BUG: No check to see if the SAs used by the packet agree with
the policy sec_ctx-wise.
(It was indicated in selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb() that
this was being accomplished by
(x->id.spi == tmpl->id.spi || !tmpl->id.spi) in xfrm_state_ok,
but it turns out tmpl->id.spi
would normally be zero (unless xfrm policy rules specify one
at the template level, which they usually don't).
NEW: The socket is checked for access to the SAs used (based on the
sid of the SAs) in selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb().
Forward case:
This would be Step 1 from the Inbound case, followed by Steps 2 and 3
from the Outbound case.
Outstanding items/issues:
- Timewait acknowledgements and such are generated in the
current/upstream implementation using a NULL socket resulting in the
any_socket sid (SYSTEM_HIGH) to be used. This problem is not addressed
by this patch set.
This patch: Add new flask definitions to SELinux
Adds a new avperm "polmatch" to arbitrate flow/state access to a xfrm
policy rule.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
From: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com>
This patch implements a cleaner fix for the memory leak problem of the
original unix datagram getpeersec patch. Instead of creating a
security context each time a unix datagram is sent, we only create the
security context when the receiver requests it.
This new design requires modification of the current
unix_getsecpeer_dgram LSM hook and addition of two new hooks, namely,
secid_to_secctx and release_secctx. The former retrieves the security
context and the latter releases it. A hook is required for releasing
the security context because it is up to the security module to decide
how that's done. In the case of Selinux, it's a simple kfree
operation.
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Initializes newcontext sooner to allow for its destruction in all cases.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch fixes a memory leak when a policydb structure is destroyed.
Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
After some discussion on the actual meaning of the filesystem class
security check in try context mount it was determined that the checks for
the context= mount options were not correct if fscontext mount option had
already been used.
When labeling the superblock we should be checking relabel_from and
relabel_to. But if the superblock has already been labeled (with
fscontext) then context= is actually labeling the inodes, and so we should
be checking relabel_from and associate. This patch fixes which checks are
called depending on the mount options.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Introduce a new rootcontext= option to FS mounting. This option will allow
you to explicitly label the root inode of an FS being mounted before that
FS or inode because visible to userspace. This was found to be useful for
things like stateless linux, see
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=190001
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Remove the conflict between fscontext and context mount options. If
context= is specified without fscontext it will operate just as before, if
both are specified we will use mount point labeling and all inodes will get
the label specified by context=. The superblock will be labeled with the
label of fscontext=, thus affecting operations which check the superblock
security context, such as associate permissions.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch introduces object audit filters based on the elements
of the SELinux context.
Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
kernel/auditfilter.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/auditsc.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
3 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This patch renames some audit constant definitions and adds
additional definitions used by the following patch. The renaming
avoids ambiguity with respect to the new definitions.
Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
include/linux/audit.h | 15 ++++++++----
kernel/auditfilter.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
kernel/auditsc.c | 10 ++++----
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 32 +++++++++++++-------------
4 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Add a new security hook definition for the sys_ioprio_get operation. At
present, the SELinux hook function implementation for this hook is
identical to the getscheduler implementation but a separate hook is
introduced to allow this check to be specialized in the future if
necessary.
This patch also creates a helper function get_task_ioprio which handles the
access check in addition to retrieving the ioprio value for the task.
Signed-off-by: David Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch extends the security_task_kill hook to handle signals sent by AIO
completion. In this case, the secid of the task responsible for the signal
needs to be obtained and saved earlier, so a security_task_getsecid() hook is
added, and then this saved value is passed subsequently to the extended
task_kill hook for use in checking.
Signed-off-by: David Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch implements an API whereby an application can determine the
label of its peer's Unix datagram sockets via the auxiliary data mechanism of
recvmsg.
Patch purpose:
This patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the
security context of the peer of a Unix datagram socket. The application
can then use this security context to determine the security context for
processing on behalf of the peer who sent the packet.
Patch design and implementation:
The design and implementation is very similar to the UDP case for INET
sockets. Basically we build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for
retrieving user credentials. Linux offers the API for obtaining user
credentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages
that are bundled together with a normal message). To retrieve the security
context, the application first indicates to the kernel such desire by
setting the SO_PASSSEC option via getsockopt. Then the application
retrieves the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism.
An example server application for Unix datagram socket should look like this:
toggle = 1;
toggle_len = sizeof(toggle);
setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PASSSEC, &toggle, &toggle_len);
recvmsg(sockfd, &msg_hdr, 0);
if (msg_hdr.msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) {
cmsg_hdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg_hdr);
if (cmsg_hdr->cmsg_len <= CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) &&
cmsg_hdr->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET &&
cmsg_hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) {
memcpy(&scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext));
}
}
sock_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option SOCK_PASSSEC to allow
a server socket to receive security context of the peer.
Testing:
We have tested the patch by setting up Unix datagram client and server
applications. We verified that the server can retrieve the security context
using the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg.
Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch encapsulates the usage of eff_cap (in netlink_skb_params) within
the security framework by extending security_netlink_recv to include a required
capability parameter and converting all direct usage of eff_caps outside
of the lsm modules to use the interface. It also updates the SELinux
implementation of the security_netlink_send and security_netlink_recv
hooks to take advantage of the sid in the netlink_skb_params struct.
This also enables SELinux to perform auditing of netlink capability checks.
Please apply, for 2.6.18 if possible.
Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The proposed NFS key type uses its own method of passing key requests to
userspace (upcalling) rather than invoking /sbin/request-key. This is
because the responsible userspace daemon should already be running and will
be contacted through rpc_pipefs.
This patch permits the NFS filesystem to pass auxiliary data to the upcall
operation (struct key_type::request_key) so that the upcaller can use a
pre-existing communications channel more easily.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-By: Kevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Add more poison values to include/linux/poison.h. It's not clear to me
whether some others should be added or not, so I haven't added any of
these:
./include/linux/libata.h:#define ATA_TAG_POISON 0xfafbfcfdU
./arch/ppc/8260_io/fcc_enet.c:1918: memset((char *)(&(immap->im_dprambase[(mem_addr+64)])), 0x88, 32);
./drivers/usb/mon/mon_text.c:429: memset(mem, 0xe5, sizeof(struct mon_event_text));
./drivers/char/ftape/lowlevel/ftape-ctl.c:738: memset(ft_buffer[i]->address, 0xAA, FT_BUFF_SIZE);
./drivers/block/sx8.c:/* 0xf is just arbitrary, non-zero noise; this is sorta like poisoning */
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Update SELinux to cause the keycreate process attribute held in
/proc/self/attr/keycreate to be inherited across a fork and reset upon
execve. This is consistent with the handling of the other process
attributes provided by SELinux and also makes it simpler to adapt logon
programs to properly handle the keycreate attribute.
Signed-off-by: Michael LeMay <mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Below is a patch to add a new /proc/self/attr/sockcreate A process may write a
context into this interface and all subsequent sockets created will be labeled
with that context. This is the same idea as the fscreate interface where a
process can specify the label of a file about to be created. At this time one
envisioned user of this will be xinetd. It will be able to better label
sockets for the actual services. At this time all sockets take the label of
the creating process, so all xinitd sockets would just be labeled the same.
I tested this by creating a tcp sender and listener. The sender was able to
write to this new proc file and then create sockets with the specified label.
I am able to be sure the new label was used since the avc denial messages
kicked out by the kernel included both the new security permission
setsockcreate and all the socket denials were for the new label, not the label
of the running process.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Add a /proc/<pid>/attr/keycreate entry that stores the appropriate context for
newly-created keys. Modify the selinux_key_alloc hook to make use of the new
entry. Update the flask headers to include a new "setkeycreate" permission
for processes. Update the flask headers to include a new "create" permission
for keys. Use the create permission to restrict which SIDs each task can
assign to newly-created keys. Add a new parameter to the security hook
"security_key_alloc" to indicate whether it is being invoked by the kernel, or
from userspace. If it is being invoked by the kernel, the security hook
should never fail. Update the documentation to reflect these changes.
Signed-off-by: Michael LeMay <mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Restrict /proc/keys such that only those keys to which the current task is
granted View permission are presented.
The documentation is also updated to reflect these changes.
Signed-off-by: Michael LeMay <mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Cause key_alloc_serial() to generate key serial numbers randomly rather than
in linear sequence.
Using an linear sequence permits a covert communication channel to be
established, in which one process can communicate with another by creating or
not creating new keys within a certain timeframe. The second process can
probe for the expected next key serial number and judge its existence by the
error returned.
This is a problem as the serial number namespace is globally shared between
all tasks, regardless of their context.
For more information on this topic, this old TCSEC guide is recommended:
http://www.radium.ncsc.mil/tpep/library/rainbow/NCSC-TG-030.html
Signed-off-by: Michael LeMay <mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Let keyctl_chown() change a key's owner, including attempting to transfer the
quota burden to the new user.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Cause the keys linked to a keyring to be unlinked from it when revoked and it
causes the data attached to a user-defined key to be discarded when revoked.
This frees up most of the quota a key occupied at that point, rather than
waiting for the key to actually be destroyed.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Add the ability for key creation to overrun the user's quota in some
circumstances - notably when a session keyring is created and assigned to a
process that didn't previously have one.
This means it's still possible to log in, should PAM require the creation of a
new session keyring, and fix an overburdened key quota.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch adds new security hook, task_movememory, to be called when memory
owened by a task is to be moved (e.g. when migrating pages to a this hook is
identical to the setscheduler implementation, but a separate hook introduced
to allow this check to be specialized in the future if necessary.
Since the last posting, the hook has been renamed following feedback from
Christoph Lameter.
Signed-off-by: David Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@muc.de>
Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Implement an LSM hook for setting a task's IO priority, similar to the hook
for setting a tasks's nice value.
A previous version of this LSM hook was included in an older version of
multiadm by Jan Engelhardt, although I don't recall it being submitted
upstream.
Also included is the corresponding SELinux hook, which re-uses the setsched
permission in the proccess class.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@linux01.gwdg.de>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Give the statfs superblock operation a dentry pointer rather than a superblock
pointer.
This complements the get_sb() patch. That reduced the significance of
sb->s_root, allowing NFS to place a fake root there. However, NFS does
require a dentry to use as a target for the statfs operation. This permits
the root in the vfsmount to be used instead.
linux/mount.h has been added where necessary to make allyesconfig build
successfully.
Interest has also been expressed for use with the FUSE and XFS filesystems.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Nathan Scott <nathans@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Extend the get_sb() filesystem operation to take an extra argument that
permits the VFS to pass in the target vfsmount that defines the mountpoint.
The filesystem is then required to manually set the superblock and root dentry
pointers. For most filesystems, this should be done with simple_set_mnt()
which will set the superblock pointer and then set the root dentry to the
superblock's s_root (as per the old default behaviour).
The get_sb() op now returns an integer as there's now no need to return the
superblock pointer.
This patch permits a superblock to be implicitly shared amongst several mount
points, such as can be done with NFS to avoid potential inode aliasing. In
such a case, simple_set_mnt() would not be called, and instead the mnt_root
and mnt_sb would be set directly.
The patch also makes the following changes:
(*) the get_sb_*() convenience functions in the core kernel now take a vfsmount
pointer argument and return an integer, so most filesystems have to change
very little.
(*) If one of the convenience function is not used, then get_sb() should
normally call simple_set_mnt() to instantiate the vfsmount. This will
always return 0, and so can be tail-called from get_sb().
(*) generic_shutdown_super() now calls shrink_dcache_sb() to clean up the
dcache upon superblock destruction rather than shrink_dcache_anon().
This is required because the superblock may now have multiple trees that
aren't actually bound to s_root, but that still need to be cleaned up. The
currently called functions assume that the whole tree is rooted at s_root,
and that anonymous dentries are not the roots of trees which results in
dentries being left unculled.
However, with the way NFS superblock sharing are currently set to be
implemented, these assumptions are violated: the root of the filesystem is
simply a dummy dentry and inode (the real inode for '/' may well be
inaccessible), and all the vfsmounts are rooted on anonymous[*] dentries
with child trees.
[*] Anonymous until discovered from another tree.
(*) The documentation has been adjusted, including the additional bit of
changing ext2_* into foo_* in the documentation.
[akpm@osdl.org: convert ipath_fs, do other stuff]
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Nathan Scott <nathans@sgi.com>
Cc: Roland Dreier <rolandd@cisco.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Add a revocation notification method to the key type and calls it whilst
the key's semaphore is still write-locked after setting the revocation
flag.
The patch then uses this to maintain a reference on the task_struct of the
process that calls request_key() for as long as the authorisation key
remains unrevoked.
This fixes a potential race between two processes both of which have
assumed the authority to instantiate a key (one may have forked the other
for example). The problem is that there's no locking around the check for
revocation of the auth key and the use of the task_struct it points to, nor
does the auth key keep a reference on the task_struct.
Access to the "context" pointer in the auth key must thenceforth be done
with the auth key semaphore held. The revocation method is called with the
target key semaphore held write-locked and the search of the context
process's keyrings is done with the auth key semaphore read-locked.
The check for the revocation state of the auth key just prior to searching
it is done after the auth key is read-locked for the search. This ensures
that the auth key can't be revoked between the check and the search.
The revocation notification method is added so that the context task_struct
can be released as soon as instantiation happens rather than waiting for
the auth key to be destroyed, thus avoiding the unnecessary pinning of the
requesting process.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Introduce SELinux hooks to support the access key retention subsystem
within the kernel. Incorporate new flask headers from a modified version
of the SELinux reference policy, with support for the new security class
representing retained keys. Extend the "key_alloc" security hook with a
task parameter representing the intended ownership context for the key
being allocated. Attach security information to root's default keyrings
within the SELinux initialization routine.
Has passed David's testsuite.
Signed-off-by: Michael LeMay <mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* git://git.infradead.org/~dwmw2/rbtree-2.6:
[RBTREE] Switch rb_colour() et al to en_US spelling of 'color' for consistency
Update UML kernel/physmem.c to use rb_parent() accessor macro
[RBTREE] Update hrtimers to use rb_parent() accessor macro.
[RBTREE] Add explicit alignment to sizeof(long) for struct rb_node.
[RBTREE] Merge colour and parent fields of struct rb_node.
[RBTREE] Remove dead code in rb_erase()
[RBTREE] Update JFFS2 to use rb_parent() accessor macro.
[RBTREE] Update eventpoll.c to use rb_parent() accessor macro.
[RBTREE] Update key.c to use rb_parent() accessor macro.
[RBTREE] Update ext3 to use rb_parent() accessor macro.
[RBTREE] Change rbtree off-tree marking in I/O schedulers.
[RBTREE] Add accessor macros for colour and parent fields of rb_node
Fix a broken comparison that causes the process clearance to be checked for
both se_clr and se_sen audit filters.
Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Add new per-packet access controls to SELinux, replacing the old
packet controls.
Packets are labeled with the iptables SECMARK and CONNSECMARK targets,
then security policy for the packets is enforced with these controls.
To allow for a smooth transition to the new controls, the old code is
still present, but not active by default. To restore previous
behavior, the old controls may be activated at runtime by writing a
'1' to /selinux/compat_net, and also via the kernel boot parameter
selinux_compat_net. Switching between the network control models
requires the security load_policy permission. The old controls will
probably eventually be removed and any continued use is discouraged.
With this patch, the new secmark controls for SElinux are disabled by
default, so existing behavior is entirely preserved, and the user is
not affected at all.
It also provides a config option to enable the secmark controls by
default (which can always be overridden at boot and runtime). It is
also noted in the kconfig help that the user will need updated
userspace if enabling secmark controls for SELinux and that they'll
probably need the SECMARK and CONNMARK targets, and conntrack protocol
helpers, although such decisions are beyond the scope of kernel
configuration.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Add and export new functions to the in-kernel SELinux API in support of the
new secmark-based packet controls.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Secmark implements a new scheme for adding security markings to
packets via iptables, as well as changes to SELinux to use these
markings for security policy enforcement. The rationale for this
scheme is explained and discussed in detail in the original threads:
http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.network/34927/http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.network/35244/
Examples of policy and rulesets, as well as a full archive of patches
for iptables and SELinux userland, may be found at:
http://people.redhat.com/jmorris/selinux/secmark/
The code has been tested with various compilation options and in
several scenarios, including with 'complicated' protocols such as FTP
and also with the new generic conntrack code with IPv6 connection
tracking.
This patch:
Add support for a new object class ('packet'), and associated
permissions ('send', 'recv', 'relabelto'). These are used to enforce
security policy for network packets labeled with SECMARK, and for
adding labeling rules.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Add a security class for appletalk sockets so that they can be
distinguished in SELinux policy. Please apply.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch contains a fix for the previous patch that adds security
contexts to IPsec policies and security associations. In the previous
patch, no authorization (besides the check for write permissions to
SAD and SPD) is required to delete IPsec policies and security
assocations with security contexts. Thus a user authorized to change
SAD and SPD can bypass the IPsec policy authorization by simply
deleteing policies with security contexts. To fix this security hole,
an additional authorization check is added for removing security
policies and security associations with security contexts.
Note that if no security context is supplied on add or present on
policy to be deleted, the SELinux module allows the change
unconditionally. The hook is called on deletion when no context is
present, which we may want to change. At present, I left it up to the
module.
LSM changes:
The patch adds two new LSM hooks: xfrm_policy_delete and
xfrm_state_delete. The new hooks are necessary to authorize deletion
of IPsec policies that have security contexts. The existing hooks
xfrm_policy_free and xfrm_state_free lack the context to do the
authorization, so I decided to split authorization of deletion and
memory management of security data, as is typical in the LSM
interface.
Use:
The new delete hooks are checked when xfrm_policy or xfrm_state are
deleted by either the xfrm_user interface (xfrm_get_policy,
xfrm_del_sa) or the pfkey interface (pfkey_spddelete, pfkey_delete).
SELinux changes:
The new policy_delete and state_delete functions are added.
Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Replace all module uses with the new vfs_kern_mount() interface, and fix up
simple_pin_fs().
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Fix unsafe nesting of sb_lock inside sb_security_lock in
selinux_complete_init. Detected by the kernel locking validator.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Check for NULL kmalloc return value before writing to it.
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Clear selinux_enabled flag upon runtime disable of SELinux by userspace,
and make sure it is defined even if selinux= boot parameter support is
not enabled in configuration.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Tested-by: Jon Smirl <jonsmirl@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
The below patch should be applied after the inode and ipc sid patches.
This patch is a reworking of Tim's patch that has been updated to match
the inode and ipc patches since its similar.
[updated:
> Stephen Smalley also wanted to change a variable from isec to tsec in the
> user sid patch. ]
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Hi,
The patch below converts IPC auditing to collect sid's and convert to context
string only if it needs to output an audit record. This patch depends on the
inode audit change patch already being applied.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Previously, we were gathering the context instead of the sid. Now in this patch,
we gather just the sid and convert to context only if an audit event is being
output.
This patch brings the performance hit from 146% down to 23%
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
The following patch provides selinux interfaces that will allow the audit
system to perform filtering based on the process context (user, role, type,
sensitivity, and clearance). These interfaces will allow the selinux
module to perform efficient matches based on lower level selinux constructs,
rather than relying on context retrievals and string comparisons within
the audit module. It also allows for dominance checks on the mls portion
of the contexts that are impossible with only string comparisons.
Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Fix an off-by-one error in the MLS compatibility code that was causing
contexts with a MLS suffix to be rejected, preventing sharing partitions
between FC4 and FC5. Bug reported in
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=188068
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Remove an unnecessary memory barrier (implicit in rcu_dereference()) from
install_session_keyring().
install_session_keyring() is also rearranged a little to make it slightly
more efficient.
As install_*_keyring() may schedule (in synchronize_rcu() or
keyring_alloc()), they may not be entered with interrupts disabled - and so
there's no point saving the interrupt disablement state over the critical
section.
exec_keys() will also be invoked with interrupts enabled, and so that doesn't
need to save the interrupt state either.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This fixes the problem of an oops occuring when a user attempts to add a
key to a non-keyring key [CVE-2006-1522].
The problem is that __keyring_search_one() doesn't check that the
keyring it's been given is actually a keyring.
I've fixed this problem by:
(1) declaring that caller of __keyring_search_one() must guarantee that
the keyring is a keyring; and
(2) making key_create_or_update() check that the keyring is a keyring,
and return -ENOTDIR if it isn't.
This can be tested by:
keyctl add user b b `keyctl add user a a @s`
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
security/selinux/xfrm.c: In function 'selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram':
security/selinux/xfrm.c:284: error: 'struct sec_path' has no member named 'x'
security/selinux/xfrm.c: In function 'selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb':
security/selinux/xfrm.c:317: error: 'struct sec_path' has no member named 'x'
Signed-off-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* 'audit.b3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current: (22 commits)
[PATCH] fix audit_init failure path
[PATCH] EXPORT_SYMBOL patch for audit_log, audit_log_start, audit_log_end and audit_format
[PATCH] sem2mutex: audit_netlink_sem
[PATCH] simplify audit_free() locking
[PATCH] Fix audit operators
[PATCH] promiscuous mode
[PATCH] Add tty to syscall audit records
[PATCH] add/remove rule update
[PATCH] audit string fields interface + consumer
[PATCH] SE Linux audit events
[PATCH] Minor cosmetic cleanups to the code moved into auditfilter.c
[PATCH] Fix audit record filtering with !CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
[PATCH] Fix IA64 success/failure indication in syscall auditing.
[PATCH] Miscellaneous bug and warning fixes
[PATCH] Capture selinux subject/object context information.
[PATCH] Exclude messages by message type
[PATCH] Collect more inode information during syscall processing.
[PATCH] Pass dentry, not just name, in fsnotify creation hooks.
[PATCH] Define new range of userspace messages.
[PATCH] Filter rule comparators
...
Fixed trivial conflict in security/selinux/hooks.c
PTRACE_TRACEME doesn't have proper capabilities validation when parent is
less privileged than child. Issue pointed out by Ram Gupta
<ram.gupta5@gmail.com>.
Note: I haven't identified a strong security issue, and it's a small ABI
change that could break apps that rely on existing behaviour (which allows
parent that is less privileged than child to ptrace when child does
PTRACE_TRACEME).
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Ram Gupta <ram.gupta5@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Move capable() to kernel/capability.c and eliminate duplicate
implementations. Add __capable() function which can be used to check for
capabiilty of any process.
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Cause an attempt to add a duplicate non-updateable key (such as a keyring) to
a keyring to discard the extant copy in favour of the new one rather than
failing with EEXIST:
# do the test in an empty session
keyctl session
# create a new keyring called "a" and attach to session
keyctl newring a @s
# create another new keyring called "a" and attach to session,
# displacing the keyring added by the second command:
keyctl newring a @s
Without this patch, the third command will fail.
For updateable keys (such as those of "user" type), the update method will
still be called rather than a new key being created.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Make key quota detection generate an error if either quota is exceeded rather
than only if both quotas are exceeded.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Copies user-space string with strndup_user() and moves the type string
duplication code to a function (thus fixing a wrong check on the length of the
type.)
Signed-off-by: Davi Arnaut <davi.arnaut@gmail.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch address several issues in the current BSD Secure Levels code:
o plaintext_to_sha1: Missing check for a NULL return from __get_free_page
o passwd_write_file: A page is leaked if the password is wrong.
o fix securityfs registration order
o seclvl_init is a mess and can't properly tolerate failures, failure
path is upside down (deldif and delf should be switched)
Cleanups:
o plaintext_to_sha1: Use buffers passed in
o passwd_write_file: Use kmalloc() instead of get_zeroed_page()
o passwd_write_file: hashedPassword comparison is just memcmp
o s/ENOSYS/EINVAL/
o misc
(akpm: after some discussion it appears that the BSD secure levels feature
should be scheduled for removal. But for now, let's fix these problems up).
Signed-off-by: Davi Arnaut <davi.arnaut@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Add a slab cache for the SELinux inode security struct, one of which is
allocated for every inode instantiated by the system.
The memory savings are considerable.
On 64-bit, instead of the size-128 cache, we have a slab object of 96
bytes, saving 32 bytes per object. After booting, I see about 4000 of
these and then about 17,000 after a kernel compile. With this patch, we
save around 530KB of kernel memory in the latter case. On 32-bit, the
savings are about half of this.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Remove an unneded pointer variable in selinux_inode_init_security().
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
A further fix is needed for selinuxfs link count management, to ensure that
the count is correct for the parent directory when a subdirectory is
created. This is only required for the root directory currently, but the
code has been updated for the general case.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Fix copy & paste error in sel_make_avc_files(), removing a supurious call to
d_genocide() in the error path. All of this will be cleaned up by
kill_litter_super().
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Remove the call to sel_make_bools() from sel_fill_super(), as policy needs to
be loaded before the boolean files can be created. Policy will never be
loaded during sel_fill_super() as selinuxfs is kernel mounted during init and
the only means to load policy is via selinuxfs.
Also, the call to d_genocide() on the error path of sel_make_bools() is
incorrect and replaced with sel_remove_bools().
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Unify the error path of sel_fill_super() so that all errors pass through the
same point and generate an error message. Also, removes a spurious dput() in
the error path which breaks the refcounting for the filesystem
(litter_kill_super() will correctly clean things up itself on error).
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Use existing sel_make_dir() helper to create booleans directory rather than
duplicating the logic.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Fix the hard link count for selinuxfs directories, which are currently one
short.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
