For nfsd to work over cifs mounts (which presumably makes sense when trying
to reexport mounts to windows, network appliances or Samba servers to nfs
clients via nfs server).
This is the first stage of that enablement, marked experimental and turned
off by default.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
There were two i_size_writes in the new truncate
function - we missed one in the last patch.
Noticed by Shaggy when he reviewed.
Thank you Shaggy ...
CC: Shaggy <shaggy@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* master.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-2.6:
Revert "Driver core: let request_module() send a /sys/modules/kmod/-uevent"
Driver core: fix error by cleanup up symlinks properly
make kernel/kmod.c:kmod_mk static
power management: fix struct layout and docs
power management: no valid states w/o pm_ops
Driver core: more fallout from class_device changes for pcmcia
sysfs: move struct sysfs_dirent to private header
driver core: refcounting fix
Driver core: remove class_device_rename
Could cause hangs on smp systems in i_size_read on a cifs inode
whose size has been previously simultaneously updated from
different processes.
Thanks to Brian Wang for some great testing/debugging on this
hard problem.
Fixes kernel bugzilla #7903
CC: Shirish Pargoankar <shirishp@us.ibm.com>
CC: Shaggy <shaggy@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
This patch (as860) adds two new sysfs routines:
sysfs_add_file_to_group() and sysfs_remove_file_from_group().
A later patch adds code that uses the new routines.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Cc: Maneesh Soni <maneesh@in.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
struct sysfs_dirent is private to the fs/sysfs/ subtree. It is
not even referenced as an opaque structure outside of that subtree.
The following patch moves the declaration from include/linux/sysfs.h to
fs/sysfs/sysfs.h, making it clearer that nothing else in the kernel
dereferences it.
I have been running this patch for years. Please integrate and forward
upstream if there are no objections.
From: "Adam J. Richter" <adam@yggdrasil.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
* master.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sfrench/cifs-2.6:
[CIFS] One line missing from previous commit
[CIFS] mtime bounces from local to remote when cifs nocmtime i_flags overwritten
[CIFS] fix &&/& typo in cifs_setattr()
Pointers to user data should be marked with a __user hint. This one is
missing.
Signed-off-by: Glauber de Oliveira Costa <gcosta@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
affs wants to truncate the inode when the last user goes away, currently it
does that through a potentially racy i_count check in ->put_inode. But we
already have a method that's called just after the we dropped the last
reference, ->drop_inode. This patch implements affs_drop_inode to take
advantage of this.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This problem was identified and fixed some time ago by Jeff Moyer but it fell
through the cracks somehow.
It is possible that a user space application could remove and re-create a
directory during a request. To avoid returning a failure from lookup
incorrectly when our current dentry is unhashed we need to check if another
positive, hashed dentry matching this one exists and if so return it instead
of a fail.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Jeff Moyer has identified a race between mount and expire.
What happens is that during an expire the situation can arise that a directory
is removed and another lookup is done before the expire issues a completion
status to the kernel module. In this case, since the the lookup gets a new
dentry, it doesn't know that there is an expire in progress and when it posts
its mount request, matches the existing expire request and waits for its
completion. ENOENT is then returned to user space from lookup (as the dentry
passed in is now unhashed) without having performed the mount request.
The solution used here is to keep track of dentrys in this unhashed state and
reuse them, if possible, in order to preserve the flags. Additionally, this
infrastructure will provide the framework for the reintroduction of caching of
mount fails removed earlier in development.
Signed-off-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Acked-by: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The current header file definitions for autofs version 5 have caused a couple
of problems for application builds downstream.
This fixes the problem by separating the definitions.
Signed-off-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
nobh_prepare_write leaks data similarly to how simple_prepare_write did. Fix
by not marking the page uptodate until nobh_commit_write time. Again, this
could break weird use-cases, but none appear to exist in the tree.
We can safely remove the set_page_dirty, because as the comment says,
nobh_commit_write does set_page_dirty. If a filesystem wants to allocate
backing store for a page dirtied via mmap, page_mkwrite is the suggested
approach.
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
simple_prepare_write leaks uninitialised kernel data. This happens because
the it leaves an uninitialised "hole" over the part of the page that the
write is expected to go to. This is fine, but it then marks the page
uptodate, which means a concurrent read can come in and copy the
uninitialised memory into userspace before it written to.
Fix it by simply marking it uptodate in simple_commit_write instead, after
the hole has been filled in. This could theoretically break an fs that
uses simple_prepare_write and not simple_commit_write, and that relies on
the incorrect simple_prepare_write behaviour. Luckily, none of those
exists in the tree.
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
If the DIO write on FAT is expanding the size, it will be fail by -EINVAL,
because FAT can't handle it now.
This patch fallback it to the normal buffered-write and would return
success.
Signed-off-by: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Andrew noticed that unlocking the page before submitting all buffers for
writeout could cause problems if the IO completes before we've finished
messing around with the page buffers, and they subsequently get freed.
Even if there were no bug, it is a good idea to bring the error case
into line with the common case here.
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Several people have reported failures in dynamic major device number handling
due to the recent changes in there to avoid handing out the local/experimental
majors.
Rolf reports that this is due to a gcc-4.1.0 bug.
The patch refactors that code a lot in an attempt to provoke the compiler into
behaving.
Cc: Rolf Eike Beer <eike-kernel@sf-tec.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Due to type confusion, when an nfsacl verison 2 'ACCESS' request
finishes and tries to clean up, it calls fh_put on entiredly the
wrong thing and this can cause an oops.
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
A user-specified get_nlinks may depend on other inode attributes.
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Erez Zadok <ezk@cs.sunysb.edu>
Signed-off-by: Josef 'Jeff' Sipek <jsipek@cs.sunysb.edu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ericvh/v9fs:
9p: implement optional loose read cache
9p: Use kthread_stop instead of sending a SIGKILL.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bunk/trivial: (25 commits)
Documentation/kernel-docs.txt update.
arch/cris: typo in KERN_INFO
Storage class should be before const qualifier
kernel/printk.c: comment fix
update I/O sched Kconfig help texts - CFQ is now default, not AS.
Remove duplicate listing of Cris arch from README
kbuild: more doc. cleanups
doc: make doc. for maxcpus= more visible
drivers/net/eexpress.c: remove duplicate comment
add a help text for BLK_DEV_GENERIC
correct a dead URL in the IP_MULTICAST help text
fix the BAYCOM_SER_HDX help text
fix SCSI_SCAN_ASYNC help text
trivial documentation patch for platform.txt
Fix typos concerning hierarchy
Fix comment typo "spin_lock_irqrestore".
Fix misspellings of "agressive".
drivers/scsi/a100u2w.c: trivial typo patch
Correct trivial typo in log2.h.
Remove useless FIND_FIRST_BIT() macro from cardbus.c.
...
fs/jffs2/wbuf.c: In function 'jffs2_check_oob_empty':
fs/jffs2/wbuf.c:993: warning: format '%d' expects type 'int', but argument 3 has type 'size_t'
fs/jffs2/wbuf.c:993: warning: format '%d' expects type 'int', but argument 4 has type 'size_t'
fs/jffs2/wbuf.c: In function 'jffs2_check_nand_cleanmarker':
fs/jffs2/wbuf.c:1036: warning: format '%d' expects type 'int', but argument 3 has type 'size_t'
fs/jffs2/wbuf.c:1036: warning: format '%d' expects type 'int', but argument 4 has type 'size_t'
fs/jffs2/wbuf.c: In function 'jffs2_write_nand_cleanmarker':
fs/jffs2/wbuf.c:1062: warning: format '%d' expects type 'int', but argument 3 has type 'size_t'
fs/jffs2/wbuf.c:1062: warning: format '%d' expects type 'int', but argument 4 has type 'size_t'
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
While cacheing is generally frowned upon in the 9p world, it has its
place -- particularly in situations where the remote file system is
exclusive and/or read-only. The vacfs views of venti content addressable
store are a real-world instance of such a situation. To facilitate higher
performance for these workloads (and eventually use the fscache patches),
we have enabled a "loose" cache mode which does not attempt to maintain
any form of consistency on the page-cache or dcache. This results in over
two orders of magnitude performance improvement for cacheable block reads
in the Bonnie benchmark. The more aggressive use of the dcache also seems
to improve metadata operational performance.
Signed-off-by: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>
Since the kthread api does not bump the reference count on
processes that tracked it is not safe allow user space to
kill the threads, as I still retain a pointer to the task_struct.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>
Provide an audit record of the descriptor pair returned by pipe() and
socketpair(). Rewritten from the original posted to linux-audit by
John D. Ramsdell <ramsdell@mitre.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
The C99 specification states in section 6.11.5:
The placement of a storage-class specifier other than at the
beginning of the declaration specifiers in a declaration is an
obsolescent feature.
Signed-off-by: Tobias Klauser <tklauser@distanz.ch>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Fix the various misspellings of "agressive", as well as a couple
other things on the same lines while we're there.
Signed-off-by: Robert P. J. Day <rpjday@mindspring.com>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
atime flag was also overwritten. Noticed by Shirish when he was debugging
an atime problem. Should help performance a bit too.
cifs should be getting time stamps from the server (that was the original
intent too)
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Just mention which error will be returned if debugfs is disabled. Callers
should be able to figure out themselves what they need to check.
Signed-off-by: Cornelia Huck <cornelia.huck@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
debugfs: implement symbolic links
Implement a new function debugfs_create_symlink() which can be used
to create symbolic links in debugfs. This function can be useful
for people moving functionality from /proc to debugfs (e.g. the
gcov-kernel patch).
Signed-off-by: Peter Oberparleiter <peter.oberparleiter@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Here is a patch that removes all redundant kobject_unregister argument checks.
Signed-off-by: Mariusz Kozlowski <m.kozlowski@tuxland.pl>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Add format specifier %d for uid in ecryptfs_printk
Signed-off-by: Thomas Hisch <t.hisch@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
eCryptfs is gobbling a lot of stack in ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set()
because it allocates a temporary memory-hungry ecryptfs_key_record struct.
This patch introduces a new kmem_cache for that struct and converts
ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set() to use it.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
When setting an ACL that lacks inheritable ACEs on a directory, we should set
a default ACL of zero length, not a default ACL with all bits denied.
Signed-off-by: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
We're inserting deny's between some ACEs in order to enforce posix draft acl
semantics which prevent permissions from accumulating across entries in an
acl.
That's fine, but we're doing that by inserting a deny after *every* allow,
which is overkill. We shouldn't be adding them in places where they actually
make no difference.
Also replaced some helper functions for creating acl entries; I prefer just
assigning directly to the struct fields--it takes a few more lines, but the
field names provide some documentation that I think makes the result easier
understand.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Return just the effective permissions, and forget about the mask. It isn't
worth the complexity.
WARNING: This breaks backwards compatibility with overly-picky nfsv4->posix
acl translation, as may has been included in some patched versions of libacl.
To our knowledge no such version was every distributed by anyone outside citi.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
We should be returning ATTRNOTSUPP, not NOTSUPP, when acls are unsupported.
Also fix a comment.
Signed-off-by: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The wrong pointer is being kfree'd in savemem() when defer_free returns with
an error.
Signed-off-by: Benny Halevy <bhalevy@panasas.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Simplify the memory management and code a bit by representing acls with an
array instead of a linked list.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The code that splits an incoming nfsv4 ACL into inheritable and effective
parts can be combined with the the code that translates each to a posix acl,
resulting in simpler code that requires one less pass through the ACL.
Signed-off-by: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The rfc allows us to be more permissive about the ACL inheritance bits we
accept:
"If the server supports a single "inherit ACE" flag that applies to
both files and directories, the server may reject the request
(i.e., requiring the client to set both the file and directory
inheritance flags). The server may also accept the request and
silently turn on the ACE4_DIRECTORY_INHERIT_ACE flag."
Let's take the latter option--the ACL is a complex attribute that could be
rejected for a wide variety of reasons, and the protocol gives us little
ability to explain the reason for the rejection, so erroring out is a
user-unfriendly last resort.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The server name is expected to be a null-terminated string, so we can't pass
in the raw client identifier.
What's more, the client identifier is just a binary, not necessarily
printable, blob. Let's just use the ip address instead. The server name
appears to exist just to help debugging by making some printk's more
informative.
Note that the string is copies into the rpc client structure, so the pointer
to the local variable does not outlive the function call.
Signed-off-by: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
If prepare_write or commit_write return AOP_TRUNCATED_PAGE we jump to
"retry" label and than if find_or_create_page() failed function return
incorrect error code.
Signed-off-by: Dmitriy Monakhov <dmonakhov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Since the security checks are applied on each read and write of a sysctl file,
just like they are applied when calling sys_sysctl, they are redundant on the
standard VFS constructs. Since it is difficult to compute the security labels
on the standard VFS constructs we just mark the sysctl inodes in proc private
so selinux won't even bother with them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
It isn't needed anymore, all of the users are gone, and all of the ctl_table
initializers have been converted to use explicit names of the fields they are
initializing.
[akpm@osdl.org: NTFS fix]
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
With this change the sysctl inodes can be cached and nothing needs to be done
when removing a sysctl table.
For a cost of 2K code we will save about 4K of static tables (when we remove
de from ctl_table) and 70K in proc_dir_entries that we will not allocate, or
about half that on a 32bit arch.
The speed feels about the same, even though we can now cache the sysctl
dentries :(
We get the core advantage that we don't need to have a 1 to 1 mapping between
ctl table entries and proc files. Making it possible to have /proc/sys vary
depending on the namespace you are in. The currently merged namespaces don't
have an issue here but the network namespace under /proc/sys/net needs to have
different directories depending on which network adapters are visible. By
simply being a cache different directories being visible depending on who you
are is trivial to implement.
[akpm@osdl.org: fix uninitialised var]
[akpm@osdl.org: fix ARM build]
[bunk@stusta.de: make things static]
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Russell King <rmk@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The semantic effect of insert_at_head is that it would allow new registered
sysctl entries to override existing sysctl entries of the same name. Which is
pain for caching and the proc interface never implemented.
I have done an audit and discovered that none of the current users of
register_sysctl care as (excpet for directories) they do not register
duplicate sysctl entries.
So this patch simply removes the support for overriding existing entries in
the sys_sysctl interface since no one uses it or cares and it makes future
enhancments harder.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Acked-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Russell King <rmk@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@muc.de>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Corey Minyard <minyard@acm.org>
Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Cc: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@steeleye.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@ucw.cz>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark.fasheh@oracle.com>
Cc: David Chinner <dgc@sgi.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
binfmt_misc has a mount point in the middle of the sysctl and that mount point
is created as a proc_generic directory.
Doing it that way gets in the way of cleaning up the sysctl proc support as it
continues the existence of a horrible hack. So instead simply create the
directory as an ordinary sysctl directory. At least that removes the magic
special case.
[akpm@osdl.org: warning fix]
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
ocfs2 was did not have the binary number it uses under CTL_FS registered in
sysctl.h. Register it to avoid future conflicts, and change the name of the
definition to be in line with the rest of the sysctl numbers.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Mark Fasheh <mark.fasheh@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Putting ntfs-debug under FS_NRINODE was not a kosher thing to do so don't give
it any binary number.
[akpm@osdl.org: build fix]
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Anton Altaparmakov <aia21@cantab.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Will converting the coda sysctl initializers I discovered that it is yet
another user of sysctl that was stomping CTL_KERN. So off with it's
sys_sysctl support since it wasn't done in a supportable way.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Jan Harkes <jaharkes@cs.cmu.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
After Al Viro (finally) succeeded in removing the sched.h #include in module.h
recently, it makes sense again to remove other superfluous sched.h includes.
There are quite a lot of files which include it but don't actually need
anything defined in there. Presumably these includes were once needed for
macros that used to live in sched.h, but moved to other header files in the
course of cleaning it up.
To ease the pain, this time I did not fiddle with any header files and only
removed #includes from .c-files, which tend to cause less trouble.
Compile tested against 2.6.20-rc2 and 2.6.20-rc2-mm2 (with offsets) on alpha,
arm, i386, ia64, mips, powerpc, and x86_64 with allnoconfig, defconfig,
allmodconfig, and allyesconfig as well as a few randconfigs on x86_64 and all
configs in arch/arm/configs on arm. I also checked that no new warnings were
introduced by the patch (actually, some warnings are removed that were emitted
by unnecessarily included header files).
Signed-off-by: Tim Schmielau <tim@physik3.uni-rostock.de>
Acked-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Add support for using a filesystem UUID to identify and export point in the
filehandle.
For NFSv2, this UUID is xor-ed down to 4 or 8 bytes so that it doesn't take up
too much room. For NFSv3+, we use the full 16 bytes, and possibly also a
64bit inode number for exports beneath the root of a filesystem.
When generating an fsid to return in 'stat' information, use the UUID (hashed
down to size) if it is available and a small 'fsid' was not specifically
provided.
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
If we are using the same version/fsid as a current filehandle, then there is
no need to verify the the numbers are valid for this export, and they must be
(we used them to find this export).
This allows us to simplify the fsid selection code.
Also change "ref_fh_version" and "ref_fh_fsid_type" to "version" and
"fsid_type", as the important thing isn't that they are the version/type of
the reference filehandle, but they are the chosen type for the new filehandle.
And tidy up some indenting.
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Most files in the 'nfsd' filesystem are transactional. When you write, a
reply is generated that can be read back only on the same 'file'.
If the reply has zero length, the 'write' will incorrectly return a value of
'0' instead of the length that was written. This causes 'rpc.nfsd' to give an
annoying warning.
This patch fixes the test.
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
After temporary server or network failure and reconneciton, we were not
resending the unix capabilities via SetFSInfo - which confused Samba posix
byte range locking code.
Discovered by jra
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
This reverts commit eb3dfb0cb1.
It causes some strange Gnome problem with dbus-daemon getting stuck, so
we'll revert it until that problem is understood.
Reported by both walt and Greg KH, who both independently git-bisected
the problem to this commit.
Andreas is looking at it.
Reported-by: walt <wa1ter@myrealbox.com>
Reported-by: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Acked-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
RFC3530 section 3.1.1 states an NFSv4 client MUST NOT send a request
twice on the same connection unless it is the NULL procedure. Section
3.1.1 suggests that the client should disconnect and reconnect if it
wants to retry a request.
Implement this by adding an rpc_clnt flag that an ULP can use to
specify that the underlying transport should be disconnected on a
major timeout. The NFSv4 client asserts this new flag, and requests
no retries after a minor retransmit timeout.
Note that disconnecting on a retransmit is in general not safe to do
if the RPC client does not reuse the TCP port number when reconnecting.
See http://bugzilla.linux-nfs.org/show_bug.cgi?id=6
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
ClearPageUptodate() will just cause races here. What we really want to do
is to invalidate the page cache.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Fix wraparound issue with nfsi->cache_change_attribute. If it is found
to lie in the future, then update it to lie in the past. Patch based on
a suggestion by Neil Brown.
..and minor micro-optimisation: avoid reading 'jiffies' more than once in
nfs_update_inode().
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
This patch is inspired by Arjan's "Patch series to mark struct
file_operations and struct inode_operations const".
Compile tested with gcc & sparse.
Signed-off-by: Josef 'Jeff' Sipek <jsipek@cs.sunysb.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Many struct inode_operations in the kernel can be "const". Marking them const
moves these to the .rodata section, which avoids false sharing with potential
dirty data. In addition it'll catch accidental writes at compile time to
these shared resources.
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Many struct inode_operations in the kernel can be "const". Marking them const
moves these to the .rodata section, which avoids false sharing with potential
dirty data. In addition it'll catch accidental writes at compile time to
these shared resources.
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Many struct inode_operations in the kernel can be "const". Marking them const
moves these to the .rodata section, which avoids false sharing with potential
dirty data. In addition it'll catch accidental writes at compile time to
these shared resources.
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Many struct file_operations in the kernel can be "const". Marking them const
moves these to the .rodata section, which avoids false sharing with potential
dirty data. In addition it'll catch accidental writes at compile time to
these shared resources.
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Patch adds ability to work with 64bit metadata, this made by replacing work
with 32bit pointers by inline functions.
Signed-off-by: Evgeniy Dushistov <dushistov@mail.ru>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch adds into write inode path function to write UFS2 inode, and
modifys allocate inode path to allocate and init additional inode chunks.
Also some cleanups:
- remove not used parameters in some functions
- remove i_gen field from ufs_inode_info structure,
there is i_generation in inode structure with same purposes.
Signed-off-by: Evgeniy Dushistov <dushistov@mail.ru>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
These series of patches add UFS2 write-support. UFS2 - is default file system
for recent versions of FreeBSD.
The main differences from UFS1 from write support point of view
are:
1)Not all inodes are allocated during formatation of disk.
2)All meta-data(pointer to data blocks) are 64bit(in UFS1 they
are 32bit).
So patch series consist of
1)make possible mount UFS2 in read-write mode
2)code to write ufs2 inodes and code to initialize inodes chunks.
3)work with 64bit meta-data
I made simple testing like create/deleting/writing/reading/truncating, also I
ran fsx-linux and untar and build kernel on UFS1 and UFS2, after that FreeBSD
fsck do not find any errors in fs.
This patch makes possible to mount ufs2 "rw", and updates UFS2 documentation:
remove note about bug(it fixed by reallocate blocks on the fly patch) and add
me in the list of people who want receive bug reports.
Signed-off-by: Evgeniy Dushistov <dushistov@mail.ru>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Call flush_dcache_page() after modifying a pagecache by hand.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Replace kmap() with kmap_atomic(). Reduce the amount of time that mappings
are held.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Trevor Highland <tshighla@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
sys_write() takes a local copy of f_pos and writes that back
into the struct file. It does this so that two concurrent write()
callers don't make a mess of f_pos, and of the file contents.
ecryptfs should be calling vfs_write(). That way we also get the fsnotify
notifications, which ecryptfs presently appears to have subverted.
Convert direct calls to f_op->write() into calls to vfs_write().
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Provide an option to provide a view of the encrypted files such that the
metadata is always in the header of the files, regardless of whether the
metadata is actually in the header or in the extended attribute. This mode of
operation is useful for applications like incremental backup utilities that do
not preserve the extended attributes when directly accessing the lower files.
With this option enabled, the files under the eCryptfs mount point will be
read-only.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Generalize the metadata reading and writing mechanisms, with two targets for
now: metadata in file header and metadata in the user.ecryptfs xattr of the
lower file.
[akpm@osdl.org: printk warning fix]
[bunk@stusta.de: make some needlessly global code static]
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch set introduces the ability to store cryptographic metadata into an
lower file extended attribute rather than the lower file header region.
This patch set implements two new mount options:
ecryptfs_xattr_metadata
- When set, newly created files will have their cryptographic
metadata stored in the extended attribute region of the file rather
than the header.
When storing the data in the file header, there is a minimum of 8KB
reserved for the header information for each file, making each file at
least 12KB in size. This can take up a lot of extra disk space if the user
creates a lot of small files. By storing the data in the extended
attribute, each file will only occupy at least of 4KB of space.
As the eCryptfs metadata set becomes larger with new features such as
multi-key associations, most popular filesystems will not be able to store
all of the information in the xattr region in some cases due to space
constraints. However, the majority of users will only ever associate one
key per file, so most users will be okay with storing their data in the
xattr region.
This option should be used with caution. I want to emphasize that the
xattr must be maintained under all circumstances, or the file will be
rendered permanently unrecoverable. The last thing I want is for a user to
forget to set an xattr flag in a backup utility, only to later discover
that their backups are worthless.
ecryptfs_encrypted_view
- When set, this option causes eCryptfs to present applications a
view of encrypted files as if the cryptographic metadata were
stored in the file header, whether the metadata is actually stored
in the header or in the extended attributes.
No matter what eCryptfs winds up doing in the lower filesystem, I want
to preserve a baseline format compatibility for the encrypted files. As of
right now, the metadata may be in the file header or in an xattr. There is
no reason why the metadata could not be put in a separate file in future
versions.
Without the compatibility mode, backup utilities would have to know to
back up the metadata file along with the files. The semantics of eCryptfs
have always been that the lower files are self-contained units of encrypted
data, and the only additional information required to decrypt any given
eCryptfs file is the key. That is what has always been emphasized about
eCryptfs lower files, and that is what users expect. Providing the
encrypted view option will provide a way to userspace applications wherein
they can always get to the same old familiar eCryptfs encrypted files,
regardless of what eCryptfs winds up doing with the metadata behind the
scenes.
This patch:
Add extended attribute support to version bit vector, flags to indicate when
xattr or encrypted view modes are enabled, and support for the new mount
options.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Public key support code. This reads and writes packets in the header that
contain public key encrypted file keys. It calls the messaging code in the
previous patch to send and receive encryption and decryption request
packets from the userspace daemon.
[akpm@osdl.org: cleab fix]
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This is the transport code for public key functionality in eCryptfs. It
manages encryption/decryption request queues with a transport mechanism.
Currently, netlink is the only implemented transport.
Each inode has a unique File Encryption Key (FEK). Under passphrase, a File
Encryption Key Encryption Key (FEKEK) is generated from a salt/passphrase
combo on mount. This FEKEK encrypts each FEK and writes it into the header of
each file using the packet format specified in RFC 2440. This is all
symmetric key encryption, so it can all be done via the kernel crypto API.
These new patches introduce public key encryption of the FEK. There is no
asymmetric key encryption support in the kernel crypto API, so eCryptfs pushes
the FEK encryption and decryption out to a userspace daemon. After
considering our requirements and determining the complexity of using various
transport mechanisms, we settled on netlink for this communication.
eCryptfs stores authentication tokens into the kernel keyring. These tokens
correlate with individual keys. For passphrase mode of operation, the
authentication token contains the symmetric FEKEK. For public key, the
authentication token contains a PKI type and an opaque data blob managed by
individual PKI modules in userspace.
Each user who opens a file under an eCryptfs partition mounted in public key
mode must be running a daemon. That daemon has the user's credentials and has
access to all of the keys to which the user should have access. The daemon,
when started, initializes the pluggable PKI modules available on the system
and registers itself with the eCryptfs kernel module. Userspace utilities
register public key authentication tokens into the user session keyring.
These authentication tokens correlate key signatures with PKI modules and PKI
blobs. The PKI blobs contain PKI-specific information necessary for the PKI
module to carry out asymmetric key encryption and decryption.
When the eCryptfs module parses the header of an existing file and finds a Tag
1 (Public Key) packet (see RFC 2440), it reads in the public key identifier
(signature). The asymmetrically encrypted FEK is in the Tag 1 packet;
eCryptfs puts together a decrypt request packet containing the signature and
the encrypted FEK, then it passes it to the daemon registered for the
current->euid via a netlink unicast to the PID of the daemon, which was
registered at the time the daemon was started by the user.
The daemon actually just makes calls to libecryptfs, which implements request
packet parsing and manages PKI modules. libecryptfs grabs the public key
authentication token for the given signature from the user session keyring.
This auth tok tells libecryptfs which PKI module should receive the request.
libecryptfs then makes a decrypt() call to the PKI module, and it passes along
the PKI block from the auth tok. The PKI uses the blob to figure out how it
should decrypt the data passed to it; it performs the decryption and passes
the decrypted data back to libecryptfs. libecryptfs then puts together a
reply packet with the decrypted FEK and passes that back to the eCryptfs
module.
The eCryptfs module manages these request callouts to userspace code via
message context structs. The module maintains an array of message context
structs and places the elements of the array on two lists: a free and an
allocated list. When eCryptfs wants to make a request, it moves a msg ctx
from the free list to the allocated list, sets its state to pending, and fires
off the message to the user's registered daemon.
When eCryptfs receives a netlink message (via the callback), it correlates the
msg ctx struct in the alloc list with the data in the message itself. The
msg->index contains the offset of the array of msg ctx structs. It verifies
that the registered daemon PID is the same as the PID of the process that sent
the message. It also validates a sequence number between the received packet
and the msg ctx. Then, it copies the contents of the message (the reply
packet) into the msg ctx struct, sets the state in the msg ctx to done, and
wakes up the process that was sleeping while waiting for the reply.
The sleeping process was whatever was performing the sys_open(). This process
originally called ecryptfs_send_message(); it is now in
ecryptfs_wait_for_response(). When it wakes up and sees that the msg ctx
state was set to done, it returns a pointer to the message contents (the reply
packet) and returns. If all went well, this packet contains the decrypted
FEK, which is then copied into the crypt_stat struct, and life continues as
normal.
The case for creation of a new file is very similar, only instead of a decrypt
request, eCryptfs sends out an encrypt request.
> - We have a great clod of key mangement code in-kernel. Why is that
> not suitable (or growable) for public key management?
eCryptfs uses Howells' keyring to store persistent key data and PKI state
information. It defers public key cryptographic transformations to userspace
code. The userspace data manipulation request really is orthogonal to key
management in and of itself. What eCryptfs basically needs is a secure way to
communicate with a particular daemon for a particular task doing a syscall,
based on the UID. Nothing running under another UID should be able to access
that channel of communication.
> - Is it appropriate that new infrastructure for public key
> management be private to a particular fs?
The messaging.c file contains a lot of code that, perhaps, could be extracted
into a separate kernel service. In essence, this would be a sort of
request/reply mechanism that would involve a userspace daemon. I am not aware
of anything that does quite what eCryptfs does, so I was not aware of any
existing tools to do just what we wanted.
> What happens if one of these daemons exits without sending a quit
> message?
There is a stale uid<->pid association in the hash table for that user. When
the user registers a new daemon, eCryptfs cleans up the old association and
generates a new one. See ecryptfs_process_helo().
> - _why_ does it use netlink?
Netlink provides the transport mechanism that would minimize the complexity of
the implementation, given that we can have multiple daemons (one per user). I
explored the possibility of using relayfs, but that would involve having to
introduce control channels and a protocol for creating and tearing down
channels for the daemons. We do not have to worry about any of that with
netlink.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
NFS_SUPER_MAGIC is already defined in include/linux/magic.h
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
