android_kernel_xiaomi_sm8350/block/blk-crypto-fallback.c
Eric Biggers 0367acdde3 ANDROID: block: require drivers to declare supported crypto key type(s)
We need a way to tell which type of keys the inline crypto hardware
supports (standard, wrapped, or both), so that fallbacks can be used
when needed (either blk-crypto-fallback, or fscrypt fs-layer crypto).

We can't simply assume that

    keyslot_mgmt_ll_ops::derive_raw_secret == NULL

means only standard keys are supported and that

    keyslot_mgmt_ll_ops::derive_raw_secret != NULL

means that only wrapped keys are supported, because device-mapper
devices always implement this method.  Also, hardware might support both
types of keys.

Therefore, add a field keyslot_manager::features which contains a
bitmask of flags which indicate the supported types of keys.  Drivers
will need to fill this in.  This patch makes the UFS standard crypto
code set BLK_CRYPTO_FEATURE_STANDARD_KEYS, but UFS variant drivers may
need to set BLK_CRYPTO_FEATURE_WRAPPED_KEYS instead.

Then, make keyslot_manager_crypto_mode_supported() take the key type
into account.

Bug: 137270441
Bug: 151100202
Test: 'atest vts_kernel_encryption_test' on Pixel 4 with the
      inline crypto patches backported, and also on Cuttlefish.
Change-Id: Ied846c2767c1fd2f438792dcfd3649157e68b005
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2020-04-07 17:58:49 +00:00

646 lines
18 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* Copyright 2019 Google LLC
*/
/*
* Refer to Documentation/block/inline-encryption.rst for detailed explanation.
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "blk-crypto-fallback: " fmt
#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
#include <linux/blk-cgroup.h>
#include <linux/blk-crypto.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
#include <linux/keyslot-manager.h>
#include <linux/mempool.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include "blk-crypto-internal.h"
static unsigned int num_prealloc_bounce_pg = 32;
module_param(num_prealloc_bounce_pg, uint, 0);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(num_prealloc_bounce_pg,
"Number of preallocated bounce pages for the blk-crypto crypto API fallback");
static unsigned int blk_crypto_num_keyslots = 100;
module_param_named(num_keyslots, blk_crypto_num_keyslots, uint, 0);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(num_keyslots,
"Number of keyslots for the blk-crypto crypto API fallback");
static unsigned int num_prealloc_fallback_crypt_ctxs = 128;
module_param(num_prealloc_fallback_crypt_ctxs, uint, 0);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(num_prealloc_crypt_fallback_ctxs,
"Number of preallocated bio fallback crypto contexts for blk-crypto to use during crypto API fallback");
struct bio_fallback_crypt_ctx {
struct bio_crypt_ctx crypt_ctx;
/*
* Copy of the bvec_iter when this bio was submitted.
* We only want to en/decrypt the part of the bio as described by the
* bvec_iter upon submission because bio might be split before being
* resubmitted
*/
struct bvec_iter crypt_iter;
u64 fallback_dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE];
};
/* The following few vars are only used during the crypto API fallback */
static struct kmem_cache *bio_fallback_crypt_ctx_cache;
static mempool_t *bio_fallback_crypt_ctx_pool;
/*
* Allocating a crypto tfm during I/O can deadlock, so we have to preallocate
* all of a mode's tfms when that mode starts being used. Since each mode may
* need all the keyslots at some point, each mode needs its own tfm for each
* keyslot; thus, a keyslot may contain tfms for multiple modes. However, to
* match the behavior of real inline encryption hardware (which only supports a
* single encryption context per keyslot), we only allow one tfm per keyslot to
* be used at a time - the rest of the unused tfms have their keys cleared.
*/
static DEFINE_MUTEX(tfms_init_lock);
static bool tfms_inited[BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_MAX];
struct blk_crypto_decrypt_work {
struct work_struct work;
struct bio *bio;
};
static struct blk_crypto_keyslot {
struct crypto_skcipher *tfm;
enum blk_crypto_mode_num crypto_mode;
struct crypto_skcipher *tfms[BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_MAX];
} *blk_crypto_keyslots;
/* The following few vars are only used during the crypto API fallback */
static struct keyslot_manager *blk_crypto_ksm;
static struct workqueue_struct *blk_crypto_wq;
static mempool_t *blk_crypto_bounce_page_pool;
static struct kmem_cache *blk_crypto_decrypt_work_cache;
bool bio_crypt_fallback_crypted(const struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc)
{
return bc && bc->bc_ksm == blk_crypto_ksm;
}
/*
* This is the key we set when evicting a keyslot. This *should* be the all 0's
* key, but AES-XTS rejects that key, so we use some random bytes instead.
*/
static u8 blank_key[BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_KEY_SIZE];
static void blk_crypto_evict_keyslot(unsigned int slot)
{
struct blk_crypto_keyslot *slotp = &blk_crypto_keyslots[slot];
enum blk_crypto_mode_num crypto_mode = slotp->crypto_mode;
int err;
WARN_ON(slotp->crypto_mode == BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_INVALID);
/* Clear the key in the skcipher */
err = crypto_skcipher_setkey(slotp->tfms[crypto_mode], blank_key,
blk_crypto_modes[crypto_mode].keysize);
WARN_ON(err);
slotp->crypto_mode = BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_INVALID;
}
static int blk_crypto_keyslot_program(struct keyslot_manager *ksm,
const struct blk_crypto_key *key,
unsigned int slot)
{
struct blk_crypto_keyslot *slotp = &blk_crypto_keyslots[slot];
const enum blk_crypto_mode_num crypto_mode = key->crypto_mode;
int err;
if (crypto_mode != slotp->crypto_mode &&
slotp->crypto_mode != BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_INVALID) {
blk_crypto_evict_keyslot(slot);
}
if (!slotp->tfms[crypto_mode])
return -ENOMEM;
slotp->crypto_mode = crypto_mode;
err = crypto_skcipher_setkey(slotp->tfms[crypto_mode], key->raw,
key->size);
if (err) {
blk_crypto_evict_keyslot(slot);
return err;
}
return 0;
}
static int blk_crypto_keyslot_evict(struct keyslot_manager *ksm,
const struct blk_crypto_key *key,
unsigned int slot)
{
blk_crypto_evict_keyslot(slot);
return 0;
}
/*
* The crypto API fallback KSM ops - only used for a bio when it specifies a
* blk_crypto_mode for which we failed to get a keyslot in the device's inline
* encryption hardware (which probably means the device doesn't have inline
* encryption hardware that supports that crypto mode).
*/
static const struct keyslot_mgmt_ll_ops blk_crypto_ksm_ll_ops = {
.keyslot_program = blk_crypto_keyslot_program,
.keyslot_evict = blk_crypto_keyslot_evict,
};
static void blk_crypto_encrypt_endio(struct bio *enc_bio)
{
struct bio *src_bio = enc_bio->bi_private;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < enc_bio->bi_vcnt; i++)
mempool_free(enc_bio->bi_io_vec[i].bv_page,
blk_crypto_bounce_page_pool);
src_bio->bi_status = enc_bio->bi_status;
bio_put(enc_bio);
bio_endio(src_bio);
}
static struct bio *blk_crypto_clone_bio(struct bio *bio_src)
{
struct bvec_iter iter;
struct bio_vec bv;
struct bio *bio;
bio = bio_alloc_bioset(GFP_NOIO, bio_segments(bio_src), NULL);
if (!bio)
return NULL;
bio->bi_disk = bio_src->bi_disk;
bio->bi_opf = bio_src->bi_opf;
bio->bi_ioprio = bio_src->bi_ioprio;
bio->bi_write_hint = bio_src->bi_write_hint;
bio->bi_iter.bi_sector = bio_src->bi_iter.bi_sector;
bio->bi_iter.bi_size = bio_src->bi_iter.bi_size;
bio_for_each_segment(bv, bio_src, iter)
bio->bi_io_vec[bio->bi_vcnt++] = bv;
if (bio_integrity(bio_src) &&
bio_integrity_clone(bio, bio_src, GFP_NOIO) < 0) {
bio_put(bio);
return NULL;
}
bio_clone_blkg_association(bio, bio_src);
blkcg_bio_issue_init(bio);
bio_clone_skip_dm_default_key(bio, bio_src);
return bio;
}
static int blk_crypto_alloc_cipher_req(struct bio *src_bio,
struct skcipher_request **ciph_req_ret,
struct crypto_wait *wait)
{
struct skcipher_request *ciph_req;
const struct blk_crypto_keyslot *slotp;
slotp = &blk_crypto_keyslots[src_bio->bi_crypt_context->bc_keyslot];
ciph_req = skcipher_request_alloc(slotp->tfms[slotp->crypto_mode],
GFP_NOIO);
if (!ciph_req) {
src_bio->bi_status = BLK_STS_RESOURCE;
return -ENOMEM;
}
skcipher_request_set_callback(ciph_req,
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG |
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
crypto_req_done, wait);
*ciph_req_ret = ciph_req;
return 0;
}
static int blk_crypto_split_bio_if_needed(struct bio **bio_ptr)
{
struct bio *bio = *bio_ptr;
unsigned int i = 0;
unsigned int num_sectors = 0;
struct bio_vec bv;
struct bvec_iter iter;
bio_for_each_segment(bv, bio, iter) {
num_sectors += bv.bv_len >> SECTOR_SHIFT;
if (++i == BIO_MAX_PAGES)
break;
}
if (num_sectors < bio_sectors(bio)) {
struct bio *split_bio;
split_bio = bio_split(bio, num_sectors, GFP_NOIO, NULL);
if (!split_bio) {
bio->bi_status = BLK_STS_RESOURCE;
return -ENOMEM;
}
bio_chain(split_bio, bio);
generic_make_request(bio);
*bio_ptr = split_bio;
}
return 0;
}
union blk_crypto_iv {
__le64 dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE];
u8 bytes[BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_IV_SIZE];
};
static void blk_crypto_dun_to_iv(const u64 dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE],
union blk_crypto_iv *iv)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE; i++)
iv->dun[i] = cpu_to_le64(dun[i]);
}
/*
* The crypto API fallback's encryption routine.
* Allocate a bounce bio for encryption, encrypt the input bio using crypto API,
* and replace *bio_ptr with the bounce bio. May split input bio if it's too
* large.
*/
static int blk_crypto_encrypt_bio(struct bio **bio_ptr)
{
struct bio *src_bio;
struct skcipher_request *ciph_req = NULL;
DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
u64 curr_dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE];
union blk_crypto_iv iv;
struct scatterlist src, dst;
struct bio *enc_bio;
unsigned int i, j;
int data_unit_size;
struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc;
int err = 0;
/* Split the bio if it's too big for single page bvec */
err = blk_crypto_split_bio_if_needed(bio_ptr);
if (err)
return err;
src_bio = *bio_ptr;
bc = src_bio->bi_crypt_context;
data_unit_size = bc->bc_key->data_unit_size;
/* Allocate bounce bio for encryption */
enc_bio = blk_crypto_clone_bio(src_bio);
if (!enc_bio) {
src_bio->bi_status = BLK_STS_RESOURCE;
return -ENOMEM;
}
/*
* Use the crypto API fallback keyslot manager to get a crypto_skcipher
* for the algorithm and key specified for this bio.
*/
err = bio_crypt_ctx_acquire_keyslot(bc, blk_crypto_ksm);
if (err) {
src_bio->bi_status = BLK_STS_IOERR;
goto out_put_enc_bio;
}
/* and then allocate an skcipher_request for it */
err = blk_crypto_alloc_cipher_req(src_bio, &ciph_req, &wait);
if (err)
goto out_release_keyslot;
memcpy(curr_dun, bc->bc_dun, sizeof(curr_dun));
sg_init_table(&src, 1);
sg_init_table(&dst, 1);
skcipher_request_set_crypt(ciph_req, &src, &dst, data_unit_size,
iv.bytes);
/* Encrypt each page in the bounce bio */
for (i = 0; i < enc_bio->bi_vcnt; i++) {
struct bio_vec *enc_bvec = &enc_bio->bi_io_vec[i];
struct page *plaintext_page = enc_bvec->bv_page;
struct page *ciphertext_page =
mempool_alloc(blk_crypto_bounce_page_pool, GFP_NOIO);
enc_bvec->bv_page = ciphertext_page;
if (!ciphertext_page) {
src_bio->bi_status = BLK_STS_RESOURCE;
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out_free_bounce_pages;
}
sg_set_page(&src, plaintext_page, data_unit_size,
enc_bvec->bv_offset);
sg_set_page(&dst, ciphertext_page, data_unit_size,
enc_bvec->bv_offset);
/* Encrypt each data unit in this page */
for (j = 0; j < enc_bvec->bv_len; j += data_unit_size) {
blk_crypto_dun_to_iv(curr_dun, &iv);
err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_encrypt(ciph_req),
&wait);
if (err) {
i++;
src_bio->bi_status = BLK_STS_RESOURCE;
goto out_free_bounce_pages;
}
bio_crypt_dun_increment(curr_dun, 1);
src.offset += data_unit_size;
dst.offset += data_unit_size;
}
}
enc_bio->bi_private = src_bio;
enc_bio->bi_end_io = blk_crypto_encrypt_endio;
*bio_ptr = enc_bio;
enc_bio = NULL;
err = 0;
goto out_free_ciph_req;
out_free_bounce_pages:
while (i > 0)
mempool_free(enc_bio->bi_io_vec[--i].bv_page,
blk_crypto_bounce_page_pool);
out_free_ciph_req:
skcipher_request_free(ciph_req);
out_release_keyslot:
bio_crypt_ctx_release_keyslot(bc);
out_put_enc_bio:
if (enc_bio)
bio_put(enc_bio);
return err;
}
static void blk_crypto_free_fallback_crypt_ctx(struct bio *bio)
{
mempool_free(container_of(bio->bi_crypt_context,
struct bio_fallback_crypt_ctx,
crypt_ctx),
bio_fallback_crypt_ctx_pool);
bio->bi_crypt_context = NULL;
}
/*
* The crypto API fallback's main decryption routine.
* Decrypts input bio in place.
*/
static void blk_crypto_decrypt_bio(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct blk_crypto_decrypt_work *decrypt_work =
container_of(work, struct blk_crypto_decrypt_work, work);
struct bio *bio = decrypt_work->bio;
struct skcipher_request *ciph_req = NULL;
DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
struct bio_vec bv;
struct bvec_iter iter;
u64 curr_dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE];
union blk_crypto_iv iv;
struct scatterlist sg;
struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc = bio->bi_crypt_context;
struct bio_fallback_crypt_ctx *f_ctx =
container_of(bc, struct bio_fallback_crypt_ctx, crypt_ctx);
const int data_unit_size = bc->bc_key->data_unit_size;
unsigned int i;
int err;
/*
* Use the crypto API fallback keyslot manager to get a crypto_skcipher
* for the algorithm and key specified for this bio.
*/
if (bio_crypt_ctx_acquire_keyslot(bc, blk_crypto_ksm)) {
bio->bi_status = BLK_STS_RESOURCE;
goto out_no_keyslot;
}
/* and then allocate an skcipher_request for it */
err = blk_crypto_alloc_cipher_req(bio, &ciph_req, &wait);
if (err)
goto out;
memcpy(curr_dun, f_ctx->fallback_dun, sizeof(curr_dun));
sg_init_table(&sg, 1);
skcipher_request_set_crypt(ciph_req, &sg, &sg, data_unit_size,
iv.bytes);
/* Decrypt each segment in the bio */
__bio_for_each_segment(bv, bio, iter, f_ctx->crypt_iter) {
struct page *page = bv.bv_page;
sg_set_page(&sg, page, data_unit_size, bv.bv_offset);
/* Decrypt each data unit in the segment */
for (i = 0; i < bv.bv_len; i += data_unit_size) {
blk_crypto_dun_to_iv(curr_dun, &iv);
if (crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_decrypt(ciph_req),
&wait)) {
bio->bi_status = BLK_STS_IOERR;
goto out;
}
bio_crypt_dun_increment(curr_dun, 1);
sg.offset += data_unit_size;
}
}
out:
skcipher_request_free(ciph_req);
bio_crypt_ctx_release_keyslot(bc);
out_no_keyslot:
kmem_cache_free(blk_crypto_decrypt_work_cache, decrypt_work);
blk_crypto_free_fallback_crypt_ctx(bio);
bio_endio(bio);
}
/*
* Queue bio for decryption.
* Returns true iff bio was queued for decryption.
*/
bool blk_crypto_queue_decrypt_bio(struct bio *bio)
{
struct blk_crypto_decrypt_work *decrypt_work;
/* If there was an IO error, don't queue for decrypt. */
if (bio->bi_status)
goto out;
decrypt_work = kmem_cache_zalloc(blk_crypto_decrypt_work_cache,
GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!decrypt_work) {
bio->bi_status = BLK_STS_RESOURCE;
goto out;
}
INIT_WORK(&decrypt_work->work, blk_crypto_decrypt_bio);
decrypt_work->bio = bio;
queue_work(blk_crypto_wq, &decrypt_work->work);
return true;
out:
blk_crypto_free_fallback_crypt_ctx(bio);
return false;
}
/*
* Prepare blk-crypto-fallback for the specified crypto mode.
* Returns -ENOPKG if the needed crypto API support is missing.
*/
int blk_crypto_fallback_start_using_mode(enum blk_crypto_mode_num mode_num)
{
const char *cipher_str = blk_crypto_modes[mode_num].cipher_str;
struct blk_crypto_keyslot *slotp;
unsigned int i;
int err = 0;
/*
* Fast path
* Ensure that updates to blk_crypto_keyslots[i].tfms[mode_num]
* for each i are visible before we try to access them.
*/
if (likely(smp_load_acquire(&tfms_inited[mode_num])))
return 0;
mutex_lock(&tfms_init_lock);
if (likely(tfms_inited[mode_num]))
goto out;
for (i = 0; i < blk_crypto_num_keyslots; i++) {
slotp = &blk_crypto_keyslots[i];
slotp->tfms[mode_num] = crypto_alloc_skcipher(cipher_str, 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(slotp->tfms[mode_num])) {
err = PTR_ERR(slotp->tfms[mode_num]);
if (err == -ENOENT) {
pr_warn_once("Missing crypto API support for \"%s\"\n",
cipher_str);
err = -ENOPKG;
}
slotp->tfms[mode_num] = NULL;
goto out_free_tfms;
}
crypto_skcipher_set_flags(slotp->tfms[mode_num],
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS);
}
/*
* Ensure that updates to blk_crypto_keyslots[i].tfms[mode_num]
* for each i are visible before we set tfms_inited[mode_num].
*/
smp_store_release(&tfms_inited[mode_num], true);
goto out;
out_free_tfms:
for (i = 0; i < blk_crypto_num_keyslots; i++) {
slotp = &blk_crypto_keyslots[i];
crypto_free_skcipher(slotp->tfms[mode_num]);
slotp->tfms[mode_num] = NULL;
}
out:
mutex_unlock(&tfms_init_lock);
return err;
}
int blk_crypto_fallback_evict_key(const struct blk_crypto_key *key)
{
return keyslot_manager_evict_key(blk_crypto_ksm, key);
}
int blk_crypto_fallback_submit_bio(struct bio **bio_ptr)
{
struct bio *bio = *bio_ptr;
struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc = bio->bi_crypt_context;
struct bio_fallback_crypt_ctx *f_ctx;
if (bc->bc_key->is_hw_wrapped) {
pr_warn_once("HW wrapped key cannot be used with fallback.\n");
bio->bi_status = BLK_STS_NOTSUPP;
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
if (!tfms_inited[bc->bc_key->crypto_mode]) {
bio->bi_status = BLK_STS_IOERR;
return -EIO;
}
if (bio_data_dir(bio) == WRITE)
return blk_crypto_encrypt_bio(bio_ptr);
/*
* Mark bio as fallback crypted and replace the bio_crypt_ctx with
* another one contained in a bio_fallback_crypt_ctx, so that the
* fallback has space to store the info it needs for decryption.
*/
bc->bc_ksm = blk_crypto_ksm;
f_ctx = mempool_alloc(bio_fallback_crypt_ctx_pool, GFP_NOIO);
f_ctx->crypt_ctx = *bc;
memcpy(f_ctx->fallback_dun, bc->bc_dun, sizeof(f_ctx->fallback_dun));
f_ctx->crypt_iter = bio->bi_iter;
bio_crypt_free_ctx(bio);
bio->bi_crypt_context = &f_ctx->crypt_ctx;
return 0;
}
int __init blk_crypto_fallback_init(void)
{
int i;
unsigned int crypto_mode_supported[BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_MAX];
prandom_bytes(blank_key, BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_KEY_SIZE);
/* All blk-crypto modes have a crypto API fallback. */
for (i = 0; i < BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_MAX; i++)
crypto_mode_supported[i] = 0xFFFFFFFF;
crypto_mode_supported[BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_INVALID] = 0;
blk_crypto_ksm = keyslot_manager_create(
NULL, blk_crypto_num_keyslots,
&blk_crypto_ksm_ll_ops,
BLK_CRYPTO_FEATURE_STANDARD_KEYS,
crypto_mode_supported, NULL);
if (!blk_crypto_ksm)
return -ENOMEM;
blk_crypto_wq = alloc_workqueue("blk_crypto_wq",
WQ_UNBOUND | WQ_HIGHPRI |
WQ_MEM_RECLAIM, num_online_cpus());
if (!blk_crypto_wq)
return -ENOMEM;
blk_crypto_keyslots = kcalloc(blk_crypto_num_keyslots,
sizeof(blk_crypto_keyslots[0]),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!blk_crypto_keyslots)
return -ENOMEM;
blk_crypto_bounce_page_pool =
mempool_create_page_pool(num_prealloc_bounce_pg, 0);
if (!blk_crypto_bounce_page_pool)
return -ENOMEM;
blk_crypto_decrypt_work_cache = KMEM_CACHE(blk_crypto_decrypt_work,
SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT);
if (!blk_crypto_decrypt_work_cache)
return -ENOMEM;
bio_fallback_crypt_ctx_cache = KMEM_CACHE(bio_fallback_crypt_ctx, 0);
if (!bio_fallback_crypt_ctx_cache)
return -ENOMEM;
bio_fallback_crypt_ctx_pool =
mempool_create_slab_pool(num_prealloc_fallback_crypt_ctxs,
bio_fallback_crypt_ctx_cache);
if (!bio_fallback_crypt_ctx_pool)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}