228645aa79
While processing FILS EAP TLVs present in FILS wrapped data in Auth Frame, the tlv->length from the frame is used as the length to copy the buffer into the FILS auth info without validating if the received buffer length is at least greater than the length value in the TLV buffer. This would lead to OOB read if the TLV length present in the frame is greater than the actual data_len of the FILS wrapped data. Add sanity check to return error if tlv->length is greater than wrapped data_len + 2 with 2 bytes for the TLV header. Change-Id: Ibe1183c8e318ceb75db6278c935786322a029d5c CRs-Fixed: 2245944 |
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