android_kernel_xiaomi_sm8350/kernel/capability.c
Andrew Morgan e338d263a7 Add 64-bit capability support to the kernel
The patch supports legacy (32-bit) capability userspace, and where possible
translates 32-bit capabilities to/from userspace and the VFS to 64-bit
kernel space capabilities.  If a capability set cannot be compressed into
32-bits for consumption by user space, the system call fails, with -ERANGE.

FWIW libcap-2.00 supports this change (and earlier capability formats)

 http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.6/

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-syle fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: use get_task_comm()]
[ezk@cs.sunysb.edu: build fix]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: do not initialise statics to 0 or NULL]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: unused var]
[serue@us.ibm.com: export __cap_ symbols]
Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Erez Zadok <ezk@cs.sunysb.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-05 09:44:20 -08:00

343 lines
8.3 KiB
C

/*
* linux/kernel/capability.c
*
* Copyright (C) 1997 Andrew Main <zefram@fysh.org>
*
* Integrated into 2.1.97+, Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
* 30 May 2002: Cleanup, Robert M. Love <rml@tech9.net>
*/
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
/*
* This lock protects task->cap_* for all tasks including current.
* Locking rule: acquire this prior to tasklist_lock.
*/
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(task_capability_lock);
/*
* Leveraged for setting/resetting capabilities
*/
const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set = CAP_EMPTY_SET;
const kernel_cap_t __cap_full_set = CAP_FULL_SET;
const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set = CAP_INIT_EFF_SET;
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_empty_set);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_full_set);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_init_eff_set);
/*
* More recent versions of libcap are available from:
*
* http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/
*/
static void warn_legacy_capability_use(void)
{
static int warned;
if (!warned) {
char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
printk(KERN_INFO "warning: `%s' uses 32-bit capabilities"
" (legacy support in use)\n",
get_task_comm(name, current));
warned = 1;
}
}
/*
* For sys_getproccap() and sys_setproccap(), any of the three
* capability set pointers may be NULL -- indicating that that set is
* uninteresting and/or not to be changed.
*/
/**
* sys_capget - get the capabilities of a given process.
* @header: pointer to struct that contains capability version and
* target pid data
* @dataptr: pointer to struct that contains the effective, permitted,
* and inheritable capabilities that are returned
*
* Returns 0 on success and < 0 on error.
*/
asmlinkage long sys_capget(cap_user_header_t header, cap_user_data_t dataptr)
{
int ret = 0;
pid_t pid;
__u32 version;
struct task_struct *target;
unsigned tocopy;
kernel_cap_t pE, pI, pP;
if (get_user(version, &header->version))
return -EFAULT;
switch (version) {
case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1:
warn_legacy_capability_use();
tocopy = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_1;
break;
case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_2:
tocopy = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_2;
break;
default:
if (put_user(_LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION, &header->version))
return -EFAULT;
return -EINVAL;
}
if (get_user(pid, &header->pid))
return -EFAULT;
if (pid < 0)
return -EINVAL;
spin_lock(&task_capability_lock);
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
if (pid && pid != task_pid_vnr(current)) {
target = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
if (!target) {
ret = -ESRCH;
goto out;
}
} else
target = current;
ret = security_capget(target, &pE, &pI, &pP);
out:
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
spin_unlock(&task_capability_lock);
if (!ret) {
struct __user_cap_data_struct kdata[_LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S];
unsigned i;
for (i = 0; i < tocopy; i++) {
kdata[i].effective = pE.cap[i];
kdata[i].permitted = pP.cap[i];
kdata[i].inheritable = pI.cap[i];
}
/*
* Note, in the case, tocopy < _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S,
* we silently drop the upper capabilities here. This
* has the effect of making older libcap
* implementations implicitly drop upper capability
* bits when they perform a: capget/modify/capset
* sequence.
*
* This behavior is considered fail-safe
* behavior. Upgrading the application to a newer
* version of libcap will enable access to the newer
* capabilities.
*
* An alternative would be to return an error here
* (-ERANGE), but that causes legacy applications to
* unexpectidly fail; the capget/modify/capset aborts
* before modification is attempted and the application
* fails.
*/
if (copy_to_user(dataptr, kdata, tocopy
* sizeof(struct __user_cap_data_struct))) {
return -EFAULT;
}
}
return ret;
}
/*
* cap_set_pg - set capabilities for all processes in a given process
* group. We call this holding task_capability_lock and tasklist_lock.
*/
static inline int cap_set_pg(int pgrp_nr, kernel_cap_t *effective,
kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
struct task_struct *g, *target;
int ret = -EPERM;
int found = 0;
struct pid *pgrp;
pgrp = find_vpid(pgrp_nr);
do_each_pid_task(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, g) {
target = g;
while_each_thread(g, target) {
if (!security_capset_check(target, effective,
inheritable,
permitted)) {
security_capset_set(target, effective,
inheritable,
permitted);
ret = 0;
}
found = 1;
}
} while_each_pid_task(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, g);
if (!found)
ret = 0;
return ret;
}
/*
* cap_set_all - set capabilities for all processes other than init
* and self. We call this holding task_capability_lock and tasklist_lock.
*/
static inline int cap_set_all(kernel_cap_t *effective,
kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
struct task_struct *g, *target;
int ret = -EPERM;
int found = 0;
do_each_thread(g, target) {
if (target == current || is_container_init(target->group_leader))
continue;
found = 1;
if (security_capset_check(target, effective, inheritable,
permitted))
continue;
ret = 0;
security_capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
} while_each_thread(g, target);
if (!found)
ret = 0;
return ret;
}
/**
* sys_capset - set capabilities for a process or a group of processes
* @header: pointer to struct that contains capability version and
* target pid data
* @data: pointer to struct that contains the effective, permitted,
* and inheritable capabilities
*
* Set capabilities for a given process, all processes, or all
* processes in a given process group.
*
* The restrictions on setting capabilities are specified as:
*
* [pid is for the 'target' task. 'current' is the calling task.]
*
* I: any raised capabilities must be a subset of the (old current) permitted
* P: any raised capabilities must be a subset of the (old current) permitted
* E: must be set to a subset of (new target) permitted
*
* Returns 0 on success and < 0 on error.
*/
asmlinkage long sys_capset(cap_user_header_t header, const cap_user_data_t data)
{
struct __user_cap_data_struct kdata[_LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S];
unsigned i, tocopy;
kernel_cap_t inheritable, permitted, effective;
__u32 version;
struct task_struct *target;
int ret;
pid_t pid;
if (get_user(version, &header->version))
return -EFAULT;
switch (version) {
case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1:
warn_legacy_capability_use();
tocopy = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_1;
break;
case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_2:
tocopy = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_2;
break;
default:
if (put_user(_LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION, &header->version))
return -EFAULT;
return -EINVAL;
}
if (get_user(pid, &header->pid))
return -EFAULT;
if (pid && pid != task_pid_vnr(current) && !capable(CAP_SETPCAP))
return -EPERM;
if (copy_from_user(&kdata, data, tocopy
* sizeof(struct __user_cap_data_struct))) {
return -EFAULT;
}
for (i = 0; i < tocopy; i++) {
effective.cap[i] = kdata[i].effective;
permitted.cap[i] = kdata[i].permitted;
inheritable.cap[i] = kdata[i].inheritable;
}
while (i < _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S) {
effective.cap[i] = 0;
permitted.cap[i] = 0;
inheritable.cap[i] = 0;
i++;
}
spin_lock(&task_capability_lock);
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
if (pid > 0 && pid != task_pid_vnr(current)) {
target = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
if (!target) {
ret = -ESRCH;
goto out;
}
} else
target = current;
ret = 0;
/* having verified that the proposed changes are legal,
we now put them into effect. */
if (pid < 0) {
if (pid == -1) /* all procs other than current and init */
ret = cap_set_all(&effective, &inheritable, &permitted);
else /* all procs in process group */
ret = cap_set_pg(-pid, &effective, &inheritable,
&permitted);
} else {
ret = security_capset_check(target, &effective, &inheritable,
&permitted);
if (!ret)
security_capset_set(target, &effective, &inheritable,
&permitted);
}
out:
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
spin_unlock(&task_capability_lock);
return ret;
}
int __capable(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
{
if (security_capable(t, cap) == 0) {
t->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
int capable(int cap)
{
return __capable(current, cap);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);