f4520daa3c
[ Upstream commit b4f1874c62168159fdb419ced4afc77c1b51c475 ] This fixes the boot issues since 5.3 on several Dell models when the TPM is enabled. Depending on the exact grub binary, booting the kernel would freeze early, or just report an error parsing the final events log. We get an event log in the SHA-1 format, which doesn't have a tcg_efi_specid_event_head in the first event, and there is a final events table which doesn't match the crypto agile format. __calc_tpm2_event_size reads bad "count" and "efispecid->num_algs", and either fails, or loops long enough for the machine to be appear frozen. So we now only parse the final events table, which is per the spec always supposed to be in the crypto agile format, when we got a event log in this format. Fixes:c46f340569
("tpm: Reserve the TPM final events table") Fixes:166a2809d6
("tpm: Don't duplicate events from the final event log in the TCG2 log") Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1779611 Signed-off-by: Loïc Yhuel <loic.yhuel@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200512040113.277768-1-loic.yhuel@gmail.com Reviewed-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> [ardb: warn when final events table is missing or in the wrong format] Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
182 lines
5.3 KiB
C
182 lines
5.3 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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/*
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* TPM handling.
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2016 CoreOS, Inc
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* Copyright (C) 2017 Google, Inc.
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* Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
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* Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
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*/
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#include <linux/efi.h>
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#include <linux/tpm_eventlog.h>
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#include <asm/efi.h>
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#include "efistub.h"
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#ifdef CONFIG_RESET_ATTACK_MITIGATION
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static const efi_char16_t efi_MemoryOverWriteRequest_name[] =
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L"MemoryOverwriteRequestControl";
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#define MEMORY_ONLY_RESET_CONTROL_GUID \
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EFI_GUID(0xe20939be, 0x32d4, 0x41be, 0xa1, 0x50, 0x89, 0x7f, 0x85, 0xd4, 0x98, 0x29)
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#define get_efi_var(name, vendor, ...) \
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efi_call_runtime(get_variable, \
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(efi_char16_t *)(name), (efi_guid_t *)(vendor), \
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__VA_ARGS__)
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#define set_efi_var(name, vendor, ...) \
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efi_call_runtime(set_variable, \
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(efi_char16_t *)(name), (efi_guid_t *)(vendor), \
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__VA_ARGS__)
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/*
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* Enable reboot attack mitigation. This requests that the firmware clear the
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* RAM on next reboot before proceeding with boot, ensuring that any secrets
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* are cleared. If userland has ensured that all secrets have been removed
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* from RAM before reboot it can simply reset this variable.
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*/
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void efi_enable_reset_attack_mitigation(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
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{
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u8 val = 1;
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efi_guid_t var_guid = MEMORY_ONLY_RESET_CONTROL_GUID;
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efi_status_t status;
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unsigned long datasize = 0;
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status = get_efi_var(efi_MemoryOverWriteRequest_name, &var_guid,
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NULL, &datasize, NULL);
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if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
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return;
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set_efi_var(efi_MemoryOverWriteRequest_name, &var_guid,
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EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE |
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EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS |
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EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS, sizeof(val), &val);
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}
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#endif
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void efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
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{
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efi_guid_t tcg2_guid = EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL_GUID;
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efi_guid_t linux_eventlog_guid = LINUX_EFI_TPM_EVENT_LOG_GUID;
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efi_status_t status;
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efi_physical_addr_t log_location = 0, log_last_entry = 0;
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struct linux_efi_tpm_eventlog *log_tbl = NULL;
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struct efi_tcg2_final_events_table *final_events_table = NULL;
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unsigned long first_entry_addr, last_entry_addr;
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size_t log_size, last_entry_size;
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efi_bool_t truncated;
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int version = EFI_TCG2_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT_TCG_2;
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void *tcg2_protocol = NULL;
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int final_events_size = 0;
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status = efi_call_early(locate_protocol, &tcg2_guid, NULL,
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&tcg2_protocol);
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if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
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return;
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status = efi_call_proto(efi_tcg2_protocol, get_event_log,
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tcg2_protocol, version, &log_location,
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&log_last_entry, &truncated);
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if (status != EFI_SUCCESS || !log_location) {
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version = EFI_TCG2_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT_TCG_1_2;
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status = efi_call_proto(efi_tcg2_protocol, get_event_log,
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tcg2_protocol, version, &log_location,
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&log_last_entry, &truncated);
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if (status != EFI_SUCCESS || !log_location)
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return;
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}
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first_entry_addr = (unsigned long) log_location;
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/*
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* We populate the EFI table even if the logs are empty.
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*/
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if (!log_last_entry) {
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log_size = 0;
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} else {
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last_entry_addr = (unsigned long) log_last_entry;
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/*
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* get_event_log only returns the address of the last entry.
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* We need to calculate its size to deduce the full size of
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* the logs.
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*/
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if (version == EFI_TCG2_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT_TCG_2) {
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/*
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* The TCG2 log format has variable length entries,
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* and the information to decode the hash algorithms
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* back into a size is contained in the first entry -
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* pass a pointer to the final entry (to calculate its
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* size) and the first entry (so we know how long each
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* digest is)
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*/
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last_entry_size =
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__calc_tpm2_event_size((void *)last_entry_addr,
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(void *)(long)log_location,
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false);
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} else {
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last_entry_size = sizeof(struct tcpa_event) +
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((struct tcpa_event *) last_entry_addr)->event_size;
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}
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log_size = log_last_entry - log_location + last_entry_size;
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}
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/* Allocate space for the logs and copy them. */
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status = efi_call_early(allocate_pool, EFI_LOADER_DATA,
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sizeof(*log_tbl) + log_size,
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(void **) &log_tbl);
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if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
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efi_printk(sys_table_arg,
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"Unable to allocate memory for event log\n");
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return;
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}
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/*
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* Figure out whether any events have already been logged to the
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* final events structure, and if so how much space they take up
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*/
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if (version == EFI_TCG2_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT_TCG_2)
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final_events_table = get_efi_config_table(sys_table_arg,
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LINUX_EFI_TPM_FINAL_LOG_GUID);
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if (final_events_table && final_events_table->nr_events) {
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struct tcg_pcr_event2_head *header;
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int offset;
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void *data;
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int event_size;
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int i = final_events_table->nr_events;
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data = (void *)final_events_table;
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offset = sizeof(final_events_table->version) +
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sizeof(final_events_table->nr_events);
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while (i > 0) {
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header = data + offset + final_events_size;
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event_size = __calc_tpm2_event_size(header,
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(void *)(long)log_location,
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false);
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final_events_size += event_size;
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i--;
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}
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}
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memset(log_tbl, 0, sizeof(*log_tbl) + log_size);
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log_tbl->size = log_size;
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log_tbl->final_events_preboot_size = final_events_size;
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log_tbl->version = version;
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memcpy(log_tbl->log, (void *) first_entry_addr, log_size);
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status = efi_call_early(install_configuration_table,
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&linux_eventlog_guid, log_tbl);
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if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
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goto err_free;
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return;
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err_free:
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efi_call_early(free_pool, log_tbl);
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}
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