android_kernel_xiaomi_sm8350/security
Stephen Smalley bbaca6c2e7 [PATCH] selinux: enhance selinux to always ignore private inodes
Hmmm...turns out to not be quite enough, as the /proc/sys inodes aren't truly
private to the fs, so we can run into them in a variety of security hooks
beyond just the inode hooks, such as security_file_permission (when reading
and writing them via the vfs helpers), security_sb_mount (when mounting other
filesystems on directories in proc like binfmt_misc), and deeper within the
security module itself (as in flush_unauthorized_files upon inheritance across
execve).  So I think we have to add an IS_PRIVATE() guard within SELinux, as
below.  Note however that the use of the private flag here could be confusing,
as these inodes are _not_ private to the fs, are exposed to userspace, and
security modules must implement the sysctl hook to get any access control over
them.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-02-14 08:10:00 -08:00
..
keys [PATCH] remove many unneeded #includes of sched.h 2007-02-14 08:09:54 -08:00
selinux [PATCH] selinux: enhance selinux to always ignore private inodes 2007-02-14 08:10:00 -08:00
capability.c
commoncap.c
dummy.c SELinux: Fix SA selection semantics 2006-12-02 21:21:34 -08:00
inode.c [PATCH] mark struct file_operations const 9 2007-02-12 09:48:46 -08:00
Kconfig
Makefile
root_plug.c
security.c [PATCH] remove many unneeded #includes of sched.h 2007-02-14 08:09:54 -08:00