464 lines
19 KiB
Groff
Executable File
464 lines
19 KiB
Groff
Executable File
.\" Automatically generated by Pod::Man 2.25 (Pod::Simple 3.16)
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.\" ========================================================================
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.\"
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.IX Title "SSL_CTX_SET_VERIFY 3"
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.TH SSL_CTX_SET_VERIFY 3 "2020-03-02" "1.1.1e-dev" "OpenSSL"
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.\" For nroff, turn off justification. Always turn off hyphenation; it makes
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.\" way too many mistakes in technical documents.
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.if n .ad l
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.nh
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.SH "NAME"
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SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx, SSL_CTX_set_verify, SSL_set_verify, SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth, SSL_set_verify_depth, SSL_verify_cb, SSL_verify_client_post_handshake, SSL_set_post_handshake_auth, SSL_CTX_set_post_handshake_auth \&\- set peer certificate verification parameters
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.SH "SYNOPSIS"
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.IX Header "SYNOPSIS"
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.Vb 1
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\& #include <openssl/ssl.h>
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\&
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\& typedef int (*SSL_verify_cb)(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX *x509_ctx);
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\&
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\& void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode, SSL_verify_cb verify_callback);
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\& void SSL_set_verify(SSL *ssl, int mode, SSL_verify_cb verify_callback);
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\& SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void);
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\&
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\& void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int depth);
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\& void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *ssl, int depth);
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\&
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\& int SSL_verify_client_post_handshake(SSL *ssl);
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\& void SSL_CTX_set_post_handshake_auth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int val);
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\& void SSL_set_post_handshake_auth(SSL *ssl, int val);
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.Ve
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.SH "DESCRIPTION"
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.IX Header "DESCRIPTION"
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\&\fISSL_CTX_set_verify()\fR sets the verification flags for \fBctx\fR to be \fBmode\fR and
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specifies the \fBverify_callback\fR function to be used. If no callback function
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shall be specified, the \s-1NULL\s0 pointer can be used for \fBverify_callback\fR.
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.PP
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\&\fISSL_set_verify()\fR sets the verification flags for \fBssl\fR to be \fBmode\fR and
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specifies the \fBverify_callback\fR function to be used. If no callback function
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shall be specified, the \s-1NULL\s0 pointer can be used for \fBverify_callback\fR. In
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this case last \fBverify_callback\fR set specifically for this \fBssl\fR remains. If
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no special \fBcallback\fR was set before, the default callback for the underlying
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\&\fBctx\fR is used, that was valid at the time \fBssl\fR was created with
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\&\fISSL_new\fR\|(3). Within the callback function,
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\&\fBSSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx\fR can be called to get the data index
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of the current \s-1SSL\s0 object that is doing the verification.
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.PP
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\&\fISSL_CTX_set_verify_depth()\fR sets the maximum \fBdepth\fR for the certificate chain
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verification that shall be allowed for \fBctx\fR.
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.PP
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\&\fISSL_set_verify_depth()\fR sets the maximum \fBdepth\fR for the certificate chain
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verification that shall be allowed for \fBssl\fR.
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.PP
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\&\fISSL_CTX_set_post_handshake_auth()\fR and \fISSL_set_post_handshake_auth()\fR enable the
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Post-Handshake Authentication extension to be added to the ClientHello such that
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post-handshake authentication can be requested by the server. If \fBval\fR is 0
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then the extension is not sent, otherwise it is. By default the extension is not
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sent. A certificate callback will need to be set via
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\&\fISSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb()\fR if no certificate is provided at initialization.
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.PP
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\&\fISSL_verify_client_post_handshake()\fR causes a CertificateRequest message to be
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sent by a server on the given \fBssl\fR connection. The \s-1SSL_VERIFY_PEER\s0 flag must
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be set; the \s-1SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE\s0 flag is optional.
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.SH "NOTES"
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.IX Header "NOTES"
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The verification of certificates can be controlled by a set of logically
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or'ed \fBmode\fR flags:
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.IP "\s-1SSL_VERIFY_NONE\s0" 4
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.IX Item "SSL_VERIFY_NONE"
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\&\fBServer mode:\fR the server will not send a client certificate request to the
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client, so the client will not send a certificate.
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.Sp
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\&\fBClient mode:\fR if not using an anonymous cipher (by default disabled), the
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server will send a certificate which will be checked. The result of the
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certificate verification process can be checked after the \s-1TLS/SSL\s0 handshake
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using the \fISSL_get_verify_result\fR\|(3) function.
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The handshake will be continued regardless of the verification result.
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.IP "\s-1SSL_VERIFY_PEER\s0" 4
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.IX Item "SSL_VERIFY_PEER"
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\&\fBServer mode:\fR the server sends a client certificate request to the client.
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The certificate returned (if any) is checked. If the verification process
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fails, the \s-1TLS/SSL\s0 handshake is
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immediately terminated with an alert message containing the reason for
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the verification failure.
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The behaviour can be controlled by the additional
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\&\s-1SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT\s0, \s-1SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE\s0 and
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\&\s-1SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE\s0 flags.
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.Sp
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\&\fBClient mode:\fR the server certificate is verified. If the verification process
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fails, the \s-1TLS/SSL\s0 handshake is
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immediately terminated with an alert message containing the reason for
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the verification failure. If no server certificate is sent, because an
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anonymous cipher is used, \s-1SSL_VERIFY_PEER\s0 is ignored.
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.IP "\s-1SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT\s0" 4
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.IX Item "SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT"
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\&\fBServer mode:\fR if the client did not return a certificate, the \s-1TLS/SSL\s0
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handshake is immediately terminated with a \*(L"handshake failure\*(R" alert.
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This flag must be used together with \s-1SSL_VERIFY_PEER\s0.
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.Sp
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\&\fBClient mode:\fR ignored (see \s-1BUGS\s0)
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.IP "\s-1SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE\s0" 4
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.IX Item "SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE"
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\&\fBServer mode:\fR only request a client certificate once during the
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connection. Do not ask for a client certificate again during
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renegotiation or post-authentication if a certificate was requested
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during the initial handshake. This flag must be used together with
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\&\s-1SSL_VERIFY_PEER\s0.
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.Sp
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\&\fBClient mode:\fR ignored (see \s-1BUGS\s0)
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.IP "\s-1SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE\s0" 4
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.IX Item "SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE"
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\&\fBServer mode:\fR the server will not send a client certificate request
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during the initial handshake, but will send the request via
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\&\fISSL_verify_client_post_handshake()\fR. This allows the \s-1SSL_CTX\s0 or \s-1SSL\s0
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to be configured for post-handshake peer verification before the
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handshake occurs. This flag must be used together with
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\&\s-1SSL_VERIFY_PEER\s0. TLSv1.3 only; no effect on pre\-TLSv1.3 connections.
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.Sp
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\&\fBClient mode:\fR ignored (see \s-1BUGS\s0)
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.PP
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If the \fBmode\fR is \s-1SSL_VERIFY_NONE\s0 none of the other flags may be set.
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.PP
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The actual verification procedure is performed either using the built-in
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verification procedure or using another application provided verification
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function set with
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\&\fISSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback\fR\|(3).
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The following descriptions apply in the case of the built-in procedure. An
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application provided procedure also has access to the verify depth information
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and the \fIverify_callback()\fR function, but the way this information is used
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may be different.
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.PP
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\&\fISSL_CTX_set_verify_depth()\fR and \fISSL_set_verify_depth()\fR set a limit on the
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number of certificates between the end-entity and trust-anchor certificates.
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Neither the
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end-entity nor the trust-anchor certificates count against \fBdepth\fR. If the
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certificate chain needed to reach a trusted issuer is longer than \fBdepth+2\fR,
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X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG will be issued.
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The depth count is \*(L"level 0:peer certificate\*(R", \*(L"level 1: \s-1CA\s0 certificate\*(R",
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\&\*(L"level 2: higher level \s-1CA\s0 certificate\*(R", and so on. Setting the maximum
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depth to 2 allows the levels 0, 1, 2 and 3 (0 being the end-entity and 3 the
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trust-anchor).
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The default depth limit is 100,
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allowing for the peer certificate, at most 100 intermediate \s-1CA\s0 certificates and
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a final trust anchor certificate.
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.PP
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The \fBverify_callback\fR function is used to control the behaviour when the
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\&\s-1SSL_VERIFY_PEER\s0 flag is set. It must be supplied by the application and
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receives two arguments: \fBpreverify_ok\fR indicates, whether the verification of
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the certificate in question was passed (preverify_ok=1) or not
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(preverify_ok=0). \fBx509_ctx\fR is a pointer to the complete context used
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for the certificate chain verification.
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.PP
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The certificate chain is checked starting with the deepest nesting level
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(the root \s-1CA\s0 certificate) and worked upward to the peer's certificate.
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At each level signatures and issuer attributes are checked. Whenever
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a verification error is found, the error number is stored in \fBx509_ctx\fR
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and \fBverify_callback\fR is called with \fBpreverify_ok\fR=0. By applying
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X509_CTX_store_* functions \fBverify_callback\fR can locate the certificate
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in question and perform additional steps (see \s-1EXAMPLES\s0). If no error is
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found for a certificate, \fBverify_callback\fR is called with \fBpreverify_ok\fR=1
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before advancing to the next level.
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.PP
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The return value of \fBverify_callback\fR controls the strategy of the further
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verification process. If \fBverify_callback\fR returns 0, the verification
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process is immediately stopped with \*(L"verification failed\*(R" state. If
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\&\s-1SSL_VERIFY_PEER\s0 is set, a verification failure alert is sent to the peer and
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the \s-1TLS/SSL\s0 handshake is terminated. If \fBverify_callback\fR returns 1,
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the verification process is continued. If \fBverify_callback\fR always returns
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1, the \s-1TLS/SSL\s0 handshake will not be terminated with respect to verification
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failures and the connection will be established. The calling process can
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however retrieve the error code of the last verification error using
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\&\fISSL_get_verify_result\fR\|(3) or by maintaining its
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own error storage managed by \fBverify_callback\fR.
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.PP
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If no \fBverify_callback\fR is specified, the default callback will be used.
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Its return value is identical to \fBpreverify_ok\fR, so that any verification
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failure will lead to a termination of the \s-1TLS/SSL\s0 handshake with an
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alert message, if \s-1SSL_VERIFY_PEER\s0 is set.
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.PP
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After calling \fISSL_set_post_handshake_auth()\fR, the client will need to add a
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certificate or certificate callback to its configuration before it can
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successfully authenticate. This must be called before \fISSL_connect()\fR.
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.PP
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\&\fISSL_verify_client_post_handshake()\fR requires that verify flags have been
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previously set, and that a client sent the post-handshake authentication
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extension. When the client returns a certificate the verify callback will be
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invoked. A write operation must take place for the Certificate Request to be
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sent to the client, this can be done with \fISSL_do_handshake()\fR or \fISSL_write_ex()\fR.
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Only one certificate request may be outstanding at any time.
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.PP
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When post-handshake authentication occurs, a refreshed NewSessionTicket
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message is sent to the client.
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.SH "BUGS"
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.IX Header "BUGS"
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In client mode, it is not checked whether the \s-1SSL_VERIFY_PEER\s0 flag
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is set, but whether any flags other than \s-1SSL_VERIFY_NONE\s0 are set. This can
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lead to unexpected behaviour if \s-1SSL_VERIFY_PEER\s0 and other flags are not used as
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required.
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.SH "RETURN VALUES"
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.IX Header "RETURN VALUES"
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The SSL*_set_verify*() functions do not provide diagnostic information.
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.PP
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The \fISSL_verify_client_post_handshake()\fR function returns 1 if the request
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succeeded, and 0 if the request failed. The error stack can be examined
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to determine the failure reason.
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.SH "EXAMPLES"
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.IX Header "EXAMPLES"
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The following code sequence realizes an example \fBverify_callback\fR function
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that will always continue the \s-1TLS/SSL\s0 handshake regardless of verification
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failure, if wished. The callback realizes a verification depth limit with
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more informational output.
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.PP
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All verification errors are printed; information about the certificate chain
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is printed on request.
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The example is realized for a server that does allow but not require client
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certificates.
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.PP
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The example makes use of the ex_data technique to store application data
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into/retrieve application data from the \s-1SSL\s0 structure
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(see \fICRYPTO_get_ex_new_index\fR\|(3),
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\&\fISSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx\fR\|(3)).
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.PP
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.Vb 7
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\& ...
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\& typedef struct {
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\& int verbose_mode;
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\& int verify_depth;
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\& int always_continue;
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\& } mydata_t;
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\& int mydata_index;
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\&
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\& ...
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\& static int verify_callback(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
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\& {
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\& char buf[256];
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\& X509 *err_cert;
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\& int err, depth;
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\& SSL *ssl;
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\& mydata_t *mydata;
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\&
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\& err_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
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\& err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
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\& depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
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\&
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\& /*
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\& * Retrieve the pointer to the SSL of the connection currently treated
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\& * and the application specific data stored into the SSL object.
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\& */
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\& ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx());
|
|
\& mydata = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, mydata_index);
|
|
\&
|
|
\& X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(err_cert), buf, 256);
|
|
\&
|
|
\& /*
|
|
\& * Catch a too long certificate chain. The depth limit set using
|
|
\& * SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth() is by purpose set to "limit+1" so
|
|
\& * that whenever the "depth>verify_depth" condition is met, we
|
|
\& * have violated the limit and want to log this error condition.
|
|
\& * We must do it here, because the CHAIN_TOO_LONG error would not
|
|
\& * be found explicitly; only errors introduced by cutting off the
|
|
\& * additional certificates would be logged.
|
|
\& */
|
|
\& if (depth > mydata\->verify_depth) {
|
|
\& preverify_ok = 0;
|
|
\& err = X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG;
|
|
\& X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, err);
|
|
\& }
|
|
\& if (!preverify_ok) {
|
|
\& printf("verify error:num=%d:%s:depth=%d:%s\en", err,
|
|
\& X509_verify_cert_error_string(err), depth, buf);
|
|
\& } else if (mydata\->verbose_mode) {
|
|
\& printf("depth=%d:%s\en", depth, buf);
|
|
\& }
|
|
\&
|
|
\& /*
|
|
\& * At this point, err contains the last verification error. We can use
|
|
\& * it for something special
|
|
\& */
|
|
\& if (!preverify_ok && (err == X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT)) {
|
|
\& X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(err_cert), buf, 256);
|
|
\& printf("issuer= %s\en", buf);
|
|
\& }
|
|
\&
|
|
\& if (mydata\->always_continue)
|
|
\& return 1;
|
|
\& else
|
|
\& return preverify_ok;
|
|
\& }
|
|
\& ...
|
|
\&
|
|
\& mydata_t mydata;
|
|
\&
|
|
\& ...
|
|
\& mydata_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, "mydata index", NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
|
\&
|
|
\& ...
|
|
\& SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE,
|
|
\& verify_callback);
|
|
\&
|
|
\& /*
|
|
\& * Let the verify_callback catch the verify_depth error so that we get
|
|
\& * an appropriate error in the logfile.
|
|
\& */
|
|
\& SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(verify_depth + 1);
|
|
\&
|
|
\& /*
|
|
\& * Set up the SSL specific data into "mydata" and store it into th SSL
|
|
\& * structure.
|
|
\& */
|
|
\& mydata.verify_depth = verify_depth; ...
|
|
\& SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, mydata_index, &mydata);
|
|
\&
|
|
\& ...
|
|
\& SSL_accept(ssl); /* check of success left out for clarity */
|
|
\& if (peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl)) {
|
|
\& if (SSL_get_verify_result(ssl) == X509_V_OK) {
|
|
\& /* The client sent a certificate which verified OK */
|
|
\& }
|
|
\& }
|
|
.Ve
|
|
.SH "SEE ALSO"
|
|
.IX Header "SEE ALSO"
|
|
\&\fIssl\fR\|(7), \fISSL_new\fR\|(3),
|
|
\&\fISSL_CTX_get_verify_mode\fR\|(3),
|
|
\&\fISSL_get_verify_result\fR\|(3),
|
|
\&\fISSL_CTX_load_verify_locations\fR\|(3),
|
|
\&\fISSL_get_peer_certificate\fR\|(3),
|
|
\&\fISSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback\fR\|(3),
|
|
\&\fISSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx\fR\|(3),
|
|
\&\fISSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb\fR\|(3),
|
|
\&\fICRYPTO_get_ex_new_index\fR\|(3)
|
|
.SH "HISTORY"
|
|
.IX Header "HISTORY"
|
|
The \s-1SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE\s0 option, and the \fISSL_verify_client_post_handshake()\fR
|
|
and \fISSL_set_post_handshake_auth()\fR functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
|
|
.SH "COPYRIGHT"
|
|
.IX Header "COPYRIGHT"
|
|
Copyright 2000\-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
|
.PP
|
|
Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the \*(L"License\*(R"). You may not use
|
|
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
|
|
in the file \s-1LICENSE\s0 in the source distribution or at
|
|
<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
|