Quickfix for issue #73

The API of the function is changed (for decryption, tag is now an input
parameter). With the old API it is impossible to confirm to the NIST
specification and a timing sidechannel leak is inevitable.
This commit is contained in:
Sebastian Verschoor 2015-08-21 14:40:15 +02:00 committed by Steffen Jaeckel
parent 38bfef2996
commit 25af184cd5
2 changed files with 45 additions and 20 deletions

View File

@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
/**
CCM encrypt/decrypt and produce an authentication tag
*1 'pt' and 'ct' can both be 'in' or 'out', depending on 'direction'
*1 'pt', 'ct' and 'tag' can both be 'in' or 'out', depending on 'direction'
@param cipher The index of the cipher desired
@param key The secret key to use
@ -33,8 +33,8 @@
@param pt [*1] The plaintext
@param ptlen The length of the plaintext (octets)
@param ct [*1] The ciphertext
@param tag [out] The destination tag
@param taglen [in/out] The max size and resulting size of the authentication tag
@param tag [*1] The destination tag
@param taglen The max size and resulting size of the authentication tag
@param direction Encrypt or Decrypt direction (0 or 1)
@return CRYPT_OK if successful
*/
@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ int ccm_memory(int cipher,
unsigned char *tag, unsigned long *taglen,
int direction)
{
unsigned char PAD[16], ctr[16], CTRPAD[16], b;
unsigned char PAD[16], ctr[16], CTRPAD[16], ptTag[16], b;
symmetric_key *skey;
int err;
unsigned long len, L, x, y, z, CTRlen;
@ -203,11 +203,9 @@ int ccm_memory(int cipher,
PAD[x++] ^= header[y];
}
/* remainder? */
if (x != 0) {
if ((err = cipher_descriptor[cipher].ecb_encrypt(PAD, PAD, skey)) != CRYPT_OK) {
goto error;
}
/* remainder */
if ((err = cipher_descriptor[cipher].ecb_encrypt(PAD, PAD, skey)) != CRYPT_OK) {
goto error;
}
}
@ -254,7 +252,7 @@ int ccm_memory(int cipher,
goto error;
}
}
} else {
} else { /* direction == CCM_DECRYPT */
for (; y < (ptlen & ~15); y += 16) {
/* increment the ctr? */
for (z = 15; z > 15-L; z--) {
@ -328,11 +326,34 @@ int ccm_memory(int cipher,
cipher_descriptor[cipher].done(skey);
}
/* store the TAG */
for (x = 0; x < 16 && x < *taglen; x++) {
tag[x] = PAD[x] ^ CTRPAD[x];
if (direction == CCM_ENCRYPT) {
/* store the TAG */
for (x = 0; x < 16 && x < *taglen; x++) {
tag[x] = PAD[x] ^ CTRPAD[x];
}
*taglen = x;
} else { /* direction == CCM_DECRYPT */
/* decrypt the tag */
for (x = 0; x < 16 && x < *taglen; x++) {
ptTag[x] = tag[x] ^ CTRPAD[x];
}
*taglen = x;
/* check validity of the decrypted tag against the computed PAD (in constant time) */
/* HACK: the boolean value of XMEM_NEQ becomes either 0 (CRYPT_OK) or 1 (CRYPT_ERR).
* there should be a better way of setting the correct error code in constant
* time.
*/
err = XMEM_NEQ(ptTag, PAD, *taglen);
/* TODO: pt should not be revealed when the tag is invalid. However, resetting the
* memory should be done in constant time, which is not the case in the
* (commented) code below.
if (err != CRYPT_OK) {
zeromem(pt, ptlen);
}
*/
}
*taglen = x;
#ifdef LTC_CLEAN_STACK
zeromem(skey, sizeof(*skey));

View File

@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ int ccm_test(void)
tests[x].header, tests[x].headerlen,
buf2, tests[x].ptlen,
buf,
tag2, &taglen, 1 )) != CRYPT_OK) {
tests[x].tag, &taglen, 1 )) != CRYPT_OK) {
return err;
}
} else {
@ -224,13 +224,17 @@ int ccm_test(void)
#endif
return CRYPT_FAIL_TESTVECTOR;
}
if (XMEMCMP(tag2, tests[x].tag, tests[x].taglen)) {
/* Only check the tag if ccm_memory was not called: ccm_memory already
validates the tag */
if (y != 0) {
if (XMEMCMP(tag2, tests[x].tag, tests[x].taglen)) {
#if defined(LTC_TEST_DBG)
printf("\n%d: x=%lu y=%lu\n", __LINE__, x, y);
print_hex("tag is ", tag, tests[x].taglen);
print_hex("tag should", tests[x].tag, tests[x].taglen);
printf("\n%d: x=%lu y=%lu\n", __LINE__, x, y);
print_hex("tag is ", tag, tests[x].taglen);
print_hex("tag should", tests[x].tag, tests[x].taglen);
#endif
return CRYPT_FAIL_TESTVECTOR;
return CRYPT_FAIL_TESTVECTOR;
}
}
if (y == 0) {
cipher_descriptor[idx].done(&skey);